330 U.S. 1, 12 (1947)
In 1940 interested members of the Jewish, Roman Catholic, and Protestant faiths formed the Champaign Council on Religious Education and obtained permission from the Board of Education of School District No. 71 to offer weekly classes in religious instruction to public school pupils in grades four through nine.1
Classes met for thirty minutes in the lower grades and forty-five minutes in the higher grades, were held in regular public school classrooms, and were taught by instructors employed and paid by the Council but subject to the approval and supervision of the school superintendent.2
Parents signed printed request cards designating the religious group their children would attend.3 Pupils whose parents consented were released from their regular secular classes to attend the religious instruction; pupils who did not participate were required to leave their classrooms and pursue secular studies elsewhere in the school building.4 Attendance or absence from the religious classes was reported to the secular teachers using the same forms used for other subjects.5
Illinois law required children aged seven to sixteen to attend the tax-supported public schools during regular hours unless they attended approved private or parochial schools.6 Vashti McCollum, a resident and taxpayer whose child was enrolled in the Champaign public schools, filed a petition for mandamus in the Circuit Court of Champaign County seeking an order directing the Board to prohibit all religious instruction in the public schools.7
The Board answered that the program did not violate the state or federal constitutions.8 After evidence was presented and findings of fact were made, the trial court denied the petition.9 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.10 McCollum appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.11
Whether the Champaign released-time religious instruction program violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment?12
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits any law respecting an establishment of religion.13 The Fourteenth Amendment makes this prohibition applicable to the states.14 The clause erects a wall of separation between church and state that forbids the use of the tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups in the dissemination of their doctrines.15
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that in 1940 the Champaign Council on Religious Education obtained permission from the Board of Education to hold weekly religious classes in regular public school classrooms during school hours for pupils in grades four through nine.16 Instructors were paid by the Council but subject to the approval and supervision of the school superintendent.17 Pupils were released from compulsory secular classes upon parental consent while nonparticipants were required to pursue secular studies elsewhere in the building.18
Attendance was reported to secular teachers using standard forms.19
The Champaign released-time religious instruction program violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment.20
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Jackson, Rutledge, And Burton, Jj.
Justice Frankfurter explained that the principle of separation of church and state in education evolved from colonial times through fierce controversies in states like New York and Massachusetts to bar sectarian teaching from public schools.21 The Champaign program violated this principle by commingling sectarian instruction with secular education through the use of school time, property, and compulsory attendance machinery.22 This created inherent pressure on children to attend and sharpened religious differences among students.23
The concurrence stressed that the public school must remain free from entanglement in sectarian strife to promote cohesion among a heterogeneous people.24
Justice Jackson joined the result but expressed reservations about the breadth of the relief sought.25 He noted that the complaint demanded an extraordinarily broad mandamus that would ban every form of teaching suggesting the existence of God and would prohibit recitation of statements such as the Twenty-Third Psalm.26 Federal courts should limit interference with local school authorities to cases involving clear invasions of personal liberty or substantial taxpayer injury.27
He observed that the practical difficulty of isolating all religious influences from subjects such as literature, history, art, and music makes a sweeping constitutional rule unwise.28 Local school boards need flexibility to accommodate differing community needs without constant federal judicial oversight.29
Justice Reed maintained that historical American practices of cooperation between government and religion demonstrate that the First Amendment does not forbid every friendly gesture between church and state.30 He cited chaplains in Congress and the armed forces, Bible reading and prayer in public schools, tax exemptions for churches, and the use of public buildings for religious purposes as long-accepted traditions.31 The Champaign program involved only incidental use of school facilities and the release of pupils during school hours without establishing a religion or prohibiting free exercise.32
He argued that the incidental advantages religious groups receive from organized society do not constitute unconstitutional aid.33
Whether the use of tax-supported public school buildings and the compulsory education system to facilitate weekly religious classes during school hours constitutes an establishment of religion?34
The Establishment Clause prohibits the utilization of tax-established and tax-supported public school buildings and the state's compulsory education machinery to assist religious sects in providing instruction to pupils released from secular classes during regular school hours.35
Yes. The established facts establish that classes were conducted in regular public school classrooms.36 Students were released from their legal duty to attend secular classes only upon the condition that they attend the religious classes.37 The school superintendent approved instructors and received attendance reports, thereby placing the power and influence of the public school system behind the religious program.38
The use of tax-supported public school buildings and the compulsory education system to facilitate the religious classes constitutes an establishment of religion.39
Whether the coordination between public school authorities and private religious groups in operating the program breaches the constitutional separation of church and state?40
The Establishment Clause requires strict separation and prohibits close cooperation between school authorities and religious councils that integrates religious instruction into the public school program through shared facilities, scheduling, and supervisory approval.41
Yes. The established facts show that the Board of Education granted permission for the classes.42 The superintendent exercised approval and supervision over the religious instructors.43 The public school machinery was used to distribute request cards, release students, and report attendance, creating an impermissible fusion of governmental and religious functions.44
The coordination between public school authorities and private religious groups breaches the constitutional separation of church and state.45