Also known as:religious exemptions · religious accommodation
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional or statutory allowance relieving a person or entity from complying with a neutral law of general applicability when that law substantially burdens sincere religious exercise. The allowance arises either because the law contains a system of individualized exemptions that renders it not generally applicable or because a statute such as RFRA imposes strict scrutiny on federal mandates. Once triggered, the government must demonstrate that denying the exemption serves a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means of achieving it.
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Cases
How its tested
Common Examples
6
Unemployment Benefits After Peyote Use
Roland Rhodes, a member of the Native American Church, was fired after using peyote in a religious ceremony. State unemployment officials denied his claim under a neutral criminal prohibition on controlled substances. Because the prohibition is generally applicable and does not target religion, the denial of benefits stands.
Amish Parents Seek School Exemption
Rebecca Ross and her Amish community withdraw their children after eighth grade for religiously integrated apprenticeships. The state enforces compulsory attendance until age sixteen. The community's self-sufficiency and alternative education that meets state goals entitle the parents to an exemption.
Wisconsin v. Yoder406 U.S. 205 (1972)
In Green County, Wisconsin, respondents Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller are members of the Old Order Amish religion, and respondent Adin Yutzy is a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church. They and their families reside in Green County. Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law required them to cause their children to attend public or private school until reaching age 16. The respondents declined to send their children, ages 14 and 15, to public school after they completed the eighth grade.
The children involved were Frieda Yoder, aged 15, Barbara Miller, aged 15, and Vernon Yutzy, aged 14. All had graduated from the eighth grade of public school. On complaint of the school district administrator for the public schools, respondents were charged, tried, and convicted in Green County Court of violating the compulsory-attendance law. They were each fined the sum of five dollars.
At trial, respondents defended on the ground that application of the compulsory-attendance law violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial testimony showed that respondents believed, in accordance with the tenets of Old Order Amish communities generally, that their children's attendance at high school, public or private, was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life. The State stipulated that respondents' religious beliefs were sincere.
Expert witnesses, including scholars on religion and education such as Dr. John Hostetler and Dr. Donald A. Erickson, testified regarding the relationship of Amish beliefs to school attendance and the impact of compulsory high school attendance on Amish communities. The Wisconsin Circuit Court affirmed the convictions. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding that the compulsory school-attendance law violated respondents' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
On petition of the State of Wisconsin, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The record showed that the Amish have a history dating back to the 16th century Swiss Anabaptists and maintain a way of life emphasizing separation from the world, harmony with nature, and informal learning through doing on the family farm. Respondents presented evidence that an additional one or two years of formal high school education would do little to serve the state's interests in preparing citizens for political participation and self-sufficiency. The Amish have functioned effectively as a self-sufficient community for more than 200 years. There was no evidence in the record that any of the children in this case expressed a desire to attend high school against their parents' wishes.
Rhea Reynolds's small congregation seeks to expand its building but faces a city zoning rule under a neutral historic-preservation ordinance. The ordinance contains no individualized exemption mechanism and applies generally. The church does not receive a constitutional exemption because the law is neutral and generally applicable.
City of Boerne v. Flores521 U.S. 507 (1997)
St. Peter Catholic Church was built in 1923 in Boerne, Texas. Its structure replicates the mission style of the region's earlier history. The church seats about 230 worshippers, a number too small for its growing parish. Some 40 to 60 parishioners cannot be accommodated at some Sunday masses.
To meet the needs of the congregation, the Archbishop of San Antonio gave permission to the parish to plan alterations to enlarge the building.
A few months later, the Boerne City Council passed an ordinance authorizing the city's Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a preservation plan with proposed historic landmarks and districts. Under the ordinance, the commission must preapprove construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in a historic district.
Soon afterwards, the Archbishop applied for a building permit so construction to enlarge the church could proceed. City authorities, relying on the ordinance and the designation of a historic district which they argued included the church, denied the application.
The Archbishop brought this suit challenging the permit denial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The complaint contained multiple claims, but to this point the litigation has centered on RFRA and the question of its constitutionality. The District Court concluded that by enacting RFRA Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be constitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and now reverses.
Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith. RFRA prohibits government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. Unless the government can demonstrate that the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, it must also show that the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The Act applies to all federal and state law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the enactment of RFRA.
Santeria Ritual Ban Struck Down
Ronald Reed's Santeria church performs animal sacrifice as part of worship. The city enacts ordinances banning such sacrifices while permitting secular animal killings. Because the ordinances target religious conduct, the church receives an exemption under strict scrutiny.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah508 U.S. 520, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1993)
In April 1987 the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation organized under Florida law in 1973 whose president is Ernesto Pichardo, leased land in Hialeah, Florida, and announced plans to build a house of worship, school, cultural center, and museum at which members would practice Santeria.
Santeria originated in nineteenth-century Cuba as a fusion of Yoruba traditions and Roman Catholicism. It centers on animal sacrifice performed by cutting the carotid arteries, after which the animals are usually cooked and eaten except in healing and death rituals. The announcement prompted the Hialeah City Council to convene an emergency public session on June 9, 1987.
At that session residents and council members voiced strong opposition to Santeria practices. The council then adopted Resolution 87-66 declaring opposition to religious acts inconsistent with public morals, peace, or safety and passed Ordinance 87-40 incorporating Florida's animal-cruelty statute that criminalizes unnecessary or cruel killing of animals.
After the Florida attorney general issued an opinion that ritual animal sacrifice other than for food consumption violated state law, the council in August 1987 adopted Resolution 87-90 opposing ritual animal sacrifice. In September 1987 the council enacted three further ordinances. Ordinance 87-52 barred possession of animals with intent to use them for ritual sacrifice except by licensed food establishments. Ordinance 87-71 directly prohibited any person from sacrificing an animal within city limits. Ordinance 87-72 restricted slaughter of animals to properly zoned slaughterhouse premises while exempting small-scale commercial hog and cattle operations.
The Church and Pichardo filed suit against the city and its officials in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They alleged that the ordinances violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. After granting summary judgment to the individual defendants on immunity grounds, the district court conducted a nine-day bench trial on the remaining claims and entered judgment for the city. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Baker Refuses Same-Sex Wedding Cake
Rosalind Reed operates a bakery and declines to create a cake for a same-sex wedding on religious grounds. State officials investigate and express hostility toward her beliefs during the proceedings. The commission's demonstrated animus requires an exemption from the public-accommodations law.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)
In the summer of 2012, Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins, a same-sex couple planning to marry legally in Massachusetts and host a reception in Denver, visited Masterpiece Cakeshop in Lakewood, Colorado, owned and operated by Jack Phillips. Phillips, an expert baker and devout Christian who had owned the shop for twenty-four years, informed the couple that he would not create a wedding cake for their same-sex wedding because of his religious opposition to same-sex marriage. He offered to sell them other baked goods such as birthday cakes, shower cakes, cookies, and brownies. Craig and Mullins filed a discrimination complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights Division alleging that they had been denied full and equal service because of their sexual orientation in violation of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act.
The Division investigated the complaint. It found probable cause that Phillips had violated the Act. The Division determined that on multiple occasions he had turned away potential customers on the basis of sexual orientation. Phillips had declined to sell custom wedding cakes to about six other same-sex couples. The matter was referred to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The Commission sent the case to a state Administrative Law Judge for a formal hearing.
The ALJ granted summary judgment in favor of Craig and Mullins after rejecting Phillips' constitutional claims. The Commission affirmed the decision in full. It ordered Phillips to cease and desist from discriminating against same-sex couples. The Commission also required comprehensive staff training on the public accommodations provisions of the Act. Phillips had to submit quarterly compliance reports for two years documenting patrons denied service.
Phillips appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Commission's legal determinations and remedial order in 2016. The Colorado Supreme Court declined to hear the case. During public hearings before the Commission in May and July 2014, some commissioners stated that religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried into the public sphere or commercial domain. They described Phillips' invocation of his sincerely held religious beliefs as one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use. They compared it to defenses of slavery and the Holocaust. In three separate cases decided while Phillips' proceedings were pending, the Civil Rights Division concluded that other bakers had acted lawfully in declining to create cakes with decorations or messages that demeaned gay persons or gay marriages.
Phillips petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which the Court granted in 2017.
Closely Held Corporation Seeks RFRA Relief
Riley Rivera owns a closely held corporation whose religious beliefs prohibit providing certain contraceptive coverage. Federal regulations require the coverage. Because less restrictive means exist to achieve the government's interest, the corporation receives a statutory exemption under RFRA.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.573 U.S. 682 (2014)
In 2012 and 2013, three closely held for-profit corporations—Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., Mardel, Inc., and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp.—along with their owners, the Green and Hahn families, filed suits against the Secretary of Health and Human Services and other federal officials.
Hobby Lobby operates over 500 stores with more than 13,000 employees. Mardel runs 35 Christian bookstores with nearly 400 employees. Conestoga employs about 950 people in its woodworking business. The Green family owns and operates Hobby Lobby and Mardel. The Hahn family owns and operates Conestoga.
Both families hold sincere Christian religious beliefs that life begins at conception. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, employers with 50 or more full-time employees must provide group health insurance covering certain preventive services for women, including 20 FDA-approved contraceptive methods, without cost sharing. The Department of Health and Human Services issued regulations requiring coverage of all 20 methods. The Greens and Hahns object specifically to four methods because they believe these may prevent implantation of a fertilized egg, which they view as destroying an embryo in violation of their faith.
If the companies fail to provide the required coverage, they face penalties of $100 per day per affected employee, potentially reaching $475 million annually for Hobby Lobby, $33 million for Conestoga, and $15 million for Mardel. Alternatively, dropping coverage entirely could trigger penalties of $2,000 per employee per year. The companies and owners sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, seeking to enjoin the mandate as applied to the four objected-to methods.
The District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denied a preliminary injunction to the Greens and their companies. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the corporations could assert RFRA claims. In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the District Court denied a preliminary injunction to the Hahns and Conestoga. The Third Circuit affirmed, concluding that for-profit corporations cannot exercise religion under RFRA. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases.
4 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
When does a law's allowance of secular exemptions trigger strict scrutiny for religious claims?
A law is not generally applicable if it permits government officials to grant individualized exemptions for secular reasons. Once that system exists, the government must justify denying a comparable religious exemption under strict scrutiny. The presence of discretionary waivers for nonreligious hardship therefore converts rational-basis review into strict scrutiny.
Supporting sources
Does Smith bar all religious exemptions from neutral criminal laws?
Smith holds that the Free Exercise Clause does not require exemptions from neutral, generally applicable criminal prohibitions that incidentally burden religion. Absent evidence that the law targets religious practice, the state may enforce the prohibition even when it prevents a religious observance.
Supporting sources
What facts justify an exemption under the Yoder standard?
An exemption is warranted when parents belong to a self-sufficient, law-abiding religious community whose alternative education meets the state's core interests in literacy and civic preparation. The community's long-standing practices and the sincerity of the belief that formal schooling conflicts with faith are decisive.
Supporting sources
How does RFRA differ from the constitutional rule in Smith?
RFRA restores strict scrutiny for federal laws that substantially burden religious exercise even when the laws are neutral and generally applicable. Unlike the constitutional baseline, RFRA requires the government to show a compelling interest and least-restrictive means before denying an exemption to a closely held corporation or individual.
Supporting sources
religious
duty upon their children. Where the child is mature enough to express potentially conflicting desires, it would be an…
from the city's ordinances, concluded the court, would defeat the city's compelling interests in enforcing the prohibition. Id. , at 1487. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit…
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