573 U.S. 682 (2014)
In 2012 and 2013, three closely held for-profit corporations—Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., Mardel, Inc., and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp.—along with their owners, the Green and Hahn families, filed suits against the Secretary of Health and Human Services and other federal officials.1
Hobby Lobby operates over 500 stores with more than 13,000 employees.2 Mardel runs 35 Christian bookstores with nearly 400 employees.3 Conestoga employs about 950 people in its woodworking business.4 The Green family owns and operates Hobby Lobby and Mardel.5 The Hahn family owns and operates Conestoga.6
Both families hold sincere Christian religious beliefs that life begins at conception.7 Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, employers with 50 or more full-time employees must provide group health insurance covering certain preventive services for women, including 20 FDA-approved contraceptive methods, without cost sharing.8 The Department of Health and Human Services issued regulations requiring coverage of all 20 methods.9 The Greens and Hahns object specifically to four methods because they believe these may prevent implantation of a fertilized egg, which they view as destroying an embryo in violation of their faith.10
If the companies fail to provide the required coverage, they face penalties of $100 per day per affected employee, potentially reaching $475 million annually for Hobby Lobby, $33 million for Conestoga, and $15 million for Mardel.11 Alternatively, dropping coverage entirely could trigger penalties of $2,000 per employee per year.12 The companies and owners sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, seeking to enjoin the mandate as applied to the four objected-to methods.13
The District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denied a preliminary injunction to the Greens and their companies.14 The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the corporations could assert RFRA claims.15 In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the District Court denied a preliminary injunction to the Hahns and Conestoga.16 The Third Circuit affirmed, concluding that for-profit corporations cannot exercise religion under RFRA.17 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases.18
Whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 applies to regulations that govern the activities of closely held for-profit corporations?19
RFRA prohibits the Government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.20 The Government must demonstrate that the application of the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.21 RFRA defines person to include corporations under the Dictionary Act with no exclusion for for-profit entities.22
Yes. The three closely held for-profit corporations Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga are owned and operated by the Green and Hahn families.23 These families hold sincere Christian religious beliefs that life begins at conception.24 RFRA's text employs the Dictionary Act definition of person that expressly includes corporations.25
Nothing in RFRA or its purposes excludes for-profit corporations from protection when their owners direct business practices in accordance with religious tenets.26 The Supreme Court granted certiorari after the Tenth Circuit held that the Greens' businesses are persons under RFRA. The Third Circuit held that Conestoga and the Hahns could not bring RFRA claims because corporations cannot exercise religion.
RFRA applies to the regulations governing these closely held for-profit corporations.27
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Justice Kennedy agreed that RFRA applies to the closely held for-profit corporations in these cases.28 He wrote separately to emphasize that the statute protects religious freedom in the economic sphere when owners seek to exercise their beliefs through the corporate form they have chosen.29 Kennedy stressed that the existing accommodation framework already devised by HHS for religious nonprofits demonstrates that the Government can respect religious liberty without imposing the direct mandate on these employers.30
The means the Government chose is the imposition of a direct mandate on the employers in these cases. But in other instances the Government has allowed the same contraception coverage in issue here to be provided to employees of nonprofit religious organizations, as an accommodation to the religious objections of those entities. Kennedy concluded that on this record the Government has not met its burden of showing that it cannot accommodate the plaintiffs' similar religious objections under the established framework.31
Joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, And Kagan
Justice Ginsburg dissented on the ground that RFRA does not extend to for-profit corporations.32 She argued that the exercise of religion is characteristic of natural persons and nonprofit religious organizations formed to serve a community of believers, not artificial entities created to make money.33 Ginsburg maintained that extending RFRA to commercial enterprises would allow religion-based exemptions from generally applicable laws in ways Congress never intended.34
She observed that religious organizations exist to foster the interests of persons subscribing to the same religious faith while for-profit corporations use labor to make a profit.35 Ginsburg concluded that the Court's determination that RFRA extends to for-profit corporations is bound to have untoward effects because its logic extends to corporations of any size.36
Whether the contraceptive coverage mandate substantially burdens the exercise of religion by the owners of closely held corporations?37
A substantial burden under RFRA exists when government action requires a person to engage in conduct that seriously violates sincere religious beliefs.38 The question is whether the mandate interferes with the ability to conduct business in accordance with those beliefs rather than whether the beliefs are reasonable.
Yes. The Green and Hahn families sincerely believe that providing coverage for the four objected-to methods would facilitate the destruction of embryos in violation of their faith.39 The mandate requires the companies to arrange for such coverage or face penalties of approximately $475 million per year for Hobby Lobby, $33 million for Conestoga, and $15 million for Mardel.40 The connection between the required coverage and the moral wrong the families perceive is not too attenuated under precedents such as Thomas v. Review Board.41
The severe economic consequences confirm that the burden is substantial.42
The contraceptive coverage mandate substantially burdens the religious exercise of the owners of these closely held corporations.43
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Joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, And Kagan
Justice Ginsburg argued that the connection between the companies' provision of health insurance and the use of contraceptives by their employees is too attenuated to constitute a substantial burden.44 She maintained that the employees, not the companies, decide whether to use the contraceptives.45 Ginsburg concluded that the companies' religious beliefs are not substantially burdened by the requirement that they provide health insurance that covers contraceptives.46
She reasoned that any decision to use contraceptives made by a woman covered under the plan will not be propelled by the Government but will be the woman's autonomous choice informed by the physician she consults.47 Ginsburg emphasized that the requirement carries no command that the companies purchase or provide the contraceptives they find objectionable.48
Whether the Government has demonstrated that the contraceptive coverage mandate is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest?49
Even assuming a compelling interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods, the Government must show that the mandate is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest by demonstrating that no other means exist to achieve the goal without imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise.50
No. The Government has not shown that it lacks alternative means such as assuming the cost of providing the contraceptives or extending the existing accommodation already available to religious nonprofit organizations.51 That accommodation allows the issuer to provide separate payments for contraceptive services without cost sharing by the employer and without impinging on the employers' religious beliefs.52 The mandate therefore fails RFRA's least-restrictive-means requirement as applied to these closely held corporations.53
The Government has not demonstrated that the contraceptive coverage mandate is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.54
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Kagan
Justice Breyer joined Justice Ginsburg's dissent except for one subsection and agreed that the challenge fails on the merits.55 Breyer concluded that the plaintiffs had not established a substantial burden or that the mandate failed the least-restrictive-means test.56 He emphasized that the regulatory framework already balances religious liberty interests with the statutory goal of ensuring contraceptive access for women.57
Breyer noted that the Court need not decide whether for-profit corporations or their owners may bring claims under RFRA because the challenge fails regardless.58 He stressed that the existing accommodation already affords a workable balance between religious objections and the need to protect women's access to preventive care.59
Joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, And Kagan
Justice Ginsburg argued that even if the mandate imposed a substantial burden, it would survive RFRA scrutiny.60 She maintained that the Government has a compelling interest in guaranteeing that women have access to contraceptives without cost sharing.61 Ginsburg concluded that the mandate is the least restrictive means of advancing that interest and that extending the accommodation to for-profit corporations would undermine the Government's compelling interest in ensuring seamless contraceptive coverage.62
She observed that the accommodation already provided to religious nonprofits does not impinge on religious beliefs yet still serves the Government's stated interests.63 Ginsburg warned that the Court's decision opens the door to claims for religious exemptions from a wide variety of laws including those prohibiting discrimination in employment.64