Also known as: race neutral explanation · racially neutral explanation · race-neutral explanations
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A justification offered by a party exercising a peremptory challenge that does not rely on the race of the prospective juror. The justification must be clear and reasonably specific. It need not be persuasive or plausible at the second step of the inquiry.
Roger Ramirez stood trial for theft. The prosecutor struck two Black jurors who worked in software. When defense counsel raised a Batson objection, the prosecutor stated that the jurors' technical backgrounds might create sympathy for digital evidence issues. The court accepted the explanation as race-neutral and overruled the objection.
Roland Rhodes faced charges in state court. His counsel used peremptory challenges to remove all Black venire members. The prosecutor objected and demanded a race-neutral explanation. Defense counsel responded that the jurors appeared too sympathetic to law enforcement based on their answers during voir dire.
On August 10, 1990, a grand jury sitting in Dougherty County, Georgia, returned a six-count indictment charging respondents with aggravated assault and simple battery. The indictment alleged that respondents beat and assaulted Jerry and Myra Collins. Respondents are white; the alleged victims are African-Americans. Shortly after the events, a leaflet was widely distributed in the local African-American community reporting the assault and urging community residents not to patronize respondents' business. Before jury selection began, the prosecution moved to prohibit respondents from exercising peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. The State explained that it expected to show that the victims' race was a factor in the alleged assault. According to the State, counsel for respondents had indicated a clear intention to use peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner, arguing that the circumstances of their case gave them the right to exclude African-American citizens from participating as jurors in the trial. Observing that 43 percent of the county's population is African-American, the State contended that, if a statistically representative panel is assembled for jury selection, 18 of the potential 42 jurors would be African-American. With 20 peremptory challenges, respondents therefore would be able to remove all the African-American potential jurors. The trial judge denied the State's motion, holding that neither Georgia nor federal law prohibits criminal defendants from exercising peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. The issue was certified for immediate appeal. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court's ruling. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the state and federal courts on the issue.
View caseRavi Reddy sued Ridgeway Partners for contract damages. The defense struck every Black prospective juror. Reddy objected on equal protection grounds. The court required Ridgeway's counsel to articulate a race-neutral explanation tied to the jurors' responses rather than their race.
Thaddeus Donald Edmonson, a black construction worker, was injured in a jobsite accident at Fort Polk, Louisiana, a federal enclave, when a Leesville Concrete Company employee permitted one of the company's trucks to roll backward and pin him against some construction equipment. Edmonson sued Leesville Concrete Company for negligence in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana and invoked his Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury. During voir dire, Leesville used two of its three peremptory challenges authorized by statute to remove black persons from the prospective jury. Edmonson, who is himself black, requested that the District Court require Leesville to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the two jurors, but the District Court denied the request on the ground that Batson does not apply in civil proceedings. As empaneled, the jury included 11 white persons and 1 black person. The jury rendered a verdict for Edmonson, assessing his total damages at $90,000, but attributed 80% of the fault to Edmonson's contributory negligence and awarded him the sum of $18,000. Edmonson appealed, and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Batson applies to private litigants in civil trials. The full court then ordered rehearing en banc and affirmed the judgment of the District Court, holding that a private litigant in a civil case can exercise peremptory challenges without accountability for alleged racial classifications. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue.
View caseRenata Russo challenged her conviction years later on the ground that the prosecutor had failed to supply race-neutral explanations for strikes. The reviewing court held that the requirement for such explanations did not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review.
Petitioner Teague, a black man, was convicted in an Illinois state court of three counts of attempted murder, two counts of armed robbery, and one count of aggravated battery by an all-white jury. During jury selection for petitioner's trial, the prosecutor used all 10 of his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks. Petitioner's counsel used one of his 10 peremptory challenges to exclude a black woman who was married to a police officer. After the prosecutor had struck six blacks, petitioner's counsel moved for a mistrial. When the prosecutor struck four more blacks, petitioner's counsel again moved for a mistrial, arguing that petitioner was entitled to a jury of his peers. The prosecutor defended the challenges by stating that he was trying to achieve a balance of men and women on the jury. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the jury appeared to be a fair one. On appeal, petitioner argued that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges denied him the right to be tried by a jury that was representative of the community. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected petitioner's fair cross section claim. The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1983. Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Petitioner repeated his fair cross section claim, and argued that the opinions of several Justices concurring in, or dissenting from, the denial of certiorari in McCray v. New York had invited a reexamination of Swain v. Alabama. The District Court, though sympathetic to petitioner's arguments, held that it was bound by Swain and Circuit precedent. On appeal, petitioner repeated his fair cross section claim and his McCray argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner that the Sixth Amendment's fair cross section requirement applied to the petit jury and held that petitioner had made out a prima facie case of discrimination. A majority of the judges on the Court of Appeals voted to rehear the case en banc, and the panel opinion was vacated. Rehearing was postponed until after Batson v. Kentucky was decided. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner could not benefit from the rule in that case because Allen v. Hardy had held that Batson would not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Court of Appeals also held that petitioner's Swain claim was procedurally barred and in any event meritless. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's fair cross section claim, holding that the fair cross section requirement was limited to the jury venire. Petitioner's conviction became final two and a half years prior to Batson.
View caseRosalind Reed challenged a legislative district map as racially gerrymandered. The state defended the lines by asserting race-neutral political considerations. The court examined whether the offered explanation was credible or merely a pretext for racial sorting of voters.
After the 1990 census, North Carolina’s congressional delegation increased from eleven to twelve members. The State General Assembly adopted Chapter 601, which created one majority-black district known as District 1 in the northeastern region of the state. The legislature submitted the plan to the Attorney General of the United States for preclearance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights objected because the plan failed to give effect to black and Native American voting strength in the south-central to southeastern part of the state. The legislature then enacted Chapter 7, which added a second majority-black district, District 12, located in the north-central Piedmont region rather than the area specified in the objection letter. The Attorney General precleared the revised plan. District 1 is hook shaped, extending from the northeast with finger-like extensions into the southern part of the state near the South Carolina border. District 12 stretches approximately 160 miles along the Interstate 85 corridor in snakelike fashion through tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas. Five North Carolinians filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina against state officials. After the Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s initial dismissal in Shaw v. Reno, the case proceeded to a six-day trial on remand. The District Court unanimously found that the plan’s lines were deliberately drawn to produce one or more districts of a specific racial composition. A majority of the District Court upheld the plan as constitutional, while one judge dissented, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. Two of the appellants, Ruth Shaw and Melvin Shimm, reside in District 12.
View caseA party must first establish a prima facie case by showing a pattern of strikes against members of a cognizable racial group that raises an inference of discrimination. Once that showing is made, the burden shifts to the striking party to articulate a race-neutral explanation.
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No. The explanation need only be clear, reasonably specific, and facially race-neutral. The persuasiveness of the reason is assessed only at the third step when the court determines whether purposeful discrimination has been proven.
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Yes. Jury selection is a traditional governmental function conducted under court supervision. A private litigant exercising peremptory challenges therefore engages in state action and must supply a race-neutral explanation when a prima facie case of discrimination is shown.
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The court must sustain the objection, disallow the discriminatory strikes, and apply an appropriate remedy such as reseating the improperly struck jurors or beginning jury selection anew.
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