317 N.C. 1, 343 S.E.2d 814 (1986)
On 15 March 1981, Leslie Hall Kennedy, a student at North Carolina State University, was living alone in one of three apartments at 207 Cox Avenue in Raleigh while her husband worked in Florida.1 The lock on her front door often failed to catch, and she usually neglected to close the bolt lock.2
At approximately 9:00 p.m., she spoke with her husband by telephone for twenty-five minutes and told him she planned to sit in bed and read.3 Around 10:35 p.m., neighbors Ron Riggan, Ivan Dickey, and Jamie Morehead heard two loud, piercing screams from Kennedy's apartment.4 Riggan, Dickey, and Morehead went to investigate and observed blood on the front porch.5 They heard a loud laugh from the direction of Pullen Park.6
The defendant approached and stated that a girl had told him she heard someone scream.7 The three men entered the apartment through the open front door and found Kennedy lying on a bed with blood beneath her arm.8 Riggan and Dickey left to call the police while the defendant remained inside briefly before emerging and remarking that somebody had messed her up bad.9 The defendant later walked away from the scene after police arrived.10
An autopsy performed the next day showed that Kennedy died from a stab wound extending completely through her body from the middle of her back to above her left breast.11 The wound could have been caused by a ten-inch butcher knife.12 Kennedy's husband noticed that such a knife was missing from the kitchen rack.13 On 31 March 1981, police found a matching butcher knife near railroad tracks a short distance from the apartment.14
After three interviews, on 8 April 1981 the defendant stated that he had met Kennedy on 13 March, visited her apartment on 15 March at her invitation, touched her while she was in bed, and stabbed her in the back with a knife from beside the bed when she screamed before fleeing toward Pullen Park.15 The defendant returned to the apartment after hiding the knife, joined the neighbors, entered the house again, and placed a steel file in the knife rack.16 The defendant stated that he retrieved the knife and threw it away near some railroad tracks and then went home.17 At trial the defendant presented no evidence.18 The jury found him guilty of first-degree murder and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment.19 The case reached this Court after a prior appeal in which the admissibility of the defendant's statement was upheld.20
Whether the defendant's April 8, 1981 statement was admissible at trial?21
Under the law of the case doctrine, a prior appellate ruling on an issue is conclusive in subsequent proceedings when the evidence presented is virtually identical.22 A confession obtained during custodial interrogation without probable cause is inadmissible under Dunaway v. New York, and any statement must also have been made voluntarily.23
No. The evidence relating to the admissibility of the inculpatory statement made by the defendant is virtually identical to the evidence which was previously before the Court in State v. Jackson, 308 N.C. 549.24 The defendant failed to point to any evidence produced at trial which was not previously before the Court that tends to strengthen his argument that he was in custody at the time the statement was made or that the statement was not voluntarily made.25 The doctrine of the law of the case therefore applies to make the prior ruling conclusive.26
The April 8, 1981 statement was admissible at trial.27
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Branch And Justice Frye
Justice Exum dissented from that portion of the majority opinion which concludes defendant's confession was admissible.28 For the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion on the first appeal of this issue, in which Chief Justice Branch and Justice Frye joined, he dissents from the conclusion that the confession was admissible. Justice Exum joins in all other aspects of the Court's opinion in the present case.
Whether the defendant was entitled to fourteen peremptory challenges during jury selection?29
Under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1217(a), a defendant in a capital case is allowed fourteen peremptory challenges.30 N.C.G.S. § 15A-1217(b) provides only six challenges in a noncapital case.31 A capital case loses its capital nature when the prosecution announces that no evidence supports any aggravating factor upon which the jury could recommend a sentence of death.32
No. The prosecution announced prior to the commencement of jury selection that there was no evidence which would support a reasonable inference of any aggravating factor upon which the jury could recommend a sentence of death should the defendant be convicted of first-degree murder.33 The case therefore lost its capital nature. The defendant was entitled to only six peremptory challenges under established precedent holding that such an announcement removes the case from capital status.
The defendant was entitled to only six peremptory challenges.34
Whether the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges to remove black prospective jurors violated the Equal Protection Clause?35
Under Swain v. Alabama, a defendant claiming unconstitutional exclusion of black jurors must establish that the prosecutor engaged in a pattern of systematic use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the petit jury across multiple cases.36
No. The jury finally empaneled consisted of eleven whites and one black, and the State peremptorily excused four prospective black jurors.37 The prosecution stated that the prospective black jurors were not challenged on the basis of their race but were excluded because their backgrounds and family situations made them not the type of juror sought.38 Because Batson does not apply retroactively, the Swain standard governs. The defendant did not meet that standard by showing systematic exclusion across cases.
The prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.39
Whether the ruling in Batson v. Kentucky applies retroactively to this case pending on direct appeal?40
Retroactivity of new constitutional criminal procedure rules is analyzed under the framework of United States v. Johnson, Solem v. Stumes, and Shea v. Louisiana.41 A ruling that constitutes a clear break with the past by explicitly overruling prior precedent is not accorded retroactive effect even to cases pending on direct appeal, unless it bears substantially on the truth-finding process.42
No. Batson explicitly overruled the Swain requirement that a defendant show a history of systematic use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks, making it a clear break case.43 The ruling does not bear substantially on the truth-finding process, as it is not one that gave an accused the ability to effectively present his case or placed restrictions on the prosecution's ability to present improper evidence.44 Therefore Batson is not applied retroactively to this case pending on direct appeal at the time it was rendered.45
The ruling in Batson v. Kentucky does not apply retroactively to this case.46
Whether the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges violated the defendant's right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community?47
The Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement applies only to the pool from which the petit jurors are selected.48 It imposes no requirement that the petit jurors actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the distinctive groups in the population, as confirmed in Lockhart v. McCree.49
No. The defendant presented no evidence that the make-up of the venire panel from which the petit jury was selected violated the fair cross-section requirement.50 The fair cross-section principle does not extend to require that petit juries reflect the composition of the community at large or invalidate the use of peremptory challenges.51
The prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges did not violate the fair cross-section requirement.52
Whether the State presented sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to submit the first-degree murder charge to the jury?53
Before a charge may be submitted to the jury, the trial court must be satisfied that substantial evidence has been introduced tending to prove each essential element of the offense.54 First-degree murder requires an intentional and unlawful killing with malice, premeditation, and deliberation.55 Premeditation and deliberation may be proved by circumstantial evidence including want of provocation, the conduct of the defendant after the killing, the nature and number of wounds, and evidence that the killing was done in a brutal manner.56
Yes. There was no evidence that Mrs. Kennedy provoked the defendant.57 Following the killing the defendant remarked that somebody had messed her up bad and attempted to cover up his involvement by placing the steel file in the knife rack and disposing of the murder weapon.58 The knife was thrust into Mrs. Kennedy's back with such force that it went completely through her body.59
Evidence that as much as thirty to forty-five seconds may have elapsed between the initial scream and the final scream, together with the physical layout requiring the defendant to move from the bed to retrieve the knife, supports an inference that the fatal stab was not inflicted until the time of the second scream.60
The State presented sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to submit the first-degree murder charge to the jury.61