505 U.S. 42 (1992)
On August 10, 1990, a grand jury sitting in Dougherty County, Georgia, returned a six-count indictment charging respondents with aggravated assault and simple battery.1 The indictment alleged that respondents beat and assaulted Jerry and Myra Collins.2 Respondents are white; the alleged victims are African-Americans.3
Shortly after the events, a leaflet was widely distributed in the local African-American community reporting the assault and urging community residents not to patronize respondents' business.4
Before jury selection began, the prosecution moved to prohibit respondents from exercising peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner.5 The State explained that it expected to show that the victims' race was a factor in the alleged assault.6 According to the State, counsel for respondents had indicated a clear intention to use peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner, arguing that the circumstances of their case gave them the right to exclude African-American citizens from participating as jurors in the trial.7
Observing that 43 percent of the county's population is African-American, the State contended that, if a statistically representative panel is assembled for jury selection, 18 of the potential 42 jurors would be African-American.8 With 20 peremptory challenges, respondents therefore would be able to remove all the African-American potential jurors.9
The trial judge denied the State's motion, holding that neither Georgia nor federal law prohibits criminal defendants from exercising peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner.10 The issue was certified for immediate appeal.11 The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court's ruling.12 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the state and federal courts on the issue.13
Whether the Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from exercising peremptory challenges based on the race of the venirepersons?14
The exercise of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges offends the basic equal protection principles that undergird the Fourteenth Amendment.15 A criminal defendant's exercise of such challenges does not undermine the state action requirement of the Equal Protection Clause.16 The Constitution's guarantee of equal protection applies to the exercise of peremptory challenges by any litigant in a jury trial.17 The prohibition of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment's general mandate of equal protection. It is not limited to the defendant's right to a fair trial. Although the use of peremptory challenges is a venerable practice, it is not a right of either the defendant or the State.18
Yes. The Court applied this rule to the facts of McCollum's case. McCollum faced charges for a race-related assault in which the victims' race was alleged to be a factor.19 Counsel for respondents had indicated a clear intention to use peremptory strikes to exclude African-American venirepersons from the jury.20
Georgia law allowed respondents' 20 peremptory challenges to remove all such jurors from a panel that would statistically include about 18 African-Americans.21 This conduct inflicts the same dignitary harm on excluded jurors that the Court had recognized in prior cases and undermines public confidence in the judicial process, a concern heightened by the leaflet distributed in the community.22 The three-step Batson framework therefore governs the inquiry, requiring a prima facie showing of discrimination, a race-neutral explanation for the strike, and a trial court determination of purposeful discrimination.23
The Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from exercising peremptory challenges based on the race of the venirepersons.24
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment.25 He agreed that the Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from exercising peremptory challenges based on race.26 He viewed the extension of Batson as a logical application of the principles announced in that case and its progeny.27
He reached this conclusion even though he had dissented in Edmonson.28 His separate writing underscores the importance of maintaining doctrinal consistency across the Batson line despite his prior disagreement on state action in the civil context.29
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to express dissatisfaction with the Batson line of cases.30 He noted that as a matter of first impression he would have found no state action.31 Yet he accepted Edmonson as controlling precedent.32
He warned that restricting defendants' peremptory strikes inverts priorities by exalting jurors' rights over defendants' rights.33 He predicted that the decision will lead to the elimination of peremptory challenges altogether.34 This outcome would harm black defendants most by removing a traditional tool for securing a fair jury.35
Whether a criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges constitutes state action under the Equal Protection Clause?36
The peremptory challenge of a juror on the basis of race is a state action for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.37 Although private parties do not ordinarily trigger constitutional obligations, the Court has found state action where private parties make extensive use of state procedures with the overt, significant assistance of state officials.38 The government is responsible for the action when a private party acts as a state actor.39 The peremptory challenge system is an integral part of the trial process because the trial court provides the space, calls the venirepersons, oversees the challenges, dismisses struck jurors, administers the oath, and supervises deliberations.40
Yes. The Court applied the rule to the Georgia procedures at issue in this criminal trial. The trial court must supply the courtroom space, summon the venirepersons into the courtroom, oversee the peremptory challenges, dismiss the jurors who are struck, administer the oath to the jurors, and supervise the jury's deliberations.41 These steps render the defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges fairly attributable to the State as state action.42
The adversarial relationship between defendant and prosecutor does not negate this attribution because the defendant wields state-conferred power to shape the composition of the jury, a quintessential governmental body.43 The defendant is not merely advancing a private defense interest when exercising the challenge.44
A criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges constitutes state action under the Equal Protection Clause.45
Related opinions on this issue
Justice O'Connor dissented.46 She argued that criminal defendants and their lawyers are not state actors when exercising peremptory challenges.47 She relied on Polk County v. Dodson to establish that defense counsel performing traditional trial functions opposes the State.48
Therefore counsel cannot be deemed a governmental actor.49 She maintained that the adversarial posture precludes any finding of state action.50 She further emphasized that the defendant's complete control over the decision to strike reinforces the private character of the choice.51
Justice Scalia dissented.52 He agreed with Justice O'Connor that the state-action doctrine should not encompass a criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges.53 He characterized the majority's result as the illogical extension of the already erroneous Edmonson decision.54
He described the outcome as reducing the principle to absurdity because it treats a defendant who is defending himself against the State as acting on the State's behalf.55 He declined to follow the precedent to its illogical conclusion and noted that the decision gives the lie to the belief that an activist constitutional jurisprudence always evolves in the direction of greater individual rights.56 In his view, the Court used the Constitution to destroy the ages-old right of criminal defendants to exercise peremptory challenges as they wish.57
Whether the State has standing to challenge a criminal defendant's racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges?58
A litigant may raise a claim on behalf of a third party if the litigant demonstrates a concrete injury, a close relation to the third party, and some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect its own interests.59 The State suffers cognizable injury when racial discrimination undermines the fairness and integrity of its judicial process.60 The State's relation to potential jurors is especially close because it represents all citizens.61 Excluded jurors face daunting barriers to bringing suit on their own behalf.62
Yes. The Court applied the standing test to the facts of this case.63 The State as representative of all citizens suffers cognizable injury to the integrity of its own courts when a defendant removes jurors on racial grounds.64 The voir dire process creates a close relation between the State and the venirepersons.65
Individual jurors encounter substantial practical obstacles to vindicating their own rights through suit.66 These facts satisfy all three prongs of third-party standing, allowing the State to assert the excluded jurors' rights.67
The State has standing to challenge a criminal defendant's racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.68
Whether the rights of a criminal defendant preclude extending the prohibition on racially discriminatory peremptory challenges to defendants?69
Peremptory challenges are not constitutionally protected fundamental rights but are instead a state-created means to the end of an impartial jury.70 A prohibition on racially discriminatory strikes does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.71 It does not violate the right to effective assistance of counsel.72 Counsel can ordinarily explain strikes without revealing strategy or confidential communications.73 Race-based assumptions of partiality are illegitimate stereotypes the law condemns.74
No. The Court applied the rule to the facts by rejecting the claim that defendants possess a Sixth Amendment right to discriminate on the basis of race.75 Peremptory challenges may be withheld entirely without impairing the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury.76 Any explanation requirement can be accommodated through in camera procedures when necessary to protect strategy or confidential communications.77 The right to an impartial jury does not include the right to remove jurors on the basis of race or racial stereotypes.78
The rights of a criminal defendant do not preclude extending the prohibition on racially discriminatory peremptory challenges to defendants.79