plead not guilty

The State of New York indicted Santobello in 1969 on two felony counts of Promoting Gambling in the First Degree and Possession of Gambling Records in the First Degree. Santobello initially entered a plea of not guilty to both counts. After negotiations, the Assistant District Attorney agreed to permit a plea to the lesser-included offense of Possession of Gambling Records in the Second Degree and promised to make no recommendation as to sentence. On June 16, 1969, Santobello withdrew the not guilty plea and entered a guilty plea to the lesser charge. The court accepted the plea after Santobello confirmed it was voluntary and the facts described by the prosecutor were true. A series of delays followed, owing primarily to the absence of a pre-sentence report, so that by September 23, 1969, Santobello had still not been sentenced. By that date petitioner acquired new defense counsel. Petitioner's new counsel moved immediately to withdraw the guilty plea. In an accompanying affidavit, petitioner alleged that he did not know at the time of his plea that crucial evidence against him had been obtained as a result of an illegal search. In addition to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, petitioner renewed the motion to suppress and filed a motion to inspect the grand jury minutes. These motions in turn caused further delay until November 26, 1969, when the court denied all three and set January 9, 1970, as the date for sentencing. On January 9, 1970, Santobello appeared before a different judge because the original judge had retired. A new prosecutor replaced the one who negotiated the plea and recommended the maximum one-year sentence, citing Santobello’s criminal record and alleged links with organized crime. Defense counsel objected on the ground that the State had promised no sentence recommendation and sought an adjournment to prove the promise, though the State later conceded in subsequent proceedings that the promise had been made. The sentencing judge imposed the maximum one-year sentence at the New York City Correctional Institution for men, stating that the prosecutor’s recommendation did not influence the decision. Santobello obtained a certificate of reasonable doubt and was admitted to bail pending appeal. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the conviction, and leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied. Santobello then sought certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.

In 1959, petitioner Brady was charged with kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a). The indictment charged that the victim of the kidnapping was not liberated unharmed, so Brady faced a maximum penalty of death if the jury recommended it. Represented by competent counsel throughout, Brady first elected to plead not guilty. He made no serious attempt to reduce the possibility of a death penalty by waiving a jury trial because the trial judge was unwilling to try the case without a jury. Upon learning that his codefendant, who had confessed to the authorities, would plead guilty and be available to testify against him, Brady changed his plea to guilty. The trial judge twice questioned Brady as to the voluntariness of his plea before accepting it. Brady was sentenced to fifty years' imprisonment, later reduced to thirty years. In 1967, Brady sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming that his plea of guilty was not voluntarily given because the statute operated to coerce his plea, because his counsel exerted impermissible pressure upon him, and because his plea was induced by representations with respect to reduction of sentence and clemency. He also alleged that the trial judge had not fully complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. After a hearing, the District Court for the District of New Mexico denied relief. The District Court found that Brady's counsel did not put impermissible pressure on him to plead guilty and that no representations were made with respect to a reduced sentence or clemency. The court determined that Brady decided to plead guilty when he learned that his codefendant was going to plead guilty. The court concluded that the plea was voluntarily and knowingly made. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, determining that the District Court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and specifically approving the finding that Brady's plea of guilty was voluntary. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the claim that the Court of Appeals was in error in not reaching a contrary result on the authority of United States v. Jackson.

Griffin and Crenshaw were tried together and convicted of armed robbery in the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois. Immediately after their conviction, they filed a motion in the trial court asking that a certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the proceedings, be furnished to them without cost. They alleged that they were poor persons with no means of paying the necessary fees to acquire the transcript and court records needed to prosecute an appeal. These allegations were not denied. Under Illinois law, full direct appellate review of alleged errors by a writ of error requires the defendant to furnish the appellate court with a bill of exceptions or report of proceedings at the trial certified by the trial judge. As Illinois concedes, it is sometimes impossible to prepare such bills of exceptions or reports without a stenographic transcript of the trial proceedings. Indigent defendants sentenced to death are provided with a free transcript at the expense of the county where convicted. In all other criminal cases, defendants needing a transcript, whether indigent or not, must themselves buy it. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. Griffin and Crenshaw then filed a petition under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Only questions arising under the Illinois or Federal Constitution may be raised in proceedings under this Act. A companion state act provides that indigent petitioners under the Post-Conviction Act may, under some circumstances, obtain a free transcript. The effect is that indigents may obtain a free transcript to obtain appellate review of constitutional questions but not of other alleged trial errors such as admissibility and sufficiency of evidence. In their Post-Conviction proceeding, petitioners alleged that there were manifest nonconstitutional errors in the trial which entitled them to have their convictions set aside on appeal. The only impediment to full appellate review was their lack of funds to buy a transcript. These allegations have not been denied. This petition, like the first, was dismissed without hearing any evidence. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal solely on the ground that the charges raised no substantial state or federal constitutional questions. Counsel for Illinois concedes that these petitioners needed a transcript in order to get adequate appellate review of their alleged trial errors. There is no contention that petitioners were dilatory in their efforts to get appellate review, or that the Illinois Supreme Court denied review on the ground that the allegations of trial error were insufficient. We must therefore assume for purposes of this decision that errors were committed in the trial which would merit reversal. The petitioners could not get appellate review of those errors solely because they were too poor to buy a stenographic transcript. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.