351 U.S. 12 (1956)
Griffin and Crenshaw were tried together and convicted of armed robbery in the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois.1 Immediately after their conviction, they filed a motion in the trial court asking that a certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the proceedings, be furnished to them without cost.2 They alleged that they were poor persons with no means of paying the necessary fees to acquire the transcript and court records needed to prosecute an appeal.3 These allegations were not denied.4
Under Illinois law, full direct appellate review of alleged errors by a writ of error requires the defendant to furnish the appellate court with a bill of exceptions or report of proceedings at the trial certified by the trial judge.5 As Illinois concedes, it is sometimes impossible to prepare such bills of exceptions or reports without a stenographic transcript of the trial proceedings.6 Indigent defendants sentenced to death are provided with a free transcript at the expense of the county where convicted.7 In all other criminal cases, defendants needing a transcript, whether indigent or not, must themselves buy it.8 The trial court denied the motion without a hearing.9
Griffin and Crenshaw then filed a petition under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act.10 Only questions arising under the Illinois or Federal Constitution may be raised in proceedings under this Act.11 A companion state act provides that indigent petitioners under the Post-Conviction Act may, under some circumstances, obtain a free transcript.12 The effect is that indigents may obtain a free transcript to obtain appellate review of constitutional questions but not of other alleged trial errors such as admissibility and sufficiency of evidence.13 In their Post-Conviction proceeding, petitioners alleged that there were manifest nonconstitutional errors in the trial which entitled them to have their convictions set aside on appeal.14 The only impediment to full appellate review was their lack of funds to buy a transcript.15 These allegations have not been denied.16 This petition, like the first, was dismissed without hearing any evidence.17
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal solely on the ground that the charges raised no substantial state or federal constitutional questions.18 Counsel for Illinois concedes that these petitioners needed a transcript in order to get adequate appellate review of their alleged trial errors.19 There is no contention that petitioners were dilatory in their efforts to get appellate review, or that the Illinois Supreme Court denied review on the ground that the allegations of trial error were insufficient.20 We must therefore assume for purposes of this decision that errors were committed in the trial which would merit reversal.21 The petitioners could not get appellate review of those errors solely because they were too poor to buy a stenographic transcript.22 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.23
Whether Illinois may, consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, administer its statute providing writs of error as of right in criminal cases so as to deny adequate appellate review to indigent defendants while granting such review to all others?24
A state that grants appellate review in criminal cases must do so in a manner that does not discriminate against defendants on the basis of their poverty.25 This requirement follows from the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.26 Although a state is not required to provide appellate review at all, once it does, it cannot condition effective review on the ability to pay for necessary transcripts or records.27
No. The petitioners Griffin and Crenshaw were convicted of armed robbery.28 They sought a free transcript to prepare a bill of exceptions for appellate review.29 Illinois law provided free transcripts only for capital cases or constitutional claims under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.30 Their allegations of indigency were undisputed.31
They could not obtain review of nonconstitutional trial errors without the transcript.32 This practice denies indigent defendants adequate appellate review while granting it to those who can afford the costs.33 It violates the principle that there can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.34
Illinois may not administer its appellate system to deny adequate review to the poor, and the judgment is vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with providing effective appellate review to indigent defendants.35
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Frankfurter concurs in the judgment but stresses that due process does not require states to provide appeals at all.36 Historical practice shows no appeals in federal courts for nearly a hundred years and none in England until 1907.37 Equal protection permits reasonable classifications but forbids conditions on appeals that have no rational relation to criminal justice policy.38
Such conditions offend basic societal presuppositions by erecting a money barrier that shuts off review for indigents.39 The state cannot keep the promise of appellate correction to the ear while breaking it to the hope of those erroneously convicted.40 Yet the state may hedge the opportunity to prevent frivolous appeals and wasteful expenditure.41
The new rule should apply prospectively to avoid unsettling unappealed convictions from years past.42 Illinois may choose any constitutional means to afford effective review.43
Joined by Justices Minton, Reed, And Harlan
Justice Burton dissents, joined by Justices Minton, Reed, and Harlan.44 He argues that the Constitution does not compel states to furnish free transcripts in noncapital cases even if the policy is desirable.45 States may follow their own procedures in administering local criminal law.46
Distinctions between capital and noncapital cases are reasonable and valid.47 Examples include practices such as peremptory challenges and venue rules.48 Illinois does not deny equal protection when appeal terms are open to all.49
Poverty may prevent some from availing themselves of the full process.50 The Constitution requires equal protection of the laws but not equal financial means for every defendant.51 The majority holding is an unwarranted interference with state power over matters of local option.52
Justice Harlan dissents separately.53 He first urges remand because the record fails to present the constitutional question in clean-cut form.54 It remains unclear whether petitioners claim a transcript is legally required or only factually needed given alternatives like narrative bills of exceptions.55
On the merits he finds no equal protection violation.56 Illinois has not imposed arbitrary conditions or prevented appeals by its own action.57 It merely failed to alleviate natural economic disparities that exist apart from state action.58
There is likewise no due process violation because the right to appeal is not fundamental.59 Illinois has progressively expanded safeguards without creating an affirmative constitutional duty to fund transcripts in all cases.60 The failure to provide such aid is neither arbitrary nor shocking to the universal sense of justice.61