404 U.S. 257 (1971)
The State of New York indicted Santobello in 1969 on two felony counts of Promoting Gambling in the First Degree and Possession of Gambling Records in the First Degree.1 Santobello initially entered a plea of not guilty to both counts.2 After negotiations, the Assistant District Attorney agreed to permit a plea to the lesser-included offense of Possession of Gambling Records in the Second Degree and promised to make no recommendation as to sentence.3
On June 16, 1969, Santobello withdrew the not guilty plea and entered a guilty plea to the lesser charge.4 The court accepted the plea after Santobello confirmed it was voluntary and the facts described by the prosecutor were true.5 A series of delays followed, owing primarily to the absence of a pre-sentence report, so that by September 23, 1969, Santobello had still not been sentenced.6
By that date petitioner acquired new defense counsel.7 Petitioner's new counsel moved immediately to withdraw the guilty plea.8 In an accompanying affidavit, petitioner alleged that he did not know at the time of his plea that crucial evidence against him had been obtained as a result of an illegal search.9 In addition to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, petitioner renewed the motion to suppress and filed a motion to inspect the grand jury minutes.10 These motions in turn caused further delay until November 26, 1969, when the court denied all three and set January 9, 1970, as the date for sentencing.11
On January 9, 1970, Santobello appeared before a different judge because the original judge had retired.12 A new prosecutor replaced the one who negotiated the plea and recommended the maximum one-year sentence, citing Santobello’s criminal record and alleged links with organized crime.13 Defense counsel objected on the ground that the State had promised no sentence recommendation and sought an adjournment to prove the promise, though the State later conceded in subsequent proceedings that the promise had been made.14
The sentencing judge imposed the maximum one-year sentence at the New York City Correctional Institution for men, stating that the prosecutor’s recommendation did not influence the decision.15 Santobello obtained a certificate of reasonable doubt and was admitted to bail pending appeal.16 The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the conviction, and leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied.17 Santobello then sought certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.18
Whether the State’s failure to keep a commitment concerning the sentence recommendation on a guilty plea required a new trial?19
When a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.20
No. The rule requires fulfillment of prosecutorial promises that induce guilty pleas.21 The established facts show that the original Assistant District Attorney promised to make no sentence recommendation in exchange for Santobello’s plea to the lesser offense. A different prosecutor later recommended the maximum one-year sentence.22 This breached the agreement even though the breach was inadvertent.23
The sentencing judge stated that the recommendation did not influence the decision.24 The rule therefore triggers a remedy.25 The choice of remedy—specific performance through resentencing before a different judge or withdrawal of the plea—remains with the state court under the circumstances presented by the established facts.26
The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the state courts for further consideration to determine the appropriate relief consistent with the requirement that the prosecutor’s promise be fulfilled.27
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas joins the Court’s opinion but emphasizes that the prosecution staff must be treated as a single unit.28 One member’s plea commitment binds the office even if another prosecutor handles sentencing.29 He stresses that an inadvertent breach cannot excuse the default.30
The staff’s failure to communicate commitments internally would create the sort of deceptive contrivance condemned in earlier due-process cases.31 Douglas further advocates a constitutional rule requiring that, when a plea bargain is broken, the state court must vacate the sentence and then decide between specific performance or allowing the defendant to withdraw the plea.32 A court should give the defendant’s preference considerable if not controlling weight because the rights at stake belong to the defendant.33
Justice Marshall concurs in the finding of a breach but dissents from the remedy, concluding that Santobello must be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea.34 He reasons that a prosecutor’s broken promise undercuts the voluntary character of the waiver of constitutional rights implicit in the plea.35 Where the government has not relied to its detriment on the plea, the defendant should regain the right to trial.36
Marshall notes that the motion to vacate occurred before sentencing.37 The state claims no prejudice beyond disappointed expectations.38 Therefore the appropriate relief is vacation of the plea so that Santobello may replead to the original charges.39