Also known as: on-point · directly on point · on all fours
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A case or authority that discusses the precise issue now at hand.
Omar Olson sued a bank in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. He served process by leaving papers with a branch manager under a Federal Rule. The bank moved to dismiss citing a conflicting state statute. The court found no federal rule on point and applied the balance-of-interests test.
Odessa Okada filed a diversity action and served the defendant by certified mail under the Federal Rules. State law required personal delivery by a sheriff. The defendant moved to dismiss. The court held the federal rule on point and denied the motion.
Oswald Orozco sued a media company for intentional infliction of emotional distress after publication of a satirical piece. The company cited a prior Supreme Court decision on similar speech-based tort claims. The court treated that decision as on point and dismissed the claim.
On October 27, 1982, during the closing days of the Minnesota gubernatorial election campaign, Dan Cohen separately approached Lori Sturdevant of the Star Tribune and Bill Salisbury of the Pioneer Press Dispatch. Cohen, a political associate of IR candidate Wheelock Whitney, offered each reporter copies of two public court records concerning DFL lieutenant governor candidate Marlene Johnson: a 1969 record of three counts of unlawful assembly that were dismissed and a 1970 record of a petit theft conviction that was vacated about a year later. Cohen requested and received promises from both reporters that he would be treated as an anonymous source. His name would not appear in any material connected with the documents. The reporters would not pursue questions about his source. The reporters were experienced and covering the gubernatorial election. They knew Cohen as an active Republican associated with the Wheelock Whitney campaign and promised to keep his identity confidential, intending to honor that promise at the time it was made. Cohen also met with reporters from the Associated Press and WCCO-TV, who likewise promised anonymity and received the documents. The Associated Press published the story while honoring its promise, while WCCO-TV did not run the story. After receiving the documents, both newspapers interviewed Johnson for her explanation. The Star Tribune assigned a reporter to locate the original court records, discovering that another Whitney supporter had checked them out the previous day. Editors at both the Star Tribune and the Pioneer Press Dispatch independently decided to publish the stories while identifying Cohen as the source. On October 28, 1982, both newspapers published stories about Johnson's arrests and convictions. Both articles published Cohen's name, along with denials by the regular Whitney campaign officials of any connection with the published stories. The Pioneer Press Dispatch quoted Johnson as saying the release of the information was a last-minute smear campaign. Cohen was fired from his job at a Minneapolis advertising firm the same day. The Star Tribune subsequently published a column and cartoon criticizing Cohen's tactics. Cohen sued Northwest Publications, Inc., publisher of the Pioneer Press Dispatch, and Cowles Media Company, publisher of the Star Tribune, for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract. The trial court ruled that the First Amendment did not bar the claims. The jury found liability on both claims and awarded Cohen $200,000 in compensatory damages jointly and severally against the defendants plus $250,000 in punitive damages against each defendant. The court of appeals upheld the jury's finding of a breach of contract and affirmed the award of $200,000 compensatory damages. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted petitions for further review from all parties.
View caseOlivia Owens challenged a presidential proclamation restricting entry. The government pointed to earlier executive orders with comparable waiver provisions. The court found those orders on point and upheld the proclamation structure.
Shortly after taking office, President Trump signed Executive Order 13769 directing a review of information provided by foreign governments about their nationals seeking entry and temporarily restricting entry from seven countries previously identified as posing terrorism risks. After courts enjoined that order, the President revoked it and issued Executive Order 13780, which again directed a worldwide review and temporarily restricted entry from six of the countries. Following completion of the review, the President issued Proclamation No. 9645 on September 24, 2017, placing entry restrictions on nationals of eight countries—Chad, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen—whose systems for managing and sharing information the President deemed inadequate. The Proclamation imposed varying restrictions by country, exempted lawful permanent residents and asylees, provided for case-by-case waivers, and directed ongoing 180-day reviews; restrictions on Chad were later lifted after it improved its practices. Plaintiffs including the State of Hawaii, three U.S. citizens with foreign-national relatives from Iran, Syria, and Yemen applying for visas, and the Muslim Association of Hawaii challenged the Proclamation in the District of Hawaii on statutory and Establishment Clause grounds. The district court granted a nationwide preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on statutory grounds. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseOliver Okeke sued after an officer used deadly force during a felony arrest. The state cited its statute allowing force to prevent escape. The court examined whether that statute was on point with constitutional limits on seizures.
On October 3, 1974, at approximately 10:45 p.m., Memphis Police Officers Elton Hymon and Leslie Wright responded to a prowler inside call at a residence in Memphis. Upon arrival, a woman standing on the porch of the adjacent house gestured toward the house and told the officers she had heard glass breaking and that someone was breaking in next door. While Officer Wright radioed the dispatcher, Officer Hymon went behind the house, heard a door slam, and saw Edward Garner running across the backyard. Garner stopped at a six-foot-high chain link fence at the edge of the yard. With the aid of a flashlight, Hymon saw Garner's face and hands, observed no sign of a weapon, and was reasonably sure that Garner was unarmed. Hymon called out police halt and took a few steps toward Garner, who then began to climb the fence. Convinced that Garner would elude capture if he made it over the fence, Hymon shot him in the back of the head. Garner was taken by ambulance to a hospital where he died on the operating table, and ten dollars and a purse taken from the house were found on his body. At the time of the shooting, Hymon was acting under the authority of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-7-108, which provided that if after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant he either flees or forcibly resists, the officer may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest. The Memphis Police Department policy was slightly more restrictive than the statute but still permitted the use of deadly force in cases of burglary. The incident was reviewed by the Memphis Police Firearms Review Board and presented to a grand jury, neither of which took any action. Garner's father brought an action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against Officer Hymon, the Police Department, its Director, the Mayor, and the City of Memphis for asserted violations of Garner's constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. After a 3-day bench trial, the District Court entered judgment for all defendants. It then concluded that Hymon's actions were authorized by the Tennessee statute, which in turn was constitutional. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the Tennessee statute authorizing the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of a fleeing suspect was unconstitutional and that the Memphis Police Department's policies on the use of deadly force were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseOmega Energy sought a permit for a group home. The city denied it under an ordinance. The court reviewed prior equal protection decisions on special permits and determined none was on point for the mental disability classification at issue.
In July 1980, respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building at 201 Featherston Street in Cleburne, Texas. Hannah intended to lease the property to Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC) for use as a group home. The home would house thirteen mentally retarded men and women under constant staff supervision. The building contained four bedrooms and two baths, and CLC planned to add a half bath while complying with all applicable state and federal regulations for an Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded. The site lay in an R-3 Apartment House District. The city's zoning ordinance permitted apartment houses, boarding houses, hospitals, and nursing homes in that district without special permission. However, the ordinance required a special use permit, renewable annually after a public hearing, for hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded. The city classified the proposed group home as a hospital for the feeble-minded and informed CLC that a permit was required. After a public hearing, the City Council voted three to one to deny the application. CLC and its prospective residents filed suit in federal district court against the city and its officials. They alleged that the ordinance and its application discriminated against the mentally retarded in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court upheld the ordinance and the denial. It found that the council's decision was motivated by the residents' mental retardation yet rationally related to legitimate interests such as neighborhood safety and property values. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that mental retardation is a quasi-suspect class and that the ordinance was invalid both facially and as applied. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the equal protection issues raised by the zoning ordinance and its application to the proposed group home.
View caseA Federal Rule counts as on point when it directly addresses the procedural issue and is valid under the Rules Enabling Act. The court then applies the federal rule even if state law differs.
The court weighs the respective interests of the state and the federal judicial system to decide whether to follow state law or federal practice.
The court examines whether the prior decision articulates the standard of conduct that governs the client's specific factual situation and whether the attorney reasonably could have distinguished it.
The rule prohibits knowingly making a false statement of material fact. An affirmative claim of an unblemished record remains false even if the lawyer believes the prior discipline falls outside the question's scope.
…context of this entire line of cases. Suffice it that they do not serve to distinguish Colegrove v. Barrett, supra , which is on all fours with the present case, or to distinguish Kidd v. McCanless , 352 U. S. 920, in which the full Court without dissent, only five years ago, dismissed on authority of Colegrove v. Green…