Also known as: noviter perventum · newly discovered evidence
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Newly discovered facts or evidence that could not have been found earlier through reasonable diligence. Such material may support reopening a closed case or obtaining post-judgment relief when it meets the applicable procedural standards for timeliness and materiality.
After judgment against Apex Machine Tools, the company learns that a juror concealed her own pending suit against a similar manufacturer. Apex promptly moves under the rule for relief based on this information that could not have been discovered earlier despite diligent voir dire. The court treats the motion as timely and grants a new trial because the nondisclosure meets the standard for newly discovered evidence warranting relief.
Nearly three years after Peggy's conviction, newly decrypted chat logs surface showing the key witness may have discussed only public information. Peggy files a motion grounded on this evidence within the three-year window. Because an appeal remains pending, the district court lacks authority to grant relief until the appellate court remands the case.
Twenty days after a bench-trial verdict, defense counsel moves for a new trial citing the judge's mid-trial comments as evidence of bias. This ground rests on matters known at trial rather than newly discovered evidence. The court denies the motion because it was filed outside the fourteen-day limit that applies to all grounds other than newly discovered evidence.
After judgment in the aluminum industry case, a party uncovers internal documents showing market allocation that could not have been obtained earlier with reasonable diligence. The party moves to reopen the record on the basis of this material. The court considers whether the evidence satisfies the requirements for newly discovered facts that justify relief from the final judgment.
Alcoa was incorporated in Pennsylvania on September 18, 1888, as the Pittsburgh Reduction Company and later changed its name in 1907. Through assignment of the Hall patent in 1889 and the Bradley patent in 1892, Alcoa secured a legal monopoly on virgin ingot manufacture that lasted until the patents expired in 1906 and 1909 respectively. Beginning in 1895, Alcoa obtained water power through contracts that restricted the power companies from supplying others for aluminum manufacture. It also participated in successive cartels with foreign aluminum producers that limited imports into the United States. In 1912 the United States brought suit against Alcoa, resulting in a consent decree that enjoined several restrictive covenants. From 1909 onward Alcoa remained the only domestic producer of virgin ingot. Its share of virgin ingot available for sale in the United States exceeded 90 percent for most years after 1912 and averaged over 90 percent from 1934 to 1938. Alcoa expanded its production capacity from two plants producing less than 42 million pounds in 1912 to five plants producing approximately 327 million pounds by 1934. In 1928 Alcoa transferred its foreign properties to a newly formed Canadian corporation, Aluminum Limited, whose shares were distributed to Alcoa's shareholders. Limited later joined with foreign producers in the Alliance cartel agreements of 1931 and 1936 that established production quotas and royalties for aluminum. Alcoa also engaged in a price squeeze on aluminum sheet from 1925 to 1932 by maintaining high ingot prices and low sheet prices that left little margin for independent sheet rollers. The complaint in this action was filed on April 23, 1937. Trial took place from June 1, 1938, to August 14, 1940, producing over 40,000 pages of testimony. The district court delivered its opinion in 1941, filed findings in 1942, and entered judgment dismissing the complaint on July 23, 1942. The Supreme Court referred the appeal to the Second Circuit on June 12, 1944, because a quorum of qualified justices was lacking.
View caseAfter his conviction is affirmed, Allen discovers records indicating that key prosecution testimony was fabricated. He files a habeas petition asserting that this newly discovered evidence would have changed the outcome. The court evaluates whether the material meets the standard for relief based on facts that could not have been uncovered earlier despite diligent investigation.
In 1950 petitioner Brown, a Negro, was convicted of rape in Forsyth County, North Carolina, and sentenced to death. Petitioner Speller, also a Negro, was convicted of rape in Bertie County after two prior convictions were set aside, and sentenced to death. Petitioners Daniels, two Negroes aged seventeen at the time of arrest, were convicted of murder in Pitt County and sentenced to death. In each case the defendants raised claims of racial discrimination in the selection of grand and petit juries and, in some instances, the use of coerced confessions. The defendants appealed their convictions through the North Carolina courts, presenting their federal constitutional claims to the state trial and supreme courts. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the convictions. Petitions for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court raising the same federal issues were denied. The defendants then filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, again raising the claims of jury discrimination and coerced confessions. The district court in each case examined the records from the state proceedings. The district court adopted findings from the state trial courts regarding jury composition and voluntariness of confessions, and in two cases heard additional evidence. The district court denied the writs of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the denials. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgments. The records before the district courts included transcripts of the state trials showing the methods of jury selection from tax lists in the respective counties, with evidence of the percentages of Negroes on jury panels and in the population. In the Daniels case, the state supreme court had refused to consider the appeal on the merits because the statement of the case on appeal was served one day late.
View caseYears after his capital conviction, Herrera obtains affidavits from multiple witnesses recanting their trial testimony and identifying another perpetrator. He seeks relief on the ground that this newly discovered evidence establishes his innocence by clear and convincing proof. The court assesses whether the affidavits satisfy the demanding standard required to reopen a final judgment on the basis of facts unavailable at trial.
In late September 1981, the body of Texas Department of Public Safety Officer David Rucker was found beside his patrol car on a highway near Los Fresnos, Texas. At about the same time, Los Fresnos Police Officer Enrique Carrisalez stopped a speeding vehicle and was shot by the driver, dying nine days later. Petitioner Leonel Torres Herrera was arrested a few days after the shootings and charged with the capital murders of both officers. He was tried in January 1982, convicted of Carrisalez's capital murder, and sentenced to death; he pleaded guilty to Rucker's murder in July 1982. At Herrera's trial for Carrisalez's murder, eyewitness Enrique Hernandez identified him as the shooter from the patrol car. A declaration by the dying Carrisalez to the same effect was admitted. The speeding car was registered to Herrera's live-in girlfriend, and Herrera had keys to it in his pocket when arrested. Herrera's Social Security card was found at Rucker's scene. Blood spatters of type A, matching Rucker but not Herrera's type O, were found on the car and on Herrera's jeans and wallet. A handwritten letter found on Herrera when arrested strongly implied he had killed Rucker. Herrera's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in 1984, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. His state habeas application was denied. A federal habeas petition challenging the identifications was denied by the Fifth Circuit in 1990, with certiorari denied by the Supreme Court. In 1990, Herrera filed a second state habeas petition raising a claim of actual innocence supported by affidavits from attorney Hector Villarreal and former cellmate Juan Franco Palacious, both stating that Herrera's brother Raul Herrera Sr., who died in 1984, had confessed to committing the murders. The state courts denied relief. In February 1992, Herrera filed his second federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, presenting those affidavits plus additional ones from Raul Herrera Jr. and Jose Ybarra Jr. claiming Raul Sr. had confessed and that Raul Jr. had witnessed the shootings. The District Court dismissed most claims as an abuse of the writ but granted a stay of execution to permit Herrera to present his actual innocence claim in state court. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the stay, holding that a claim of actual innocence without an accompanying constitutional violation is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View caseA motion under Rule 60(b)(2) must be filed within a reasonable time and no more than one year after entry of judgment. The evidence must be newly discovered and could not have been found earlier with reasonable diligence in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b).
Under Rule 33(b)(1), the motion must be filed within three years after the verdict or finding of guilty. If an appeal is pending, the district court may not grant the motion until the appellate court remands the case.
Courts require that the newly discovered evidence be material and likely to produce a different result. Mere impeachment evidence that does not undermine the core of the prosecution's case or the judgment usually fails to satisfy the standard for reopening the proceeding.
Leave to amend is governed by the liberal standard of Rule 15, not by the post-judgment standards for newly discovered evidence. A party may obtain leave when justice so requires, but the court considers undue delay and prejudice rather than the strict diligence and materiality tests that apply to Rule 60 or Rule 33 motions.