Also known as: no claim · no claims · no-claims bonus · NCD
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An absence of any legal right or entitlement to assert a demand or cause of action against another party.
Noah Nakamura believed that Naomi Norton had no claim of right to the cabin she occupied after wrongfully evicting him weeks earlier. With winter approaching and no time to obtain a court order, Noah used minimal force to reenter the land. Because the circumstances met the urgency requirement under the governing rule, his action was justified and Norton could not prevail on a trespass claim.
Nicholas Nunez purchased a defective wheel from a retailer and suffered injury when it failed. He discovered that the wheel had been manufactured by Nova Pharmaceuticals but had no direct contractual relationship with that company. Under the applicable rule, Nunez had no claim against the remote manufacturer and could recover only from the retailer.
The defendant Buick Motor Company manufactured automobiles and purchased ready-made wheels from the Imperial Wheel Company of Flint, Michigan. The Imperial company had furnished the defendant with eighty thousand wheels, none of which had proved defective prior to this incident. The defendant sold one such automobile to a firm of automobile dealers in Schenectady, who in turn sold the car to the plaintiff. While the plaintiff was driving the automobile at a speed of only eight miles an hour, a wheel collapsed because it was made of defective wood whose spokes crumbled into fragments. The plaintiff was thrown out and injured. The wheel had been bought from the outside manufacturer rather than produced by the defendant. Evidence showed that the defects could have been discovered by reasonable inspection, which the defendant omitted. There was no claim that the defendant knew of the defect and willfully concealed it. The car was designed to go fifty miles an hour. It had seats for three persons. The plaintiff commenced an action for negligence against the defendant. The case was tried to a jury. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment with costs.
View caseNaveen Nanda sought to place promotional materials in a utility's billing envelopes but the utility refused. Nanda had no claim to compel the utility to carry his messages because the restriction served a substantial government interest and left open alternative channels. The court upheld the denial without finding any protected right to that particular forum.
In December 1973, the Public Service Commission ordered electric utilities in New York State to cease all advertising that promoted the use of electricity because the interconnected utility system lacked sufficient fuel stocks for the 1973-1974 winter. The order rested on the Commission's finding that the system did not have sufficient fuel stocks or sources of supply to meet customer demands. Three years later, when the fuel shortage had eased, the Commission requested comments from the public on its proposal to continue the ban on promotional advertising. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. opposed the ban on First Amendment grounds. After reviewing the public comments, the Commission extended the prohibition in a Policy Statement issued on February 25, 1977. The Policy Statement divided advertising expenses into promotional and institutional categories. It permitted informational advertising designed to encourage shifts of consumption from peak demand times to periods of low electricity demand. The Commission banned promotional advertising because additional electricity would be more expensive to produce and promotional advertising would give misleading signals to the public. Central Hudson challenged the order in state court. The order was upheld through the New York Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and reversed.
View caseNina Nielsen attempted to represent a nationwide class of employees alleging discrimination at Navarro Industries. The proposed class lacked the required commonality and typicality because individual employment decisions varied widely. Nielsen therefore had no claim to class treatment and could proceed only on her individual case.
In 2001, three current or former female employees of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.—Betty Dukes, Christine Kwapnoski, and Edith Arana—filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of California alleging that the company had discriminated against them and other women in pay and promotions. Wal-Mart, the nation’s largest private employer with approximately 3,400 stores across the country and more than one million employees, delegated pay and promotion decisions to local store managers who exercised broad discretion in a largely subjective manner. The plaintiffs claimed that this discretion was exercised disproportionately in favor of men, resulting in lower pay and fewer promotions for female employees. They sought to represent a class of approximately 1.5 million current and former female employees who had worked at any Wal-Mart domestic retail store since December 26, 1998. To support their motion for class certification, the plaintiffs presented statistical evidence from experts Dr. Richard Drogin and Dr. Marc Bendick showing pay and promotion disparities between men and women, anecdotal evidence consisting of about 120 affidavits from female employees describing discriminatory experiences at only 235 of the company's 3,400 stores, and the testimony of sociologist Dr. William Bielby who analyzed Wal-Mart’s corporate culture. Betty Dukes began working at a Pittsburg, California store in 1994 as a cashier and was later promoted to customer service manager before being demoted; she alleged retaliation and that male greeters were paid more. Christine Kwapnoski worked at Sam’s Club stores and claimed a male manager yelled at female employees and told her to “doll up.” Edith Arana worked at a Duarte, California store from 1995 to 2001. She was denied opportunities for management training despite repeated requests. The District Court certified the class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), finding that the plaintiffs had presented significant evidence of a company-wide pattern of discrimination. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, substantially affirmed the certification order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether the class certification was consistent with Rule 23(a) and (b)(2).
View caseNathaniel Newman operated a steamboat line between New York and New Jersey under a state-granted exclusive license. When a competitor entered the route, Newman asserted his monopoly right but the court held that the license created no claim against federally licensed vessels. The competing operator could continue service without liability.
In 1798 the New York Legislature granted Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton the exclusive right for twenty years to navigate the waters within the jurisdiction of the state with boats moved by fire or steam, a privilege later renewed and extended in 1803 and 1807. The right was assigned first to John R. Livingston and then to Aaron Ogden, who thereby claimed authority to operate steamboats between Elizabethtown, New Jersey, and New York City. Thomas Gibbons, meanwhile, took possession of two steamboats, the Stoudinger and the Bellona, which he employed in the same waters while holding a license issued under the federal Act of February 18, 1793, for enrolling and licensing vessels to be employed in the coasting trade and fisheries. Gibbons filed a bill in the Court of Chancery of New York against Ogden seeking an injunction to restrain Ogden from navigating those waters with steamboats. The bill recited the state grants and the assignment to Ogden, alleged that Ogden was violating the exclusive privilege, and prayed for injunctive relief. Gibbons answered that his vessels were duly enrolled and licensed under the 1793 federal statute and insisted on his right to navigate between Elizabethtown and New York notwithstanding the state legislation. The Chancellor awarded the injunction and, after hearing, perpetuated it on the ground that the New York acts were valid. The Court for the Trial of Impeachments and Correction of Errors, the highest court of the state to which the cause could be carried, affirmed the decree. Gibbons then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.
View caseNexus Technologies challenged a federal statute regulating possession of firearms near schools. The company argued that the law exceeded congressional power because the activity had no substantial effect on interstate commerce. The court agreed that the statute created no valid federal claim of authority over purely local conduct.
In March 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bullets. Acting on an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted Lopez, who admitted possessing the weapon. Local police arrested him and charged him under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The following day, state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count of knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone. Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress's power to legislate control over public schools. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate activities affecting commerce because the business of schools affects interstate commerce. After a bench trial, the court found Lopez guilty and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and two years of supervised release. Lopez appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the conviction, holding that the statute was beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View caseIt denotes the absence of any recognized legal right or entitlement to assert a demand. The term was created because ordinary English lacked a precise opposite for the word claim.
When an actor reasonably believes the other party has no claim of right to property and circumstances are urgent, the actor may use force to reenter land without waiting for a court order. The belief that the other party holds no claim is a required element.
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The court may order separate trials or other protective measures when a party is joined against whom the asserting party makes no claim and who makes no claim against the asserting party. This prevents unnecessary delay or expense.
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No. A beneficiary who predeceases the testator takes no interest because the will speaks only at death. The predeceased beneficiary's estate therefore has no claim to the property.
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