material elements

Leland was charged with murder in the first degree in the Circuit Court of Multnomah County, Oregon. He pleaded not guilty and gave notice of his intention to prove insanity. The jury found him guilty of first degree murder. Because the jury did not recommend life imprisonment, he received a death sentence. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The facts emerged from Leland's confessions corroborated by other evidence. He killed a fifteen-year-old girl by striking her over the head several times with a steel bar and stabbing her twice with a hunting knife. Five days after the crime, after his arrest for automobile theft, Leland asked to speak with a homicide officer. He voluntarily confessed and directed police to the body. That same day he signed a full confession and, at his own request, wrote out another confession by hand. Counsel were appointed after indictment. Oregon law required a defendant pleading insanity to prove that defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The statute also provided that a morbid propensity to commit prohibited acts formed no defense. The specific statute stated that when the commission of the act charged as a crime is proven, the defense of insanity must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge instructed the jury on lesser included offenses. The jury could return verdicts of guilty of first degree murder, guilty of second degree murder, guilty of manslaughter, not guilty, or not guilty by reason of insanity. A first degree murder verdict required unanimous agreement of all twelve jurors, while an insanity acquittal required only ten. The prosecution bore the burden to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt throughout the trial. The confession was produced in court five days before the defense rested its case. Counsel and expert witnesses had ample time to study it. The trial judge offered additional time for review, but the offer was refused. The record showed no prejudice from the delayed access. No assignment of error was made on this ground in the motion for a new trial.

Virginia Code Annotated § 18.2-423 makes it unlawful for any person, with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn or cause to be burned a cross on the property of another, a highway, or other public place. The statute further provides that any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons. In 1998 three individuals were separately convicted under this statute in two incidents. Barry Black was convicted for leading a cross burning at a Ku Klux Klan rally on private property in Carroll County. Richard Elliott and Jonathan O'Mara were convicted for burning a cross on the lawn of their African-American neighbor James Jubilee in Virginia Beach. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the convictions of both Elliott and O'Mara. The Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated the appeals and held the statute unconstitutional on its face. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2002 to review the decision.

On July 29, 1972, the body of Mary Houston Cole was discovered in a secluded church parking lot in Chesterfield County, Virginia. She had been shot twice at close range with a .38-caliber pistol. The victim had last been seen alive the previous evening in the company of petitioner Hugh Jackson, who was carrying a .38-caliber pistol. Jackson had befriended Cole while he was imprisoned on a disorderly conduct charge at the local county jail. After his release she arranged for him to live in the home of her son and daughter-in-law. On the day of the killing Jackson had been drinking and had spent considerable time shooting at targets with his revolver. Late in the afternoon he unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Cole to drive him to North Carolina. She instead drove him to a local diner where both were observed by several police officers. A deputy sheriff later observed Jackson and Cole preparing to leave the diner in her car. Jackson was in possession of his revolver and a kitchen knife was visible in the vehicle. Cole's body was found the following day and a half later, naked from the waist down with her slacks beneath her body. Six cartridge cases fired from Jackson's gun were recovered nearby. Jackson drove the victim's car to North Carolina, made a short trip to Florida, and was arrested several days later. In a post-arrest statement introduced at trial, Jackson admitted shooting Cole but claimed the shooting occurred accidentally during a struggle. He said the victim had attacked him with a knife when he resisted her sexual advances. He stated he had first fired warning shots into the ground and reloaded before the fatal shots. At trial he asserted self-defense or, alternatively, that intoxication had prevented him from forming the specific intent required for first-degree murder under Virginia law. The trial judge, sitting as factfinder, convicted Jackson of first-degree murder and sentenced him to thirty years in prison. Jackson's motion to set aside the judgment was denied. The Virginia Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of error alleging insufficient evidence. Jackson then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The District Court applied the Thompson v. Louisville no-evidence standard and granted relief after finding insufficient proof of premeditation. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed that judgment.