343 U.S. 790, 72 S. Ct. 1002, 96 L. Ed. 1302 (1952)
Leland was charged with murder in the first degree in the Circuit Court of Multnomah County, Oregon.1 He pleaded not guilty and gave notice of his intention to prove insanity.2 The jury found him guilty of first degree murder.3 Because the jury did not recommend life imprisonment, he received a death sentence.4 The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.5
The facts emerged from Leland's confessions corroborated by other evidence.6 He killed a fifteen-year-old girl by striking her over the head several times with a steel bar and stabbing her twice with a hunting knife.7 Five days after the crime, after his arrest for automobile theft, Leland asked to speak with a homicide officer.8 He voluntarily confessed and directed police to the body. That same day he signed a full confession and, at his own request, wrote out another confession by hand.9 Counsel were appointed after indictment.10
Oregon law required a defendant pleading insanity to prove that defense beyond a reasonable doubt.11 The statute also provided that a morbid propensity to commit prohibited acts formed no defense.12 The specific statute stated that when the commission of the act charged as a crime is proven, the defense of insanity must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.13
The trial judge instructed the jury on lesser included offenses.14 The jury could return verdicts of guilty of first degree murder, guilty of second degree murder, guilty of manslaughter, not guilty, or not guilty by reason of insanity.15 A first degree murder verdict required unanimous agreement of all twelve jurors, while an insanity acquittal required only ten.16 The prosecution bore the burden to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt throughout the trial.17
The confession was produced in court five days before the defense rested its case.18 Counsel and expert witnesses had ample time to study it.19 The trial judge offered additional time for review, but the offer was refused.20 The record showed no prejudice from the delayed access.21 No assignment of error was made on this ground in the motion for a new trial.22
Whether the Oregon statute requiring a defendant who pleads insanity to prove that defense beyond a reasonable doubt violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?23
No. The rule allows states to assign the burden of proving insanity to the defendant as a distinct issue separate from the elements of the offense.26 The Oregon statute required appellant to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.27 The prosecution remained obligated to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of first degree murder, including premeditation, deliberation, malice, and intent.28 The trial court repeatedly emphasized this requirement in its charge to the jury.29
It instructed that the burden of proof of guilt rested upon the State throughout the trial.30 The insanity issue was decided by a special verdict after separate consideration of the evidence.31
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Black
Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Black, dissented.34 He argued that the Due Process Clause embodies the historic principle that the government must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.35 A state may not shift to the accused the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he lacked the culpability required for murder.36
Oregon's statute is unique among the states in requiring the defendant to prove the absence of an essential element of the crime.37 This requirement erases the distinction between civil and criminal liability.38 Although states have latitude to adopt procedures such as special pleading or separate trials for insanity claims, they cannot relieve the prosecution of its duty to prove every element of the offense.39
Whether the Oregon statute providing that a morbid propensity to commit prohibited acts forms no defense to a criminal prosecution violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?40
The Oregon statute does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Whether the trial court's refusal to require pretrial production of a confession to defense counsel violates due process?45
No. The rule requires a showing of prejudice from delayed disclosure to establish a due process violation.48 The confession was produced in court five days before appellant rested his case.49 This provided ample time for counsel and expert witnesses to study it.50 The trial judge offered further time which was refused.51 The record contains no indication of prejudice.52 Appellant made no assignment of error on this ground in his motion for a new trial.53
The trial court's refusal does not violate due process.54