magistrate judge

Roland Camara, lessee of the ground floor of an apartment building in San Francisco, faced criminal charges under the city's Housing Code for refusing to allow municipal inspectors to enter his residence without a search warrant. On November 6, 1963, an inspector from the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Department of Public Health entered the building to conduct a routine annual inspection for possible code violations. The building manager told the inspector that Camara was using the rear of his leasehold as a personal residence, which the occupancy permit did not authorize. The inspector confronted Camara and demanded entry to inspect the premises, but Camara refused because the inspector lacked a warrant. The inspector returned on November 8 without a warrant, and Camara again denied access. A citation was then mailed ordering Camara to appear at the district attorney's office. When he failed to appear, two inspectors returned on November 22 and informed him that Section 503 of the Housing Code required him to permit entry at reasonable times upon presentation of proper credentials. Camara still refused without a warrant. A complaint was filed charging him with violating Section 507 by refusing to permit a lawful inspection. He was arrested on December 2 and released on bail. Camara's demurrer to the criminal complaint was denied in the municipal court. He then filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in California Superior Court, alleging that the ordinance authorizing the warrantless inspection was unconstitutional on its face. The Superior Court denied the writ. The District Court of Appeal affirmed the denial, and the Supreme Court of California denied a petition for hearing. Camara had properly raised and obtained consideration of the federal constitutional questions in the state courts. The inspection program operated under Section 86(3) of the San Francisco Municipal Code, which required apartment house operators to pay an annual license fee that partly defrayed the cost of periodic inspections. The Bureau of Housing Inspection conducted these inspections at least once a year and as often thereafter as deemed necessary. The permit of occupancy for the building was not issued until the license was obtained.

In 1968, Ernest Fitzgerald, a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force, testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress that a new transport plane, the C-5A, was substantially over its projected cost. This testimony apparently embarrassed the Department of Defense and the Air Force. Shortly thereafter, Fitzgerald's job was abolished in a reorganization of the Air Force. Fitzgerald brought suit against a number of officials of the Executive Branch, including petitioners Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield. Fitzgerald alleged that Harlow and Butterfield had participated in a conspiracy to violate his constitutional and statutory rights by arranging to have him dismissed from his position in the Air Force in retaliation for his testimony. As evidence of Harlow's involvement, Fitzgerald relied on a series of conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzgerald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. He also relied on a recorded conversation in which the President later voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for canning" Fitzgerald. As evidence against Butterfield, Fitzgerald cited a May 1969 White House memorandum. In it Butterfield claimed to have learned that Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to public view. Fitzgerald also cited communications between Butterfield and Haldeman in December 1969 and January 1970 as evidence that Butterfield participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful discharge and prevent his reemployment. Harlow asserted that Secretary Seamans had advised him that considerations of efficiency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force. Harlow had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed. Butterfield stated that he was not involved in any decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until more than a month after the termination had been scheduled and announced publicly. Butterfield never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any official of the Defense Department. The District Court denied the motions of Harlow and Butterfield for summary judgment based on absolute Presidential immunity or, alternatively, qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed in part and remanded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.