457 U.S. 800 (1982)
In 1968, Ernest Fitzgerald, a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force, testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress that a new transport plane, the C-5A, was substantially over its projected cost.1 This testimony apparently embarrassed the Department of Defense and the Air Force.2 Shortly thereafter, Fitzgerald's job was abolished in a reorganization of the Air Force.3 Fitzgerald brought suit against a number of officials of the Executive Branch, including petitioners Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield.4
Fitzgerald alleged that Harlow and Butterfield had participated in a conspiracy to violate his constitutional and statutory rights by arranging to have him dismissed from his position in the Air Force in retaliation for his testimony.5 As evidence of Harlow's involvement, Fitzgerald relied on a series of conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzgerald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans.6 He also relied on a recorded conversation in which the President later voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for canning" Fitzgerald.7
As evidence against Butterfield, Fitzgerald cited a May 1969 White House memorandum.8 In it Butterfield claimed to have learned that Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to public view.9 Fitzgerald also cited communications between Butterfield and Haldeman in December 1969 and January 1970 as evidence that Butterfield participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful discharge and prevent his reemployment.10
Harlow asserted that Secretary Seamans had advised him that considerations of efficiency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force.11 Harlow had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed.12 Butterfield stated that he was not involved in any decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until more than a month after the termination had been scheduled and announced publicly.13 Butterfield never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any official of the Defense Department.14
The District Court denied the motions of Harlow and Butterfield for summary judgment based on absolute Presidential immunity or, alternatively, qualified immunity.15 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed in part and remanded.16 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.17
Whether senior Presidential aides are entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability for their official acts?18
In Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), this Court held that executive officials in general are entitled only to a qualified immunity and that Presidential aides are not entitled to any greater immunity than that available to executive officials generally.19
No. The established facts show that petitioners Harlow and Butterfield were senior White House aides.20 They engaged in conversations regarding Fitzgerald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Seamans and H.R. Haldeman.21 However, they are not the President.22 Thus they receive only qualified immunity under the rule from Butz v. Economou as applied in this case.23
Senior Presidential aides are entitled only to qualified immunity from damages liability for their official acts.24
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Burger dissented from the denial of absolute immunity to senior Presidential aides.25 He argued that the majority's refusal to recognize derivative absolute immunity contradicts the functional approach adopted in Gravel v. United States.26 In Gravel the Court held that it is impossible for Members of Congress to perform their legislative tasks without the help of aides.27 Such aides must be treated as alter egos entitled to the same absolute immunity.28
Burger contended that the same reasoning applies with greater force to the President, whose constitutional duties are far more extensive than those of any Member of Congress.29 Without derivative immunity the functioning of the Presidency would be diminished and frustrated because aides would face constant distraction from the threat of litigation.30 He emphasized that the President cannot personally implement a fraction of his policies and must rely on aides who work literally at his elbow.31
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the petitioners are entitled to absolute immunity for their official acts.32 He reasoned that the functions performed by petitioners were intimately related to the President's constitutional responsibilities.33 In his view the Court's decision today unnecessarily narrows the protection that should be afforded to high-ranking Presidential advisers.34
Stevens would have reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals to recognize absolute immunity for the petitioners.35 The decision fails to afford the full protection that high-ranking advisers require when their actions are closely tied to the President's own duties.36
Whether the qualified immunity standard for executive officials performing discretionary functions should be reframed as an objective inquiry into whether the conduct violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known?37
The previously established good faith test for qualified immunity is not sufficiently precise to guide officials in the proper exercise of their discretion or to permit courts to determine when immunity should be available.38 Government officials performing discretionary functions are therefore shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.39
The qualified immunity standard for executive officials performing discretionary functions is reframed as an objective inquiry into whether the conduct violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.42
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Marshall And Blackmun
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment.43 He agreed that petitioners are entitled only to qualified immunity and that the good faith test should be clarified to an objective standard.44 Brennan emphasized that the new standard would not allow an official who actually knows he is violating the law to escape liability even if he could not reasonably have been expected to know what he actually did know.45
He noted that the decision does not alter the rule that absolute immunity remains appropriate in some circumstances.46 Brennan also observed that some measure of discovery may sometimes be required to determine exactly what an official actually knew at the time of his actions.47 Summary judgment would remain readily available when the state of the law was ambiguous.48
Justice Rehnquist concurred in the Court's opinion.49 He stated that at such time as a majority of the Court is willing to re-examine the holding in Butz v. Economou he would join in that undertaking with alacrity.50 Until that time comes, however, Rehnquist agreed that the Court's opinion in this case properly disposes of the issues presented and therefore joined it.51
Rehnquist expressed a willingness to revisit the broader question of qualified immunity for executive officials when the opportunity arises but accepted the resolution reached under existing precedent.52
Whether the District Court should determine on remand whether the governing law was clearly established at the time of the challenged actions?53
On remand, the District Court should determine whether the governing law was clearly established at the time of the challenged actions and, if so, whether a reasonable official would have known that the alleged conduct violated that law.54
Yes. The facts establish that the District Court denied summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds without resolving whether the law was clearly established in 1969 when Harlow and Butterfield acted.55 The case must therefore be remanded for that threshold determination before any further discovery or trial proceeds.56
The District Court should determine on remand whether the governing law was clearly established at the time of the challenged actions.57