Legal Parenthood

Karen Capato married Robert Capato in May 1999. Shortly thereafter, Robert was diagnosed with esophageal cancer and was told that the chemotherapy he required might render him sterile. Because the couple wanted children, Robert deposited his semen in a sperm bank before undergoing chemotherapy. Despite Robert's treatment, Karen conceived naturally and gave birth to a son in August 2001. Robert's health deteriorated in late 2001, and he died in Florida in March 2002. His will, executed in Florida, named as beneficiaries the son born of his marriage to Karen and two children from a previous marriage, but made no provision for children conceived after his death. Shortly after Robert's death, Karen began in vitro fertilization using her husband's frozen sperm. She conceived in January 2003 and gave birth to twins in September 2003, eighteen months after Robert's death. Karen Capato claimed survivors insurance benefits on behalf of the twins. The Social Security Administration denied her application. The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed the agency's decision. The court determined that the twins would qualify for benefits only if they could inherit from the deceased wage earner under Florida intestacy law. Under Florida law, a child born posthumously may inherit only if conceived during the decedent's lifetime. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. It concluded that the undisputed biological children of a deceased wage earner and his widow qualify for survivors benefits without regard to state intestacy law. Courts of Appeals had divided on the question, with some circuits reaching conflicting results. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.

In January 1993, Lauren Woodward and her husband Warren Woodward, who had been married for approximately three and one-half years and remained childless, learned that Warren had leukemia. The couple arranged for a quantity of Warren's semen to be medically withdrawn and preserved through a process known as sperm banking before he began treatment. Warren underwent an unsuccessful bone marrow transplant and died in October 1993, after which Lauren was appointed administratrix of his estate. In October 1995, Lauren gave birth to twin girls who had been conceived through artificial insemination using Warren's preserved semen. In January 1996, she applied to the Social Security Administration for child's insurance benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) and mother's benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402(g)(1). The SSA denied the claims on the ground that the twins were not the husband's children within the meaning of the Act. In February 1996, while pursuing appeals from the SSA denial, Lauren filed a complaint for correction of birth record in the Probate and Family Court against the clerk of the city of Beverly, seeking to add Warren as the father on the twins' birth certificates. In October 1996, a Probate Court judge entered a judgment of paternity based on stipulations of voluntary acknowledgment of parentage and ordered the birth certificates amended to declare Warren the children's father. An administrative law judge conducted a de novo hearing. The judge concluded that the children did not qualify for benefits because they were not entitled to inherit from Warren under Massachusetts intestacy and paternity laws. The SSA appeals council affirmed that decision. Lauren appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The court certified the question regarding the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children under Massachusetts intestacy law to the Supreme Judicial Court because the parties agreed that a determination under state law was dispositive and no directly applicable precedent existed.

In November 1973, after incidents reflecting parental neglect, respondent Kramer, Commissioner of the Ulster County Department of Social Services, initiated a neglect proceeding under the Family Court Act and removed Tina Santosky from her natural home. About ten months later, he removed John III and placed him with foster parents. On the day John was taken, Annie Santosky gave birth to a third child, Jed, who was transferred to a foster home three days later on the ground that immediate removal was necessary to avoid imminent danger to his life or health. In October 1978, respondent petitioned the Ulster County Family Court to terminate petitioners' parental rights in the three children. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the fair preponderance of the evidence standard specified in the Family Court Act. The Family Court Judge rejected this constitutional challenge, weighed the evidence under the statutory standard, acknowledged that the Santoskys had maintained contact with their children but found those visits at best superficial and devoid of any real emotional content, decided that the agency had made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship, concluded that the Santoskys were incapable even with public assistance of planning for the future of their children, and after a dispositional hearing ruled that the best interests of the three children required permanent termination of the Santoskys' custody. Petitioners appealed, again contesting the constitutionality of the standard of proof. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed, holding application of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard proper and constitutional on the ground that it recognizes and seeks to balance rights possessed by the child with those of the natural parents. The New York Court of Appeals then dismissed petitioners' appeal upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is directly involved. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider petitioners' constitutional claim.