132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012)
Karen Capato married Robert Capato in May 1999.1 Shortly thereafter, Robert was diagnosed with esophageal cancer and was told that the chemotherapy he required might render him sterile.2 Because the couple wanted children, Robert deposited his semen in a sperm bank before undergoing chemotherapy.3 Despite Robert's treatment, Karen conceived naturally and gave birth to a son in August 2001.4
Robert's health deteriorated in late 2001, and he died in Florida in March 2002.5 His will, executed in Florida, named as beneficiaries the son born of his marriage to Karen and two children from a previous marriage, but made no provision for children conceived after his death.6 Shortly after Robert's death, Karen began in vitro fertilization using her husband's frozen sperm.7 She conceived in January 2003 and gave birth to twins in September 2003, eighteen months after Robert's death.8
Karen Capato claimed survivors insurance benefits on behalf of the twins.9 The Social Security Administration denied her application. The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed the agency's decision.10 The court determined that the twins would qualify for benefits only if they could inherit from the deceased wage earner under Florida intestacy law.11
Under Florida law, a child born posthumously may inherit only if conceived during the decedent's lifetime.12 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed.13 It concluded that the undisputed biological children of a deceased wage earner and his widow qualify for survivors benefits without regard to state intestacy law.14 Courts of Appeals had divided on the question, with some circuits reaching conflicting results.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.16
Whether the Social Security Administration's interpretation of the Social Security Act, under which a posthumously conceived child must qualify for inheritance from the deceased wage earner under state intestacy law to receive child's insurance benefits, is the correct reading of the statute?17
Under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, an agency's longstanding interpretation is entitled to deference if it was promulgated after notice-and-comment rulemaking.18 Congress must have delegated authority to the agency to make rules carrying the force of law, and the interpretation must be a permissible construction of the statute.19 Section 416(h)(2)(A) completes the definition of child in section 416(e)(1). It directs the Commissioner to apply the intestacy law of the insured individual's domiciliary State in determining whether an applicant is the child of an insured individual for purposes of the subchapter.20
Yes. The SSA's interpretation is the correct reading of the statute because section 416(h)(2)(A) supplies the operative test for child status under the Act.21 The District Court found that Robert was domiciled in Florida at death and that Florida intestacy law permits a posthumously conceived child to inherit only if conceived during the decedent's lifetime.22 The twins therefore do not qualify as children under the completed statutory definition, and the Third Circuit erred in holding that biological parentage alone suffices without regard to section 416(h).23
The SSA's interpretation is the correct reading of the statute, is entitled to Chevron deference, and requires reversal of the Third Circuit's judgment.24