46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988)
In December 1982, Richard Elden and Linda Ebeling were involved in an automobile accident allegedly caused by defendant Sheldon's negligence.1 Elden was a passenger in Ebeling's car.2 He sustained serious personal injuries.3 Ebeling was thrown from the car and died a few hours later.4
Elden filed an action against Sheldon and the automobile owner.5 In the complaint he alleged that at the time of the accident he had an unmarried cohabitation relationship with Ebeling that was both stable and significant and parallel to a marital relationship.6 The complaint set forth three causes of action: the first for Elden's own injuries, the second for negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from witnessing the injury to his de facto spouse, and the third for loss of consortium.7
Defendants demurred to the second and third causes of action on the ground that Elden was not legally married to Ebeling at the time of the accident.8 The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal.9
After the trial court sustained defendants' demurrer, the parties settled the personal injury claim.10 They stipulated to the entry of judgment that preserved Elden's right to appeal from the dismissal of his causes of action for loss of consortium and negligent infliction of emotional distress.11 Elden appealed from the judgment of dismissal.12
Whether a plaintiff who witnessed the tortious injury and death of the person with whom he shared an unmarried cohabitant relationship may recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress?13
Under Dillon v. Legg, recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress to a bystander turns primarily on foreseeability assessed through physical, temporal, and relational proximity to the victim, yet overriding policy considerations may bar a cause of action even when the risk is foreseeable.14 Those policies include the state's strong interest in promoting formal marriage, the practical burden on courts of evaluating the stability and significance of nonmarital relationships, and the imperative to limit the scope of liability to prevent an intolerable societal burden.15
No. The established facts demonstrate that Elden and Ebeling shared an unmarried cohabitation relationship described as stable, significant, and parallel to marriage, yet they were not legally married at the time of the December 1982 accident in which Elden witnessed Ebeling's fatal injuries.16 Applying the rule to these facts, the relational proximity prong of Dillon cannot overcome the policy barriers because extending recovery would undermine the state's interest in channeling relational rights through marriage, force courts to conduct intrusive inquiries into the couple's emotional, sexual, and economic ties to determine equivalence to marriage, and risk multiplying claims by opening the door to de facto siblings, parents, and other nonmarital relationships.17
The plaintiff may not recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress.18
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Broussard dissents on the ground that the majority's categorical exclusion based on marital status is arbitrary and disconnected from the core tort principles of foreseeability and genuine injury.19 He maintains that once the widespread acceptance of unmarried cohabitation establishes foreseeability as a matter of law, the inquiry should end.20 He argues that the state's interest in marriage is not advanced by denying relief to already-injured plaintiffs who can prove on a case-by-case basis that their relationship was the functional equivalent of marriage.21
Whether a plaintiff who witnessed the tortious injury and death of the person with whom he shared an unmarried cohabitant relationship may recover damages for loss of consortium?22
Under Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., a cause of action for loss of consortium is available only to a married person whose spouse has been injured by a third party's negligence.23 Courts have consistently refused to extend the action to unmarried cohabitants because the right is founded on the legal relationship of marriage.24 The same policy considerations that limit emotional-distress claims—the state's interest in marriage, judicial administrability, and the need to contain liability—apply with equal force.25
No. The established facts show that Elden and Ebeling were not legally married, and the complaint alleged only an unmarried cohabitation relationship that was stable and significant and parallel to marriage.26 Applying the rule to these facts, the court declines to enlarge the cause of action beyond the marital relationship because doing so would require the same difficult, privacy-intrusive factual determinations about the couple's fidelity, economic entanglement, and emotional bonds that the policies against extension are designed to avoid.27
The plaintiff may not recover damages for loss of consortium.28
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Broussard further dissents on the loss-of-consortium claim, contending that the historical proprietary origins of the action have been abandoned in favor of a modern view centered on relational interests such as love, companionship, and emotional support.29 He argues that marital status has no principled bearing on the ability to suffer these intangible losses.30 He maintains that the majority's refusal to adapt the common law to contemporary social realities abdicates the court's responsibility to keep doctrine aligned with present conditions.31