Also known as: intermediate scrutiny · intermediate level scrutiny
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A standard of judicial review requiring that a classification serve an important governmental objective and be substantially related to achieving that objective. The government bears the burden of proof and must supply an exceedingly persuasive justification that is genuine rather than hypothesized.
Isabella Ingram and her husband jointly owned a duplex purchased as a marital investment. A state statute designated the husband as head of household and authorized him alone to encumber the property. The husband executed a deed of trust on the duplex to secure his separate business loan. Isabella challenged the statute in federal court on equal protection grounds.
Ira Irving operated a cable system serving multiple communities. A federal regulation required carriage of local broadcast stations on his channels without additional compensation. The rule displaced fifteen percent of available capacity previously used for premium programming. Ira sued the agency claiming the mandate violated the First Amendment.
Ibrahim Iqbal applied to a state-supported military college that admitted only men. The institution defended the single-sex policy as necessary to preserve its distinctive educational environment. Ibrahim sued state officials alleging an unconstitutional gender classification. The record contained no evidence that women could not succeed in the program.
India Inoue gave birth to a child outside marriage. State law imposed a six-year deadline for filing a paternity action on behalf of nonmarital children but allowed marital children to seek support indefinitely. India filed suit after the deadline had passed. She challenged the statute on equal protection grounds.
Isaac Irving sought a permit to operate a supervised residence for adults with intellectual disabilities. City officials denied the application citing neighbor concerns about safety and emergency response. No data showed heightened risks compared with other residential uses. Isaac sued alleging the denial violated equal protection.
In July 1980, respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building at 201 Featherston Street in Cleburne, Texas. Hannah intended to lease the property to Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC) for use as a group home. The home would house thirteen mentally retarded men and women under constant staff supervision. The building contained four bedrooms and two baths, and CLC planned to add a half bath while complying with all applicable state and federal regulations for an Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded. The site lay in an R-3 Apartment House District. The city's zoning ordinance permitted apartment houses, boarding houses, hospitals, and nursing homes in that district without special permission. However, the ordinance required a special use permit, renewable annually after a public hearing, for hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded. The city classified the proposed group home as a hospital for the feeble-minded and informed CLC that a permit was required. After a public hearing, the City Council voted three to one to deny the application. CLC and its prospective residents filed suit in federal district court against the city and its officials. They alleged that the ordinance and its application discriminated against the mentally retarded in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court upheld the ordinance and the denial. It found that the council's decision was motivated by the residents' mental retardation yet rationally related to legitimate interests such as neighborhood safety and property values. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that mental retardation is a quasi-suspect class and that the ordinance was invalid both facially and as applied. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the equal protection issues raised by the zoning ordinance and its application to the proposed group home.
Ilana Isaacs owned copyrights in musical compositions. A federal statute extended the term of existing copyrights by twenty years. Ilana challenged the extension as exceeding Congress's enumerated powers. The statute applied uniformly without regard to any classification based on gender or legitimacy.
In 1998 Congress enacted the Copyright Term Extension Act, which extended the duration of all federal copyrights by twenty years. For works created by identified natural persons the new term runs from creation until seventy years after the author's death. For anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works made for hire the term is ninety-five years from publication or one hundred twenty years from creation, whichever expires first. The statute applied these extended terms both to copyrights already in existence and to works created after its effective date. Petitioners are individuals and businesses whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have gone into the public domain. They filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaration that the extension of existing copyrights exceeded Congress's power under the Copyright Clause and violated the First Amendment. On cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings the district court entered judgment for the Attorney General. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. A majority of the panel upheld the statute against both challenges, while Judge Sentelle dissented in part on the Copyright Clause issue. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the extension of existing copyrights exceeds Congress's power under the Copyright Clause and whether the extension violates the First Amendment.
Gender classifications receive intermediate scrutiny. The government must demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive justification showing the classification serves an important objective and is substantially related to that objective.
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…holding attempted by RFRA. Even assuming RFRA would be interpreted in effect to mandate some lesser test, say, one equivalent to intermediate scrutiny, the statute nevertheless would require searching judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant likelihood of invalidation. This is a considerable congressional intrusion into the…
…that mental retardation was a quasi-suspect classification and that it should assess the validity of the ordinance under intermediate-level scrutiny
…"not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." Ante , at 564 and 566. I agree with the Court that this level
…errs in arguing that the only thing actually at issue here is conduct, not speech, and that the correct standard of review is intermediate scrutiny, as set out in United States v. O’Brien , 391 U. S. 367, 377. That standard is not used to review a content-based regulation of speech, and §2339B regulates plaintiffs’ speech to the PKK…
…scrutiny. However, Metro Broadcasting had held that certain "benign" federal racial classifications need only satisfy intermediate scrutiny
No. Such a statute creates a facial gender classification that rests on outdated stereotypes rather than an important governmental objective substantially advanced by the means chosen.
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Content-neutral regulations such as must-carry rules for cable operators receive intermediate scrutiny. The government must show the regulation advances important interests unrelated to speech suppression and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary.
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Classifications based on illegitimacy receive intermediate scrutiny. They must be substantially related to an important governmental objective such as preventing stale claims, and a six-year limitations period that treats nonmarital children differently fails this test.
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Mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect class. Although the group has faced historical prejudice and lacks political power, the classification receives rational basis review because it is relevant to many legitimate legislative distinctions.
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