Also known as: infamous crime · crimes of infamy
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A category of serious criminal offenses that at common law involved fraud, dishonesty, or obstruction of justice and that under the Fifth Amendment require prosecution by grand jury indictment. Modern statutes and decisions have expanded the category to encompass most felonies. Conviction of an infamous crime can trigger collateral consequences such as loss of voting rights, disqualification from public office, or impeachment of a witness.
Federal prosecutors charge Idina Iverson with embezzling corporate funds. They file an information rather than seeking a grand jury indictment. The district court dismisses the case because embezzlement qualifies as an infamous crime that must be initiated by presentment or indictment.
Isabelle Inman, convicted of larceny in state court, attempts to register to vote. State officials deny her application under a constitutional provision barring persons convicted of infamous crimes. She sues, arguing the disqualification violates equal protection because the underlying offense does not involve moral turpitude.
The Alabama Constitution of 1901 included Art. VIII, §182, which expanded upon the 1875 constitution's disenfranchisement provision by adding numerous specific crimes and a catchall for any crime involving moral turpitude. The 1901 convention delegates, all white, selected crimes they believed were more commonly committed by blacks. In the 1980s, Carmen Edwards, a black woman, and Victor Underwood, a white man, were each convicted of the misdemeanor of presenting a worthless check and consequently barred from voting by their respective county boards of registrars, which relied on Alabama Attorney General opinions classifying the offense as involving moral turpitude. Edwards and Underwood brought suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama against the Montgomery and Jefferson County Boards of Registrars under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief invalidating §182 as applied to misdemeanants. The district court certified a plaintiff class consisting of persons purged or barred from voting due to misdemeanor convictions and a defendant class of all Alabama county boards of registrars. The case proceeded to trial on a claim that the misdemeanors in §182 were intentionally adopted to disenfranchise blacks and produced that effect. The district court determined that disenfranchisement of blacks motivated the 1901 convention but found insufficient evidence that the crimes provision specifically was based on racial animus, and it upheld the provision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed this finding as clearly erroneous after reviewing the convention proceedings, historical studies, and expert testimony. It concluded that racial discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor in the adoption of §182 and that the provision would not have been enacted absent that factor. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1984. Evidence presented included statements from convention president John B. Knox advocating white supremacy within constitutional limits, and data showing the provision disenfranchised about ten times as many blacks as whites by 1903, with a continuing disparate impact of at least 1.7 times in Jefferson and Montgomery Counties.
View caseImran Iyer is tried for robbery, an infamous crime, and convicted. The state appeals and obtains a retrial on the same facts. Iyer moves to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds, claiming the second prosecution places him twice in jeopardy for the same infamous offense.
Frank Palko was indicted in Fairfield County, Connecticut, for the crime of murder in the first degree. A jury found him guilty of murder in the second degree, and he was sentenced to confinement in the state prison for life. Thereafter the State of Connecticut, with the permission of the judge presiding at the trial, gave notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Errors pursuant to an act adopted in 1886, now section 6494 of the General Statutes. Upon such appeal, the Supreme Court of Errors reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial. It found that there had been error of law to the prejudice of the state in excluding testimony as to a confession by defendant, in excluding testimony upon cross-examination of defendant to impeach his credibility, and in the instructions to the jury as to the difference between first and second degree murder. Pursuant to the mandate of the Supreme Court of Errors, Palko was brought to trial again. Before a jury was impaneled and also at later stages of the case he made the objection that the effect of the new trial was to place him twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and in so doing to violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Upon the overruling of the objection the trial proceeded. The jury returned a verdict of murder in the first degree, and the court sentenced the defendant to the punishment of death. The Supreme Court of Errors affirmed the judgment of conviction, adhering to a decision announced in 1894, State v. Lee, which upheld the challenged statute. Palko sought review in the Supreme Court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 344.
View caseIgor Ito is convicted of possessing a large quantity of cocaine, classified as an infamous crime. The court imposes a mandatory life sentence without parole. Ito challenges the sentence as cruel and unusual, arguing that the nature of the infamous offense does not justify such punishment.
Ronald Harmelin was convicted in Michigan state court of possessing 672 grams of cocaine. Michigan law imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for that quantity of the drug. Harmelin had no prior felony convictions. The Michigan Court of Appeals initially reversed the conviction because evidence supporting it had been obtained in violation of the Michigan Constitution. On petition for rehearing, the Court of Appeals vacated its prior decision and affirmed the sentence. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The quantity of cocaine at issue had a potential yield of between 32,500 and 65,000 doses. The sentencing court imposed the mandatory term without considering any individualized circumstances of the offense or the offender. Harmelin challenged the sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds, arguing both that it was grossly disproportionate to the crime and that the mandatory nature of the penalty was unconstitutional.
View caseIsaac Irving is prosecuted for stealing government property, an infamous crime. The government offers evidence of the taking but no direct proof of intent. The defense moves for acquittal, contending that the elements of an infamous offense require proof of mens rea beyond the mere act.
In December 1948, Morissette went hunting on a large tract of land in Michigan that the Government had used as a practice bombing range for the Air Force. Spent bomb casings from the range had been dumped into heaps and left exposed to the weather for four years or more. Morissette collected three tons of the casings, flattened them at a nearby farm, and sold them for eighty-four dollars. Morissette worked as a fruit stand operator in the summer and as a trucker and scrap iron collector in the winter. He was an honorably discharged veteran of World War II who had a good reputation among his neighbors. He loaded the casings onto his truck and transported them in broad daylight without any effort to conceal what he was doing. When authorities began an investigation, Morissette voluntarily and candidly told them the whole story, explaining that he believed the casings were abandoned and that he had no intention of stealing them. He was indicted for unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly stealing and converting property of the United States valued at eighty-four dollars in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. At trial, the District Court refused to permit Morissette to show that he thought the property was abandoned or to argue that he lacked criminal intent. The court instructed the jury that if it believed the government testimony, Morissette was guilty, and the jury convicted him. The court sentenced him to two months in prison or a fine of two hundred dollars. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseIris Irons, a minor, is charged with armed robbery, an infamous crime. The state seeks to transfer the case to adult court. Defense counsel argues that the juvenile system must afford the same grand-jury protections required for infamous crimes before any transfer can occur.
On Monday, June 8, 1964, at about 10 a.m., Gerald Francis Gault, then 15 years old and subject to a six-month probation order entered February 25, 1964, was taken into custody by the Sheriff of Gila County along with Ronald Lewis after a neighbor, Mrs. Cook, complained of a lewd telephone call. Gerald's parents were both at work; no notice was left at the home. Gerald was placed in the Children's Detention Home. When his mother returned home at about 6 p.m., she learned of his custody through his older brother and went to the detention home, where Deputy Probation Officer Flagg told her a hearing would be held the next day at 3 p.m. On June 9, 1964, Officer Flagg filed a formal petition alleging only that Gerald was a delinquent minor in need of the court's protection; the petition was never served on the Gaults. At the hearing in chambers before Juvenile Judge McGhee, Gerald, his mother, his brother, and two probation officers appeared. No complainant was present, no one was sworn, and no transcript or record was made. Gerald was questioned about the call. He was returned to the detention home and released on June 11 or 12. On the day of release, Mrs. Gault received a plain-paper note from Officer Flagg stating that a further hearing was set for June 15 at 11 a.m. At the June 15 hearing, Gerald, his parents, Ronald Lewis and his father, and the probation officers appeared. A referral report listing the charge as "Lewd Phone Calls" was filed but not shown to the family. At the conclusion of the hearing the judge committed Gerald as a delinquent to the State Industrial School for the period of his minority, until age 21. Arizona law permitted no appeal from juvenile court orders. On August 3, 1964, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in the Arizona Supreme Court and referred to the Superior Court. After a hearing on August 17 at which Judge McGhee was cross-examined, the Superior Court dismissed the writ. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).
View caseAt common law, infamous crimes included offenses involving fraud, dishonesty, or obstruction of justice. Modern authorities have broadened the category to cover most felonies.
Supporting sources
The Fifth Amendment requires that infamous crimes be prosecuted by grand jury indictment or presentment. This procedural safeguard ensures that serious charges receive independent review before a person is held to answer in federal court.
Supporting sources
Conviction may result in loss of the right to vote, disqualification from public office or jury service, disbarment of attorneys, and impeachment of the convicted person as a witness.
Supporting sources
The Fifth Amendment grand-jury clause has not been incorporated against the states. States may therefore prosecute infamous crimes by information or complaint rather than by indictment.
…to the right of suffrage, and prohibits denying to any person the suffrage to which he is entitled except upon conviction of an infamous crime. Art. I, § 5; Art. IV, § 1. It requires an enumeration of qualified voters within every term of ten years after 1871 and an apportionment of representatives and senators among the several…