471 U.S. 222 (1985)
The Alabama Constitution of 1901 included Art. VIII, §182, which expanded upon the 1875 constitution's disenfranchisement provision by adding numerous specific crimes and a catchall for any crime involving moral turpitude.1 The 1901 convention delegates, all white, selected crimes they believed were more commonly committed by blacks.2 In the 1980s, Carmen Edwards, a black woman, and Victor Underwood, a white man, were each convicted of the misdemeanor of presenting a worthless check and consequently barred from voting by their respective county boards of registrars, which relied on Alabama Attorney General opinions classifying the offense as involving moral turpitude.3
Edwards and Underwood brought suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama against the Montgomery and Jefferson County Boards of Registrars under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.4 They sought declaratory and injunctive relief invalidating §182 as applied to misdemeanants.5 The district court certified a plaintiff class consisting of persons purged or barred from voting due to misdemeanor convictions and a defendant class of all Alabama county boards of registrars.6 The case proceeded to trial on a claim that the misdemeanors in §182 were intentionally adopted to disenfranchise blacks and produced that effect.7
The district court determined that disenfranchisement of blacks motivated the 1901 convention but found insufficient evidence that the crimes provision specifically was based on racial animus, and it upheld the provision.8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed this finding as clearly erroneous after reviewing the convention proceedings, historical studies, and expert testimony.9 It concluded that racial discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor in the adoption of §182 and that the provision would not have been enacted absent that factor.10
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1984.11 Evidence presented included statements from convention president John B. Knox advocating white supremacy within constitutional limits, and data showing the provision disenfranchised about ten times as many blacks as whites by 1903, with a continuing disparate impact of at least 1.7 times in Jefferson and Montgomery Counties.12
Whether Art. VIII, §182 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 was enacted with the intent to discriminate against blacks on account of their race?13
To establish a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the face of mixed motives, plaintiffs must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that racial discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor in the adoption of section 182. They shall then prevail unless the registrars prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the same decision would have resulted had the impermissible purpose not been considered.14
Yes. The all-white delegates to the 1901 convention selected specific misdemeanors such as presenting a worthless check for inclusion in §182 because they believed those crimes were more frequently committed by blacks.15 Convention president John B. Knox openly declared the goal of establishing white supremacy within constitutional limits, and historical evidence plus expert testimony confirmed that racial animus was a motivating factor behind the crimes provision.16
The Court of Appeals correctly held the district court's contrary finding clearly erroneous under Rule 52(a), and appellants' counsel conceded at oral argument that race played a part in the convention's decisions.17
Section 182 was enacted with the intent to discriminate against blacks on account of their race.18
Whether that provision violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when applied to persons convicted of misdemeanors?19
Official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact. Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.20 Once racial discrimination is shown to have been a substantial or motivating factor behind enactment of the law, the burden shifts to the law's defenders to demonstrate that the law would have been enacted without this factor.21
Yes. Section 182 is facially neutral yet produces a racially disparate impact.22 It disenfranchised approximately ten times as many blacks as whites by 1903.23 The provision continues to affect blacks at a rate at least 1.7 times higher than whites in Jefferson and Montgomery Counties for nonprison offenses.24
Because the provision was enacted with discriminatory intent and that intent remains operative, the Court of Appeals properly concluded that §182 as applied to misdemeanants violates the Equal Protection Clause under the Arlington Heights framework.25
The provision violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when applied to persons convicted of misdemeanors.26
Whether the existence of a permissible motive for the provision defeats a showing of racially discriminatory intent and impact?27
Where both impermissible racial motivation and racially discriminatory impact are demonstrated, Arlington Heights and Mt. Healthy supply the proper analysis. An additional purpose to discriminate against poor whites would not render nugatory the purpose to discriminate against all blacks, and the latter was a but-for motivation for the enactment of §182.28
No. Even accepting appellants' claim that the convention also sought to disenfranchise poor whites to counter Populism, the evidence establishes that racial discrimination against blacks was a substantial motivating factor and a but-for cause of §182's adoption.2930 The Court of Appeals found no competing permissible intent sufficient to overcome the racial purpose, and the existence of an additional motive does not defeat the equal-protection violation.31
The existence of a permissible motive for the provision does not defeat a showing of racially discriminatory intent and impact.32
Whether §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment excepts the provision from the operation of the Equal Protection Clause of §1?33
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to permit the purposeful racial discrimination attending the enactment and operation of §182 which otherwise violates §1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.34
No. The Tenth Amendment cannot save legislation prohibited by the subsequently enacted Fourteenth Amendment. Section 2 does not authorize purposeful racial discrimination in the denial of the franchise.35 Nothing in Richardson v. Ramirez suggests otherwise, so §182 remains subject to the equal-protection prohibition of §1.36
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not except the provision from the operation of the Equal Protection Clause of §1.37