incident-to-arrest doctrine

Police officers obtained a search warrant authorizing a search for drugs and firearms at the home of petitioner Booker T. Hudson in Michigan. Upon arriving to execute the warrant, the officers knocked on the door and announced their presence. They waited only three to five seconds before turning the knob of the unlocked front door and entering Hudson's home. Inside the residence, officers discovered large quantities of drugs, including cocaine rocks in Hudson's pocket, and a loaded gun lodged between the cushion and armrest of the chair in which he was sitting. Hudson was charged under Michigan law with unlawful drug and firearm possession. He moved to suppress all the inculpatory evidence, arguing that the officers' premature entry violated his rights. The Michigan trial court granted the motion to suppress. On interlocutory review, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed that ruling, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Hudson was subsequently convicted of the possession charges. He renewed his suppression claim on appeal, but the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected it and affirmed the conviction. The Michigan Supreme Court again declined review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the case.

Edward Lawson was detained or arrested on approximately fifteen occasions by San Diego police officers between March 1975 and January 1977 while walking on the streets of the city. On each occasion, officers stopped Lawson and requested that he produce a driver's license or other identification. When he was unable to comply, the officers arrested him under California Penal Code section 647(e). Lawson was prosecuted twice under the statute and convicted once. The second charge was dismissed. Lawson filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California against various officers and officials, including Deputy Chief Commander H. A. Porazzo of the California Highway Patrol. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that section 647(e) was unconstitutional, a mandatory injunction restraining its enforcement, and compensatory and punitive damages. The District Court held the statute overbroad, enjoined its enforcement, and denied damages on the ground that the officers had acted in good faith. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's determination that the statute was unconstitutional. It concluded that the statute violated the Fourth Amendment, contained a vague enforcement standard susceptible to arbitrary enforcement, and failed to give fair notice of the conduct prohibited. The Ninth Circuit also reversed the denial of a jury trial on the damages issue and remanded the case for trial. The officers appealed to the Supreme Court from the portion of the judgment declaring the statute unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. California Penal Code section 647(e) (West 1970) provides that every person who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place without apparent reason or business is guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor. The statute further requires that such a person refuse to identify himself and to account for his presence when requested by any peace officer if the surrounding circumstances indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such identification. California courts have construed the statute to require that a detained person provide credible and reliable identification. This identification must carry reasonable assurance that it is authentic and provide means for later contact with the person who has identified himself. The District Court made no specific findings concerning the circumstances of each stop, but the trial transcript contains descriptions given by both Lawson and the officers. One officer testified that he stopped Lawson on an otherwise vacant street late at night because the area was isolated and near a high-crime zone. Another testified that he detained Lawson while walking at a late hour in a business area where burglaries had occurred. Lawson stated that he had never been stopped by police for any reason apart from these detentions under the statute.

On August 25, 1999, Tucson police officers Griffith and Reed responded to an anonymous tip that the residence at 2524 North Walnut Avenue was being used to sell drugs by knocking on the front door and speaking with Rodney Gant, who identified himself and stated that he expected the owner to return later. The officers left and conducted a records check revealing that Gant's driver's license had been suspended and that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest for driving with a suspended license. When the officers returned to the house that evening, they found a man near the back of the house and a woman in a car parked in front of it. After a third officer arrived, they arrested the man for providing a false name and the woman for possessing drug paraphernalia. Both arrestees were handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars when Gant arrived. Gant arrived in his car, parked at the end of the driveway, and got out. Officer Griffith recognized the car, confirmed Gant's identity with a flashlight, called to him, and arrested him 10 to 12 feet from the vehicle before handcuffing him. Because the other arrestees occupied the only patrol cars at the scene, Griffith called for backup. When two more officers arrived, they locked Gant in the backseat of their vehicle. After Gant had been handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car, two officers searched his car. One of them found a gun, and the other discovered a bag of cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat. Gant was charged with two offenses of possession of a narcotic drug for sale and possession of drug paraphernalia. He moved to suppress the evidence seized from his car on the ground that the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. A jury found Gant guilty on both drug counts, and he was sentenced to a 3-year term of imprisonment. After protracted state-court proceedings, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the search of Gant's car was unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certiorari.

On April 9, 1978, New York State Trooper Douglas Nicot stopped a vehicle traveling at an excessive speed on the New York Thruway. The car contained four men including respondent Roger Belton. Nicot smelled burnt marihuana and observed an envelope marked Supergold on the floor that he associated with marihuana. Nicot directed the men to exit the car and placed them under arrest for unlawful possession of marihuana. He patted each man down and separated them into four areas along the Thruway. Nicot then searched the passenger compartment and found a black leather jacket belonging to Belton on the back seat. Nicot unzipped a pocket of the jacket and discovered cocaine inside. He placed the jacket in his own vehicle and transported the four arrestees to a nearby police station. Belton was subsequently indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance. In the trial court Belton moved to suppress the cocaine. The motion was denied and he pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense while preserving his constitutional claim. The Appellate Division upheld the search and seizure. The New York Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.