547 U.S. 586 (2006)
Police officers obtained a search warrant authorizing a search for drugs and firearms at the home of petitioner Booker T. Hudson in Michigan.1 Upon arriving to execute the warrant, the officers knocked on the door and announced their presence. They waited only three to five seconds before turning the knob of the unlocked front door and entering Hudson's home.2 Inside the residence, officers discovered large quantities of drugs, including cocaine rocks in Hudson's pocket, and a loaded gun lodged between the cushion and armrest of the chair in which he was sitting.3
Hudson was charged under Michigan law with unlawful drug and firearm possession.4 He moved to suppress all the inculpatory evidence, arguing that the officers' premature entry violated his rights.5 The Michigan trial court granted the motion to suppress.6 On interlocutory review, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed that ruling, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.7
Hudson was subsequently convicted of the possession charges.8 He renewed his suppression claim on appeal, but the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected it and affirmed the conviction.9 The Michigan Supreme Court again declined review.10 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the case.11
Whether violation of the knock-and-announce rule requires suppression of evidence seized during the ensuing search?12
The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect.13 Suppression is not a personal constitutional right.14 It applies only where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served and its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.15 The Court has never applied the exclusionary rule to violations of the knock-and-announce rule.16 The interests protected by the rule have little to do with the seizure of evidence.17 The causal connection between the violation and the discovery of evidence is too remote.18
No. Police officers obtained a valid search warrant authorizing a search for drugs and firearms at Hudson's home and discovered cocaine rocks in his pocket along with a loaded gun in the chair where he sat. Michigan conceded that the officers' three-to-five-second wait after knocking and announcing constituted a knock-and-announce violation, yet the evidence was seized pursuant to execution of the valid warrant.19 The manner-of-entry violation was not a but-for cause of obtaining the evidence, as the police would have discovered the gun and drugs inside the house whether or not the preliminary misstep had occurred.20 The interests protected by the knock-and-announce rule, including protection of life and limb, property, and privacy and dignity, bear no relation to the shielding of potential evidence from government eyes, so suppression would not serve those interests.21
The social costs of applying exclusion here, including the risk of releasing dangerous criminals and a flood of litigation over reasonable wait times, are considerable while the deterrent effect is minimal because civil liability, internal police discipline, and professionalism already constrain violations.22
Violation of the knock-and-announce rule does not require suppression of evidence seized during the ensuing search.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment.24 He agreed that the exclusionary rule does not apply to this knock-and-announce violation.25 The violation here was not sufficiently serious to require suppression.26
The officers announced their presence and waited a few seconds.27 The record does not show a deliberate disregard of the knock-and-announce requirement.28 He cautioned that the decision should not be read to suggest that the knock-and-announce rule is unimportant or that its violation can never lead to suppression.29
Different considerations may apply in cases of more severe violations.30 The causal link between the violation and the discovery of evidence was too attenuated to justify suppression.31
Joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, And Ginsburg
Justice Breyer dissented.32 He argued that the exclusionary rule must apply to knock-and-announce violations because it is the only effective deterrent.33 Civil suits are not an adequate substitute.34
They are rarely brought and even more rarely successful.35 He maintained that the violation was the but-for cause of the entry and seizure.36 The majority's causation analysis is flawed.37
The evidence here was obtained because the police entered without waiting long enough.38 He contended that the social costs of exclusion are not as high as claimed.39 The rule had operated for decades in many jurisdictions without the predicted problems.40
The majority's decision will lead to more violations.41