403 U.S. 443 (1971)
In January 1964, fourteen-year-old Pamela Mason disappeared from her home in Manchester, New Hampshire, during a heavy snowstorm after receiving a telephone call about a babysitting job.1 Her body was discovered eight days later beside a major highway, prompting a massive police investigation.2
On January 28, officers visited Edward Coolidge at his home after learning he had been absent on the night of the disappearance.3 Coolidge produced three guns for inspection and agreed to take a lie-detector test.4 On February 2, while Coolidge was at the police station undergoing the test, two plainclothes officers arrived at his house and spoke with his wife.5 Mrs. Coolidge provided four guns belonging to her husband and some clothing she believed he might have worn on the night in question.6 Coolidge was held overnight on an unrelated charge but released the next day.7
Over the following two and a half weeks, the State accumulated evidence implicating Coolidge.8 On February 19, the results of the investigation were presented at a meeting between the police officers working on the case and the State Attorney General, who had personally taken charge of all police activities relating to the murder, and was later to serve as chief prosecutor at the trial.9 Coolidge was arrested at his home that day.10 His 1951 Pontiac automobile parked in the driveway was seized and towed to the police station two and a half hours later.11
The Pontiac was searched and vacuumed on February 21, again in January 1965, and a third time in April 1965.12 At Coolidge's subsequent jury trial for murder, vacuum sweepings from the car were introduced into evidence.13 One of the guns taken from the home was also introduced.14 Vacuum sweepings from the clothing were introduced into evidence.15 The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the conviction after upholding the admissibility of the evidence, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.16
Whether the search warrant for the defendant's automobile was invalid because it was issued by the Attorney General who was not a neutral and detached magistrate?17
Yes. The Attorney General of New Hampshire personally took charge of all police activities relating to the murder.20 He later served as chief prosecutor at trial.21 The warrants were then signed and issued by the Attorney General himself, acting as a justice of the peace.22
Under the rule from Johnson v. United States, the determination of probable cause must be made by a neutral judicial officer.23 It cannot be made by the chief government enforcement agent directing the competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.24 The Attorney General's dual role as investigator and magistrate disqualified him from issuing the warrant.25 This rendered the seizure and subsequent searches of the Pontiac unconstitutional.26
The warrant was invalid and the evidence obtained from the automobile should have been excluded.27
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan agreed that the conviction must be reversed.28 He would not reach all of the questions discussed by Justice Stewart.29 In his view, this case is controlled by the principle that a search warrant must be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.30
Because the Attorney General was not neutral, the warrant for the automobile was invalid.31 That is sufficient to decide this case.32 He also agreed that the warrantless search of the home cannot be sustained.33
He expressed no view on the other issues discussed.34
Justice Douglas joined the opinion of the Court.35 He emphasized that this case illustrates once again the importance of the warrant requirement and the need for strict adherence to the Fourth Amendment's commands.36 The exceptions to the warrant requirement must be narrowly drawn to prevent erosion of constitutional protections against arbitrary police intrusions.37
This case demonstrates the dangers that arise when law enforcement officials are permitted to bypass the neutral magistrate requirement.38 Strict adherence ensures that the Fourth Amendment retains its vitality as a meaningful check on governmental power.39
Whether the warrantless seizure and search of the defendant's automobile could be justified as incident to a lawful arrest?40
No. Coolidge was arrested inside his house on February 19.43 His Pontiac remained untouched in the driveway until after he had been taken away.44 It was not searched until two days later at the police station.45 Under pre-Chimel standards applicable to the 1964 events, the vehicle was outside the immediate vicinity of the arrest.46
The search was not substantially contemporaneous with the arrest.47 Preston v. United States confirms that a search of a car made at another place without a warrant is simply not incident to the arrest once the accused is in custody.48
The seizure and search of the automobile cannot be justified as incident to arrest.49
Whether the warrantless seizure and search of the defendant's automobile could be justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement?50
No. The police had known for weeks of the Pontiac's probable role in the crime.53 Coolidge had been cooperative and presented no flight risk.54 The car was parked in his driveway and under police guard after his arrest.55 There was ample time and opportunity to secure a warrant.56
The rationale of Carroll and Chambers requires exigent circumstances such as an alerted suspect on the open highway.57 Here the opportunity for search was not fleeting.58 The car was not being used for any illegal purpose at the time of seizure.59
The automobile exception does not justify the warrantless seizure and search.60
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Joined by Chief Justice Burger
Justice White would affirm the judgment.61 In his view, Coolidge's Pontiac was lawfully seized as evidence of the crime in plain sight.62 It was thereafter lawfully searched under Cooper v. California.63
He is in substantial disagreement with Parts II-C and II-D of the Court's opinion.64 He does not agree with Part II-B.65 He concurs only in the result as to Part III.66
He would treat searches of automobiles as the arrest of a person when probable cause exists.67
Chief Justice Burger dissents.68 In his view, the police conduct in this case was reasonable under all the circumstances.69 The officers had probable cause to believe that evidence of the crime would be found in petitioner's home and automobile.70
The seizure of the clothing was justified under the plain view doctrine once the officers were lawfully in the home with the consent of petitioner's wife.71 With respect to the automobile, the warrant was valid.72 The Attorney General was still acting in a judicial capacity when he issued the warrant.73
The majority's holding will unduly complicate law enforcement efforts.74 The conviction should be affirmed.75
Whether the warrantless seizure of the defendant's automobile could be justified under the plain view doctrine?76
The plain view doctrine permits seizure of evidence only when the police have a prior justification for an intrusion.77 They must come upon the evidence inadvertently.78 It must be immediately apparent that the item is incriminating.79 Planned seizures where the police know the location in advance and intend to seize the item require a warrant.80
No. The police knew the exact description and location of the Pontiac well in advance.81 They intended to seize it when they came onto Coolidge's property.82 They had ample opportunity to obtain a valid warrant.83 The discovery was not inadvertent.84
The officers had decided at the February 19 meeting to seize the car as an instrumentality of the crime.85 Because the initial intrusion was not justified by any exception and the seizure was anticipated, the plain view doctrine does not apply.86
The plain view doctrine does not justify the seizure of the automobile.87
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Blackmun
Justice Black agrees with much of what the Chief Justice has said.88 The Fourth Amendment does not require the elaborate structure that the Court has built around it.89 The search of the automobile was supported by probable cause.90
The warrant was not defective merely because it was issued by the Attorney General.91 The Constitution does not require that the magistrate be completely uninvolved in the investigation.92 The exclusionary rule should not be applied so rigidly as to exclude reliable evidence where the police have acted in good faith.93
Justice Blackmun joins the Chief Justice's dissent.94 He believes the Court continues to expand the exclusionary rule at the expense of justice and the truth-finding function of the courts.9596 The evidence here was reliable and probative of the defendant's guilt.97
The minor defects in procedure identified by the majority do not justify setting aside a jury verdict of guilty after a fair trial.98 Expanding the exclusionary rule in this manner undermines the integrity of the criminal justice system and prevents juries from considering trustworthy evidence.99
Whether the guns and clothing obtained from the defendant's home were the product of a valid consent by his wife?100
No. Two plainclothes officers arrived at the Coolidge house at night while Coolidge was at the station.103 They told Mrs. Coolidge her husband was in serious trouble and probably would not return that night.104 They asked about guns and clothing.105 Mrs. Coolidge produced the items after the officers accompanied her to the bedroom and one officer said they might as well take them.106
Under these circumstances her acquiescence cannot be considered voluntary consent.107 The seizure of the guns and clothing violated the Fourth Amendment.108
The guns and clothing were not obtained through valid consent.109