461 U.S. 352, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903 (1983)
Edward Lawson was detained or arrested on approximately fifteen occasions by San Diego police officers between March 1975 and January 1977 while walking on the streets of the city.1 On each occasion, officers stopped Lawson and requested that he produce a driver's license or other identification.2 When he was unable to comply, the officers arrested him under California Penal Code section 647(e).3 Lawson was prosecuted twice under the statute and convicted once.4 The second charge was dismissed.5
Lawson filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California against various officers and officials, including Deputy Chief Commander H. A. Porazzo of the California Highway Patrol.6 The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that section 647(e) was unconstitutional, a mandatory injunction restraining its enforcement, and compensatory and punitive damages.7 The District Court held the statute overbroad, enjoined its enforcement, and denied damages on the ground that the officers had acted in good faith.8
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's determination that the statute was unconstitutional.9 It concluded that the statute violated the Fourth Amendment, contained a vague enforcement standard susceptible to arbitrary enforcement, and failed to give fair notice of the conduct prohibited.10 The Ninth Circuit also reversed the denial of a jury trial on the damages issue and remanded the case for trial.11 The officers appealed to the Supreme Court from the portion of the judgment declaring the statute unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement.12 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.13
California Penal Code section 647(e) (West 1970) provides that every person who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place without apparent reason or business is guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor.14 The statute further requires that such a person refuse to identify himself and to account for his presence when requested by any peace officer if the surrounding circumstances indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such identification.15 California courts have construed the statute to require that a detained person provide credible and reliable identification.16 This identification must carry reasonable assurance that it is authentic and provide means for later contact with the person who has identified himself.17
The District Court made no specific findings concerning the circumstances of each stop, but the trial transcript contains descriptions given by both Lawson and the officers.18 One officer testified that he stopped Lawson on an otherwise vacant street late at night because the area was isolated and near a high-crime zone.19 Another testified that he detained Lawson while walking at a late hour in a business area where burglaries had occurred.20 Lawson stated that he had never been stopped by police for any reason apart from these detentions under the statute.21
Whether California Penal Code section 647(e), as construed by the California courts to require a person detained under the statute to provide credible and reliable identification, is unconstitutionally vague on its face within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?22
The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.23 The more important aspect of the doctrine is the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.24
Yes. The statute as construed by the California courts in People v. Solomon requires that a detained person provide "credible and reliable" identification.25 It contains no standard for determining what a suspect must do to comply with that requirement.26 The terms "credible and reliable" are not defined in the statute.27 The California courts have not provided any narrowing construction that would give the terms a sufficiently definite meaning.28 This vests complete discretion in the police to determine whether a person has "identified" himself in a "credible and reliable" manner.29
The statute therefore encourages arbitrary enforcement by failing to provide sufficiently definite guidelines for law enforcement officials.30
The statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.31
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan joins the Court's opinion.32 He writes separately to emphasize that the statute at issue here is unconstitutionally vague.33 The vagueness exists not only because the statute fails to provide adequate guidelines for law enforcement.34 It also fails to give fair notice to persons of ordinary intelligence as to what conduct is prohibited.35 Brennan would also hold that the statute violates the Fourth Amendment.36
He reasons that states may not authorize the arrest and criminal prosecution of an individual for failing to produce identification or further information on demand by a police officer.37 This prohibition applies when the purpose is merely to facilitate general law enforcement objectives of investigating and preventing unspecified crimes.38
Justice Marshall dissents.39 He argues that the California statute is not unconstitutionally vague when properly construed.40 The requirement that a person provide "credible and reliable" identification when requested by a peace officer is sufficiently clear in the context of the statute's other requirements.41
The statute is directed at loitering and wandering without apparent reason or business.42 The identification requirement is triggered only when the surrounding circumstances indicate that the public safety demands such identification.43 Marshall would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.44
Joined by Justice Rehnquist
Justice White dissents.45 He contends that the vagueness of a criminal statute must be judged in light of the conduct charged to be violative of the statute.46 White argues that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague on its face unless it is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.47
There is a range of conduct that is clearly within the reach of the statute, such as a suspect refusing to provide any information at all during a valid Terry stop.48 White concludes that the judgment below should therefore not be affirmed but reversed.49 He would remit appellee Lawson to challenging the statute as it has been or will be applied to him.50