Also known as: heightened standards of judicial review · heightened scrutiny
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A standard of judicial review that demands the government demonstrate an important or compelling interest and a close fit between the challenged classification or restriction and that interest. It applies to suspect or quasi-suspect classifications and burdens on fundamental rights, rendering the government action presumptively invalid unless the required showing is made.
State officials enforce a statute barring married couples from obtaining contraceptives through state pharmacies. Hugo Hart and his spouse challenge the law after their request is denied. The court applies heightened scrutiny because the restriction burdens the fundamental right to marital privacy and invalidates the statute for lack of narrow tailoring to any compelling interest.
A state statute caps the rent that Helios Energy may charge for its service stations. Helios Energy sues, claiming the cap effects a regulatory taking. The court evaluates the regulation under the Takings Clause rather than heightened scrutiny and holds that the substantially-advances test does not govern takings claims.
In 1997, the State of Hawaii had a highly concentrated wholesale oil market due to its small size and isolation over 1,600 miles from the mainland, with only two refineries and six gasoline wholesalers operating in the state. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. was the largest refiner and marketer, controlling 60 percent of the in-state gasoline market and 30 percent of the wholesale market on Oahu. Gasoline was sold at retail through approximately 300 service stations, about half leased by oil companies to independent lessee-dealers. Chevron operated 64 such lessee-dealer stations under arrangements where it leased land, constructed stations, and leased them to dealers while setting wholesale prices and requiring supply contracts. In June 1997, the Hawaii Legislature enacted Act 257, which capped the rent oil companies could charge lessee-dealers at 15 percent of gross profits from gasoline sales plus 15 percent of other product sales, and imposed other restrictions on station ownership. Thirty days after enactment, Chevron filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii against the Governor and Attorney General, challenging the rent cap. The parties stipulated that the cap would reduce aggregate rent on 11 of Chevron's stations by about $207,000 per year but allow increases on the remaining 53, potentially raising overall rental income by nearly $1.1 million annually, and that Chevron had not recovered station maintenance costs through rent alone over the past 20 years. The District Court granted summary judgment to Chevron. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case. After a one-day bench trial featuring competing expert economists, the District Court entered judgment for Chevron. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2004.
View caseThe Patent and Trademark Office refuses to register a mark containing a racial slur submitted by Hakim Hall. Hall sues, alleging a First Amendment violation. The court subjects the denial to heightened scrutiny because the refusal constitutes viewpoint discrimination and strikes down the statutory bar.
Simon Tam serves as the lead singer of the rock group The Slants, whose members are Asian-Americans. He chose the name in an effort to reclaim the term and drain its denigrating force as a derogatory reference to Asian persons. The group has incorporated childhood slurs into its lyrics and titled albums including The Yellow Album and Slanted Eyes, Slanted Hearts. Tam filed an application with the Patent and Trademark Office seeking registration of THE SLANTS as a trademark. The PTO examining attorney rejected the application after applying a two-part analysis and concluding that a substantial composite of persons of Asian descent would find the mark offensive. The attorney cited dictionary definitions labeling the term as derogatory and evidence that the band's name had prompted cancellation of a performance along with negative comments from online readers. Tam appealed the denial first to the examining attorney and then to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which upheld the refusal. Tam then brought the case before the Federal Circuit. Sitting en banc, that court reversed the Board. The Government petitioned for certiorari, and the Supreme Court granted review.
View caseThe City of New London condemns Hazel Hoffman's waterfront home to assemble land for a private development project expected to increase tax revenue. Hoffman challenges the taking. The court applies rational-basis review under the Public Use Clause rather than heightened scrutiny and upholds the condemnation.
In the late 1990s the city of New London, Connecticut, confronted severe economic decline after the 1996 closure of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, which had employed more than 1,500 people. The city's unemployment rate stood nearly double the state average and its population had dropped below 24,000 residents from a 1970 high of 30,000. State and local officials therefore designated the Fort Trumbull peninsula for targeted economic revitalization. In 1998 the New London Development Corporation, a private nonprofit entity, was reactivated to prepare a redevelopment plan covering roughly 90 acres. The plan divided the area into seven parcels designated for a waterfront conference hotel and marinas, retail and entertainment space, research and office facilities, parking and park support, residential units, a Coast Guard museum, and additional office and retail uses. The city council formally approved the plan in January 2000 and authorized the NLDC to acquire needed parcels by purchase or, if necessary, by eminent domain. Petitioners Susette Kelo, Wilhelmina Dery, and seven other owners held fifteen properties within parcels 3 and 4A; ten of those parcels were occupied by the owners or their family members and none was alleged to be blighted. After negotiations with the NLDC failed, the corporation initiated condemnation proceedings against the remaining properties in November 2000. In December 2000 the petitioners filed suit in New London Superior Court asserting that the proposed takings violated the public-use limitation of the Fifth Amendment. Following a seven-day bench trial the Superior Court entered a permanent restraining order barring condemnation of the parcel 4A properties but denied relief as to the parcel 3 properties. Both sides appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which upheld the validity of all challenged takings. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the federal constitutional question.
View caseThe water management district conditions approval of Hector Hernandez's building permit on dedication of land for flood control. Hernandez sues, claiming an unconstitutional exaction. The court applies heightened scrutiny to evaluate whether an essential nexus and rough proportionality exist between the condition and the project's impact.
In 1972, Coy A. Koontz, Sr. purchased an undeveloped 14.9-acre tract of land on the south side of Florida State Road 50 east of Orlando that lies entirely within the jurisdiction of the St. Johns River Water Management District. The property contains wetlands as defined by Florida statute. A drainage ditch runs along the property's western edge, and high-voltage power lines bisect it into northern and southern sections. The northern 3.7-acre section drains well despite its classification. The southern section includes a small creek, forested uplands, and wetlands that sometimes have water as much as a foot deep. In 1984 the District adopted a rule requiring permit applicants whose projects would adversely impact wetlands to offset that loss by creating, enhancing, or preserving wetlands elsewhere. That requirement could be satisfied by purchasing credits from a mitigation bank. In 1994 Koontz applied to the District for Management and Storage of Surface Water and Wetlands Resource Management permits to develop the northern 3.7 acres. He proposed to raise the elevation of the building site, install a dry-bed pond, and grant a conservation easement over the remaining 11 acres. The District found the mitigation inadequate. It stated it would approve the permits only if Koontz reduced the development to one acre and deeded the remaining 13.9 acres to the District. In the alternative, Koontz could pay contractors to replace culverts or fill ditches on District-owned land several miles away to enhance approximately 50 acres of wetlands. Koontz found both alternatives unacceptable and filed suit in Florida circuit court under Fla. Stat. § 373.617(2) alleging that the demands constituted an unreasonable exercise of the state's police power. After a two-day bench trial at which experts testified that the northern section had already been seriously degraded by surrounding construction, the trial court found the demands lacked the required nexus and rough proportionality and awarded damages. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed, but the Florida Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the permit denial was not a taking and that the District had not actually demanded any property from Koontz. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among state courts of last resort on whether the Nollan and Dolan standards apply to a land-use agency's demand for money.
View caseThe City of Hialeah enacts an ordinance banning ritual animal sacrifice practiced by members of the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye. The church sues, alleging a free exercise violation. The court applies heightened scrutiny because the ordinance targets religious conduct and invalidates it for lacking narrow tailoring to a compelling interest.
In April 1987 the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation organized under Florida law in 1973 whose president is Ernesto Pichardo, leased land in Hialeah, Florida, and announced plans to build a house of worship, school, cultural center, and museum at which members would practice Santeria. Santeria originated in nineteenth-century Cuba as a fusion of Yoruba traditions and Roman Catholicism. It centers on animal sacrifice performed by cutting the carotid arteries, after which the animals are usually cooked and eaten except in healing and death rituals. The announcement prompted the Hialeah City Council to convene an emergency public session on June 9, 1987. At that session residents and council members voiced strong opposition to Santeria practices. The council then adopted Resolution 87-66 declaring opposition to religious acts inconsistent with public morals, peace, or safety and passed Ordinance 87-40 incorporating Florida's animal-cruelty statute that criminalizes unnecessary or cruel killing of animals. After the Florida attorney general issued an opinion that ritual animal sacrifice other than for food consumption violated state law, the council in August 1987 adopted Resolution 87-90 opposing ritual animal sacrifice. In September 1987 the council enacted three further ordinances. Ordinance 87-52 barred possession of animals with intent to use them for ritual sacrifice except by licensed food establishments. Ordinance 87-71 directly prohibited any person from sacrificing an animal within city limits. Ordinance 87-72 restricted slaughter of animals to properly zoned slaughterhouse premises while exempting small-scale commercial hog and cattle operations. The Church and Pichardo filed suit against the city and its officials in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They alleged that the ordinances violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. After granting summary judgment to the individual defendants on immunity grounds, the district court conducted a nine-day bench trial on the remaining claims and entered judgment for the city. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseHeightened scrutiny applies to classifications based on race, alienage, national origin, sex, or legitimacy, as well as burdens on fundamental rights such as marital privacy. The government must then show an important or compelling interest and a close fit between the means and that interest.
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Rational basis review upholds a classification if it is rationally related to a legitimate interest. Heightened scrutiny presumes invalidity and requires the government to prove an important or compelling interest plus substantial relation or narrow tailoring.
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Federal alienage classifications receive rational basis review because Congress possesses plenary power over immigration. State alienage classifications generally trigger strict scrutiny unless they involve a governmental function exception.
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The law is invalidated because it interferes with the fundamental right to make intimate decisions within marriage without a sufficiently tailored justification. Courts have struck down contraceptive bans and marital-status distinctions in benefit programs under this standard.
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