Also known as: foremen · forematron · foreperson · forepersons · jury foreman
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
An officer of a grand jury appointed by the court to preside over its proceedings. The foreperson administers oaths, signs indictments, records the number of concurring jurors, and reports any lack of concurrence to the magistrate judge.
An officer of a grand jury appointed by the court to preside over its proceedings. The foreperson administers oaths, signs indictments, records the number of concurring jurors, and reports any lack of concurrence to the magistrate judge.
A person who directs the work of employees. The foreman oversees daily operations at a job site and may testify about safety conditions or communications with other parties.
Forrest Falconer, the printing foreman at a local newspaper, signed an affidavit confirming publication of a summons in a quiet-title action. The court accepted the affidavit as satisfying the statutory requirement for proof of service by publication. This established personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.
A person who directs the work of employees. The foreman oversees daily operations at a job site and may testify about safety conditions or communications with other parties.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Felicia Fuentes served as foreperson of a federal grand jury investigating a fraud scheme. After twelve jurors voted to indict, she signed the indictment and presented it in open court to the magistrate judge. When the magistrate accepted the return by video teleconference to avoid delay, the indictment became valid.
Finn Fletcher served as foreman of the sentencing jury in a capital murder trial. After the jury recommended death, Fletcher signed the verdict form designating the statutory aggravating circumstance found beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court imposed the death sentence based on that finding.
On November 21, 1973, Troy Gregg and Floyd Allen were hitchhiking north in Florida when they were picked up by Fred Simmons and Bob Moore in their car. Their car broke down. Simmons purchased another vehicle with some of the cash he was carrying. While still in Florida, the group picked up Dennis Weaver, who rode with them to Atlanta, where he was let out about 11 p.m. A short time later the four men stopped for a rest along the highway in Gwinnett County, Georgia. The next morning the bodies of Simmons and Moore were discovered in a nearby ditch. On November 23, after reading about the shootings in an Atlanta newspaper, Weaver communicated with the Gwinnett County police and related information concerning the journey with the victims, including a description of the car. The next afternoon, Gregg and Allen, while in Simmons' car, were arrested in Asheville, North Carolina. In the search incident to the arrest a .25-caliber pistol, later shown to be that used to kill Simmons and Moore, was found in Gregg's pocket. After receiving Miranda warnings and signing a written waiver, Gregg signed a statement admitting he shot Simmons and Moore but claiming self-defense. At the guilt stage of the bifurcated trial, a medical examiner testified that Simmons died from a bullet wound in the eye and that Moore died from bullet wounds in the cheek and in the back of the head. The examiner further testified that both men had several bruises and abrasions about the face and head. Gregg testified claiming self-defense after Simmons and Moore allegedly attacked with a pipe and knife, but the jury convicted him of two counts of armed robbery and two counts of murder. At the penalty stage before the same jury, neither side presented additional evidence. The trial judge instructed the jury that it could recommend either a death sentence or a life prison sentence on each count. The judge further charged the jury that in determining the sentence it was free to consider mitigating or aggravating circumstances. The judge instructed that death could not be imposed unless the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt one of the aggravating circumstances. The jury found the first and second aggravating circumstances and returned verdicts of death on each count. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions and the death sentences for murder after reviewing the record and comparing the sentences to similar cases, but it vacated the death sentences for armed robbery. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the challenge to the death sentences under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
View caseFarah Fox, foreperson of the grand jury, reported that reporter Branzburg refused to identify confidential sources during testimony. The report triggered contempt proceedings when Branzburg declined to answer questions about observed drug activity. The court enforced the grand jury's authority to obtain the information.
In November 1969, Paul Branzburg, a staff reporter for the Courier-Journal newspaper in Louisville, Kentucky, published an article describing his observations of two individuals synthesizing hashish from marijuana in Jefferson County. The article included a photograph and stated that Branzburg had promised not to reveal the identities of the two. He was subsequently subpoenaed by the Jefferson County grand jury and refused to identify the individuals he had observed. A state trial court ordered him to answer, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals denied his petition for relief. In January 1971, Branzburg published a second article detailing drug use in Frankfort, Kentucky, based on interviews with several dozen users over two weeks. He was subpoenaed by the Franklin County grand jury to testify about violations of drug statutes. The Court of Appeals denied the requested writs and rejected his First Amendment claim. This Court granted certiorari. In July 1970, Paul Pappas, a television newsman-photographer, was assigned to cover civil disorders in New Bedford, Massachusetts, involving the Black Panthers. He entered Panther headquarters under an agreement not to disclose what he saw or heard inside except for an anticipated police raid, which did not occur. Two months later, he was summoned before the Bristol County grand jury but refused to answer questions about his observations inside the headquarters. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that he must appear and testify. In February 1970, Earl Caldwell, a New York Times reporter covering the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, received a subpoena to appear before a federal grand jury investigating possible violations of federal law by the group, including threats against the President. The District Court denied the motion to quash but issued a protective order. Caldwell refused to appear and was held in contempt. The Court of Appeals reversed, recognizing a qualified privilege. This Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases.
3 common questions
The foreperson administers oaths, signs all indictments, and records the number of jurors concurring in each indictment. The foreperson must also report in writing to the magistrate judge if fewer than twelve jurors concur when a complaint or information is pending.
Supporting sources
A workplace foreman directs employees and oversees job-site operations. A grand jury foreperson performs procedural duties limited to the grand jury's investigative and charging functions.
Yes. The foreperson signs every indictment returned by the grand jury, and that signature is required for the indictment to be presented in open court.
Supporting sources
In February 1866, J.H. Mitchell obtained a judgment in an Oregon circuit court against Neff for less than $300 in an action for attorney services. At that time, Neff resided outside Oregon, received no personal service of process, and made no appearance in the case. The judgment was entered by default following constructive service by publication as authorized by the Oregon Code for non-resident defendants possessing property within the state. The Oregon Code also provided for attachment of a non-resident's property in money actions. No such attachment occurred with respect to the land at issue. Instead, after the judgment, an execution issued, leading to a levy on the land and its sale at a sheriff's auction. Pennoyer purchased the property at that sale and received a sheriff's deed. Separately, in 1866, the United States issued a patent to Neff for the same tract of land under the Donation Law of Oregon, which Neff valued at $15,000. Neff then brought suit against Pennoyer in the circuit court to recover possession of the premises based on his patent title. The lower court held the Oregon judgment invalid because of deficiencies in the affidavits used to obtain the publication order and to prove publication occurred. The Supreme Court of the United States granted review to consider the validity of the state court judgment and the resulting sheriff's sale.
View caseFelipe Figueroa, the mine foreman, relayed threats from union representatives to striking workers. The court examined whether the union had endorsed the threats through its agents. The foreman's account helped determine whether the union could be held responsible for the ensuing violence.
Paul Gibbs was hired in the summer of 1960 by Grundy Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Tennessee Consolidated Coal Company, to serve as mine superintendent for a new mine at Gray's Creek and to haul the coal produced there under a separate contract. This arrangement occurred amid ongoing rivalry between the United Mine Workers of America and the Southern Labor Union for representation of coal miners in the southern Appalachian fields. On August 15 and 16, 1960, armed members of UMW Local 5881 prevented the mine from opening through threats and violence, including beating an organizer for the rival union, after learning that jobs they believed had been promised to them were going to others. George Gilbert, the UMW field representative for the area, was attending an Executive Board meeting in Middlesboro, Kentucky, when the violence occurred and did not return until late on August 16. Upon his return he received instructions from international union superiors to establish a limited picket line, prevent any further violence, and ensure the strike did not spread. No further violence took place at the mine site, a picket line was maintained for nine months, and no further attempts were made to open the mine during that period. Gibbs lost his superintendent position and never performed the haulage contract. He claimed to have lost other trucking contracts and mine leases in nearby areas as a result of a concerted union plan against him. He filed suit against the international UMW only, not against Local 5881 or its members, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. Jurisdiction over the federal claim rested on alleged secondary boycotts under section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Jurisdiction over the state law claim for unlawful conspiracy and boycott was premised on the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. At trial the district court refused to submit claims of pressure on mining firms other than Grundy to cease doing business with Gibbs. The jury returned a verdict finding violations of both section 303 and state law and awarded $60,000 in damages under the employment contract, $14,500 under the haulage contract, and $100,000 in punitive damages. On post-trial motion the court set aside the haulage contract award for lack of proof of damages and sustained a remitted award on the state law claim alone. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseFiona Foster, a purchasing foreman at Bell Aerospace, exercised discretion in selecting suppliers without routine oversight. The NLRB considered whether such managerial authority placed her outside the bargaining unit. The Court held that the Board could decide the issue through adjudication rather than rulemaking.
In July 1970, Amalgamated Local No. 1286 of the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America petitioned the National Labor Relations Board for a representation election to determine whether the union would be certified as the bargaining representative of the 25 buyers in the purchasing and procurement department at Bell Aerospace Company's plant in Wheatfield, New York. The company opposed the petition on the ground that the buyers were managerial employees and thus were not covered by the Act. The plant is engaged in research and development in the design and fabrication of aerospace products. The purchasing and procurement department receives requisition orders from other departments at the plant and is responsible for purchasing all of the company's needs from outside suppliers. Some items are standardized and may be purchased off the shelf from various distributors and suppliers. Other items must be made to the company's specifications, and the requisition orders may be accompanied by detailed blueprints and other technical plans. Absent specific instructions to the contrary, buyers have full discretion, without any dollar limit, to select prospective vendors, draft invitations to bid, evaluate submitted bids, negotiate price and terms, and prepare purchase orders. Buyers execute all purchase orders up to $50,000. They may place or cancel orders of less than $5,000 on their own signature. On commitments in excess of $5,000, buyers must obtain the approval of a superior, with higher levels of approval required as the purchase cost increases. For the Minute Man missile project, which represents 70% of the company's sales, purchase decisions are made by a team of personnel from the engineering, quality assurance, finance, and manufacturing departments, with the buyer serving as team chairman. After the representation hearing, the Regional Director transferred the case to the Board. On May 20, 1971, the Board issued its decision holding that the company's buyers constituted an appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining and directing an election. Relying on its recent decision in North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc., the Board stated that even though the company's buyers might be managerial employees, they were nevertheless covered by the Act and entitled to its protections. The Board rejected the company's contention that representation should be denied because the buyers' authority to commit the company's credit, select vendors, and negotiate purchase prices would create a potential conflict of interest. On June 16, 1971, a representation election was conducted in which 15 of the buyers voted for the union and nine against. On August 12, the Board certified the union as the exclusive bargaining representative for the company's buyers. The company stood by its contention that the buyers were not covered by the Act and refused to bargain with the union. An unfair labor practice complaint resulted in a Board finding that the company had violated sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act and an order compelling the company to bargain with the union. The company petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review of the order and the Board cross-petitioned for enforcement. The Court of Appeals denied enforcement and remanded the case to the Board for a rulemaking proceeding. The Supreme Court granted the Board's petition for certiorari.
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