137 S. Ct. 855, 861 (2017)
In 2007, two teenage sisters were sexually assaulted in the bathroom of a Colorado horse-racing facility.1 The girls identified the assailant as a racetrack employee, and police arrested Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez.2 Each girl separately identified him as the man who assaulted her. State prosecutors charged Peña-Rodriguez with harassment, unlawful sexual contact, and attempted sexual assault on a child.3
Before the jury was empaneled, members of the venire received a written questionnaire asking if anything would make it difficult to be a fair juror.4 The court and defense counsel repeatedly asked prospective jurors whether they could be fair and impartial.5 None of the empaneled jurors expressed reservations based on racial bias.6 After a three-day trial, the jury convicted Peña-Rodriguez of unlawful sexual contact and harassment but failed to reach a verdict on the attempted sexual assault charge.7
When the jury was discharged, the court gave the mandated instruction that whether jurors discussed the case was their own decision.8 Following discharge, two jurors remained in the jury room to speak privately with defense counsel.9 They reported that during deliberations another juror, identified as H.C., had expressed anti-Hispanic bias toward Peña-Rodriguez and his alibi witness.10 With the trial court's supervision, counsel obtained sworn affidavits from the two jurors.11
The affidavits stated that H.C. said Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to believe they could do whatever they wanted with women.12 The affidavits further stated that nine times out of ten Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and young girls.13 H.C. believed Peña-Rodriguez was guilty because he is Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want.1415 H.C. did not find the alibi witness credible because the witness was an illegal.16
The trial court acknowledged H.C.'s apparent bias.17 It denied Peña-Rodriguez's motion for a new trial on the ground that Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) generally prohibits a juror from testifying about statements made during deliberations in a proceeding inquiring into the validity of the verdict.18 A divided panel of the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the statements did not fall within an exception to the rule.19 The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed by a 4-3 vote.20
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether there is a constitutional exception to the no-impeachment rule for instances of racial bias.21
Whether the Sixth Amendment requires an exception to the no-impeachment rule when, after the verdict, a juror makes a clear statement indicating that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in his or her vote to convict?22
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to an impartial jury.23 This right is violated if even one juror harbors racial bias or animus toward the defendant.24 Therefore, where a juror makes a clear statement indicating that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in his or her vote to convict, the no-impeachment rule must give way.25 The trial court may then consider the evidence of the juror's statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.26
Yes. The established facts show that after a three-day trial the jury convicted Peña-Rodriguez of unlawful sexual contact and harassment.27 Following discharge, two jurors approached defense counsel and, with court supervision, provided sworn affidavits describing Juror H.C.'s statements during deliberations.28 The affidavits recounted that Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to believe they could do whatever they wanted with women.29 The affidavits also recounted that nine times out of ten Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and young girls.30 Peña-Rodriguez was guilty because he is Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want. The alibi witness was not credible because the witness was an illegal.31 The trial court acknowledged H.C.'s apparent bias but denied the motion for a new trial solely on the ground that Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) prohibits juror testimony about statements made during deliberations.32
These statements constitute clear expressions of racial animus that were a significant motivating factor in the juror's vote to convict.33 The statements directly link guilt to the defendant's ethnicity and national origin.34 The Sixth Amendment therefore requires that the no-impeachment rule yield so the trial court may consider the evidence.35
The Sixth Amendment requires an exception to the no-impeachment rule under these circumstances.36
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas dissented on the ground that the holding cannot be squared with the original understanding of the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments.37 He explained that the common-law no-impeachment rule was firmly established by the time of the founding and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.38 Lord Mansfield's rule prohibiting jurors from supplying affidavits to impeach their verdict had become the near-universal American rule by the mid-nineteenth century.39
Because the Sixth Amendment incorporates the common-law understanding of an impartial jury, the historical record shows no right to impeach a verdict with juror testimony about misconduct.40 The Constitution does not mandate the new exception created by the majority.41
Joined by Roberts, C. J., And Thomas, J.
Justice Alito dissented on the ground that the decision is incompatible with Tanner and Warger and will invite the very harms no-impeachment rules were designed to prevent.42 He maintained that the Tanner safeguards remain adequate even for racial bias claims. The distinction drawn between racial bias and other forms of partiality lacks support in the text or history of the Sixth Amendment.43
Allowing post-verdict juror testimony will inhibit full and frank discussion in the jury room.44 It will expose jurors to harassment and undermine the finality of verdicts without a principled limiting principle.45