Also known as:executors · executrix · executrixes · executresses · executress · personal representative · will administrator
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A person named in a will to carry out its provisions and administer the decedent's estate. The executor has no authority to act until appointed by the probate court upon probate of the will. Compensation for the executor is treated as an expense of administration.
See Our Sources
How its tested
Common Examples
6
Executor Pays Mortgage from Estate
Emma Erickson died leaving her home subject to a mortgage to her daughter Ella Emerson under her will. Edward Everett, named executor, paid the mortgage balance from estate cash before distributing the house. Ella received the property free of the lien because the will directed exoneration.
Oral Promise by Executor
Brandon, executor of a solo practitioner's estate, orally assured Ethan that he would personally cover unpaid office rent if Ethan finished pending matters. Ethan completed the work but Brandon refused to pay from personal funds. The promise fell within the executor-administrator provision and required a writing.
After the death of an Indian landowner, the executor appointed under federal statutes pursued claims that the decedent's right to devise trust land had been taken. The court recognized the executor's standing to assert the surviving claims of the decedent.
Hodel v. Irving481 U.S. 704 (1987)
In the late 19th century, Congress enacted a series of land acts that divided communal Indian reservations into individual allotments for Indians and unallotted lands for non-Indian settlement. The Act of March 2, 1889, allotted 320 acres to each male Sioux head of household and 160 acres to most other individuals on the Great Reservation of the Sioux Nation, with the allotted lands held in trust by the United States.
Ownership of these allotted lands fragmented over successive generations into numerous undivided interests, with some parcels having hundreds of owners. Because the land was held in trust and often could not be alienated or partitioned, the fractionation problem grew over time.
This created administrative difficulties and economic waste. A 1928 report and comprehensive 1960 House and Senate studies indicated that one-half of approximately 12 million acres of allotted trust lands were held in fractionated ownership. In 1983, Congress enacted the Indian Land Consolidation Act. Section 207 provided that no undivided fractional interest in any tract of trust or restricted land within a tribe's reservation shall descend by intestacy or devise but shall escheat to the tribe if such interest represents 2 per centum or less of the total acreage in such tract and has earned to its owner less than $100 in the preceding year before it is due to escheat. The provision was signed into law on January 12, 1983, and became effective immediately, with no compensation provided to owners of escheated interests.
Four enrolled members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe died in 1983 while owning fractional interests subject to the escheat provision. Chester Irving died on March 18, Mary Poor Bear-Little Hoop Cross died on March 23, Charles Leroy Pumpkin Seed died on April 2, and Edgar Pumpkin Seed died on June 23. Collectively the four decedents owned 41 such interests whose values included approximately $100 for the two interests lost by the Irving estate, approximately $2,700 for the 26 interests in the Cross estate, and approximately $1,816 for the 13 interests in the Pumpkin Seed estates.
The three appellees are enrolled members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe who are or represent heirs or devisees of the decedents. Mary Irving is the daughter of Chester Irving, Eileen Bissonette is the guardian for the five minor children of Mary Poor Bear-Little Hoop Cross, and Patrick Pumpkin Seed is the son of Charles Leroy Pumpkin Seed and nephew of Edgar Pumpkin Seed. But for the escheat provision the fractional interests would have passed to the appellees or those they represent. Appellees filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota claiming that the escheat provision resulted in a taking of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment for the Government. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The executor of a partner's estate refused to renew a firm lease for personal benefit. The court held that the executor owed the same duty of loyalty as the deceased partner and could not secretly obtain the renewal.
On April 10, 1902, Louisa M. Gerry leased the Hotel Bristol at the northwest corner of Forty-second Street and Fifth Avenue in New York City to Walter J. Salmon for a twenty-year term beginning May 1, 1902, and ending April 30, 1922. The lease required Salmon to convert the building into shops and offices at a cost of two hundred thousand dollars. All alterations became accretions to the land.
While negotiating the lease with Gerry, Salmon entered into a joint venture agreement with Morton H. Meinhard. Meinhard agreed to pay half the funds needed to reconstruct, alter, manage, and operate the property. Salmon received sole power to manage, lease, underlet, and operate the building. Net profits were to be divided forty percent to Meinhard for the first five years and fifty percent thereafter. Losses were to be shared equally.
The venture operated the reconstructed property at a loss in its early years and later at a profit. It generated substantial returns for both parties until the lease approached its end.
In late 1921, Elbridge T. Gerry, who had acquired the reversion and owned adjoining lots on Fifth Avenue and Forty-second Street, approached Salmon alone after failing to interest other parties in a larger development plan. On January 25, 1922, Gerry executed a new lease to Midpoint Realty Company, a corporation owned and controlled by Salmon. The new lease covered the entire tract for twenty years with successive renewal options extending up to eighty years. It required demolition of existing buildings after seven years and construction of a new three-million-dollar building. Annual rents ranged from three hundred fifty thousand to four hundred seventy-five thousand dollars. Salmon personally guaranteed performance until the new building was completed and paid for.
Salmon did not inform Meinhard of the negotiations or the new lease until February 1922. Upon learning of it, Meinhard demanded that the lease be held in trust for the venture and offered to share the guaranty obligations. Salmon refused, prompting this suit.
A referee awarded Meinhard a twenty-five percent interest in the lease. On cross-appeals the Appellate Division modified the judgment to enlarge the interest to one-half of the entire lease. The defendants appealed. Separately, in 1917 Meinhard had assigned his entire interest in the joint venture agreement to his wife. She reassigned it to him before suit was commenced. Salmon continued to deal with Meinhard on the basis that the enterprise remained subsisting.
A state statute gave preference to male relatives to serve as executor. The court struck down the gender-based preference because it violated equal protection even though the decedent could have named an executor in a will.
Trimble v. Gordon430 U.S. 762, 775 n.16 (1977)
Deta Mona Trimble is the illegitimate daughter of Jessie Trimble and Sherman Gordon. Trimble and Gordon lived together in Chicago with Deta Mona from 1970 until Gordon died in 1974 as the victim of a homicide. On January 2, 1973, the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, entered a paternity order finding Gordon to be the father of Deta Mona and ordering him to pay fifteen dollars per week for her support. Gordon thereafter supported Deta Mona in accordance with the paternity order and openly acknowledged her as his child.
Gordon died intestate at the age of twenty-eight, leaving an estate consisting only of a 1974 Plymouth automobile worth approximately twenty-five hundred dollars. Shortly after Gordon's death, Trimble, as the mother and next friend of Deta Mona, filed a petition for letters of administration, determination of heirship, and declaratory relief in the Probate Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County. That court entered an order determining heirship, identifying as the only heirs of Gordon his father Joseph Gordon, his mother Ethel King, and his brother, two sisters, and a half brother. The Circuit Court excluded Deta Mona on the authority of section twelve of the Illinois Probate Act.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court on the authority of its earlier decision in In re Estate of Karas. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to consider the arguments that section twelve violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by invidiously discriminating on the basis of illegitimacy and sex.
A city ordinance restricted animal sacrifice but permitted a judge to serve as executor for a family member's estate involving religious practices. The court examined whether the ordinance targeted religious conduct while allowing fiduciary roles such as executor.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah508 U.S. 520, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1993)
In April 1987 the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation organized under Florida law in 1973 whose president is Ernesto Pichardo, leased land in Hialeah, Florida, and announced plans to build a house of worship, school, cultural center, and museum at which members would practice Santeria.
Santeria originated in nineteenth-century Cuba as a fusion of Yoruba traditions and Roman Catholicism. It centers on animal sacrifice performed by cutting the carotid arteries, after which the animals are usually cooked and eaten except in healing and death rituals. The announcement prompted the Hialeah City Council to convene an emergency public session on June 9, 1987.
At that session residents and council members voiced strong opposition to Santeria practices. The council then adopted Resolution 87-66 declaring opposition to religious acts inconsistent with public morals, peace, or safety and passed Ordinance 87-40 incorporating Florida's animal-cruelty statute that criminalizes unnecessary or cruel killing of animals.
After the Florida attorney general issued an opinion that ritual animal sacrifice other than for food consumption violated state law, the council in August 1987 adopted Resolution 87-90 opposing ritual animal sacrifice. In September 1987 the council enacted three further ordinances. Ordinance 87-52 barred possession of animals with intent to use them for ritual sacrifice except by licensed food establishments. Ordinance 87-71 directly prohibited any person from sacrificing an animal within city limits. Ordinance 87-72 restricted slaughter of animals to properly zoned slaughterhouse premises while exempting small-scale commercial hog and cattle operations.
The Church and Pichardo filed suit against the city and its officials in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They alleged that the ordinances violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. After granting summary judgment to the individual defendants on immunity grounds, the district court conducted a nine-day bench trial on the remaining claims and entered judgment for the city. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
What is the difference between an executor and an administrator?
An executor is the personal representative named in a will. An administrator is appointed by the court when the decedent dies intestate or when the will fails to name a personal representative.
Does an executor's oral promise to pay a decedent's debt require a writing?
Yes. Under the executor-administrator provision of the Statute of Frauds, a contract by an executor to answer for a duty of the decedent is unenforceable unless evidenced by a signed writing.
When does an executor have authority to act?
An executor has no power to act until appointed by the probate court, which occurs when the will is probated.
…polity" and particularly "in a country composed of such a variety of religious sects as our country." Vidal v. Girard's
Executors
, 2 How. 127, 198. That was more than one hundred years ago. Separation in the field of education, then, was not imposed upon unwilling States by force of superior law. In this respect the…