Also known as: effective days · effective date
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A date on which a legal instrument, order, filing, or statutory provision becomes operative and enforceable. The date is fixed either by the terms of the document itself or by operation of the governing statute or rule unless a delayed date is expressly provided.
Eastern Electric filed articles of incorporation on March 15 without specifying any later date. The secretary of state accepted the filing that same day. Corporate existence therefore began immediately, allowing the company to enter binding contracts the following week without personal liability for the organizers.
Emmett Egan obtained a child-support order in State A. After State B modified the order, State A retained authority to award relief for any violations that occurred before the modification took effect. The court therefore calculated arrears using the original order up to the modification date.
Echo Systems created an irrevocable trust directing distributions for a beneficiary's health and education. The trustee applied the ascertainable-standard definition that was in effect on the date the trust code became operative. Later amendments to the Internal Revenue Code did not alter the standard used for this trust.
Edward Everett executed a will attempting to grant his daughter a power of appointment over trust property. The daughter died two weeks before the will was admitted to probate. Because she died before the document's effective date, no power of appointment was ever created.
The City of Hialeah passed an ordinance regulating animal sacrifice. The ordinance stated it would become effective upon signing by the mayor. Once signed, the provisions applied immediately to pending permit applications without any further grace period.
In April 1987 the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation organized under Florida law in 1973 whose president is Ernesto Pichardo, leased land in Hialeah, Florida, and announced plans to build a house of worship, school, cultural center, and museum at which members would practice Santeria. Santeria originated in nineteenth-century Cuba as a fusion of Yoruba traditions and Roman Catholicism. It centers on animal sacrifice performed by cutting the carotid arteries, after which the animals are usually cooked and eaten except in healing and death rituals. The announcement prompted the Hialeah City Council to convene an emergency public session on June 9, 1987. At that session residents and council members voiced strong opposition to Santeria practices. The council then adopted Resolution 87-66 declaring opposition to religious acts inconsistent with public morals, peace, or safety and passed Ordinance 87-40 incorporating Florida's animal-cruelty statute that criminalizes unnecessary or cruel killing of animals. After the Florida attorney general issued an opinion that ritual animal sacrifice other than for food consumption violated state law, the council in August 1987 adopted Resolution 87-90 opposing ritual animal sacrifice. In September 1987 the council enacted three further ordinances. Ordinance 87-52 barred possession of animals with intent to use them for ritual sacrifice except by licensed food establishments. Ordinance 87-71 directly prohibited any person from sacrificing an animal within city limits. Ordinance 87-72 restricted slaughter of animals to properly zoned slaughterhouse premises while exempting small-scale commercial hog and cattle operations. The Church and Pichardo filed suit against the city and its officials in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They alleged that the ordinances violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. After granting summary judgment to the individual defendants on immunity grounds, the district court conducted a nine-day bench trial on the remaining claims and entered judgment for the city. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA state statute reapportioning legislative districts was enacted on June 1. The law specified that it would take effect on the first day of the next regular legislative session. Until that session began, the prior district lines remained in force for all elections.
In 1901 the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a statute apportioning the Senate with thirty-three members and the House of Representatives with ninety-nine members among the state's ninety-five counties. The Tennessee Constitution required a decennial enumeration of qualified voters and reapportionment of both houses on that basis. The General Assembly performed reapportionments after the enumerations of 1871, 1881, and 1891. After 1901 every proposal for reapportionment failed to pass. Between 1901 and 1960 the state's population grew from 2,020,616 to 3,567,089. The number of persons eligible to vote rose from 487,380 to 2,092,891. Substantial redistribution occurred from rural to urban counties. Appellants were residents and qualified voters of the urban counties of Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, Montgomery, and Shelby. They brought a civil action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the Secretary of State, Attorney General, Coordinator of Elections, and members of the State Board of Elections. The complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. It alleged that continued application of the 1901 statute debased their votes and denied equal protection of the laws. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional. It also sought an injunction against conducting further elections under the statute. Alternative relief included at-large elections or a court-ordered reapportionment. A three-judge district court convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 dismissed the complaint. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court characterized the controversy as a nonjusticiable political question. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The case was argued in April 1961, set for reargument, reargued in October 1961, and decided on March 26, 1962.
View caseCorporate existence begins on the filing date unless the articles expressly specify a later date. The delayed date postpones only the start of corporate existence and does not affect the validity of the filing itself.
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Yes. The tribunal that issued the original order may still enforce it as to arrears and interest that accrued before the modification and may award appropriate relief for violations occurring before the effective date of the modification.
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No power is created. Any attempted exercise of the power is ineffective because the document conferring the power never took effect during the donee's lifetime.
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…waived representation by counsel." "§ 3207. Abortion facilities. . . . . . "(b) Reports.—Within 30 days after the effective date of this chapter, every facility at which abortions are performed shall file, and update immediately upon any change, a report with the department, containing the following…