definite and firm conviction of error

In September 1976, respondent David Washington committed a series of crimes over a ten-day period in the Miami area that included three brutal stabbing murders along with torture, kidnapping, severe assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, and theft. After his two accomplices were arrested, Washington surrendered to police and gave a lengthy statement confessing to the third criminal episode. The State of Florida indicted him for kidnapping and murder and appointed an experienced criminal lawyer to represent him. Washington waived his right to a jury trial against counsel's advice and pleaded guilty to all charges, including the three capital murder counts. In the plea colloquy he stated that he had committed a string of burglaries but had no significant prior criminal record and that he had been under extreme stress caused by his inability to support his family. Counsel spoke with Washington about his background, contacted his wife and mother by telephone, but did not seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric examination. At the sentencing hearing before the trial judge, counsel's strategy relied primarily on the plea colloquy to convey remorse and emotional stress and argued that these factors justified sparing Washington the death penalty. Counsel successfully moved to exclude Washington's rap sheet and decided not to request a presentence report because it would have included his criminal history. The trial judge found multiple aggravating circumstances for each murder and no mitigating circumstances, sentencing Washington to death on each of the three murder counts. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Washington sought collateral relief in state court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on six grounds including failure to request a psychiatric report, investigate and present character witnesses, and seek a presentence investigation report. He submitted fourteen affidavits from friends, neighbors, and relatives willing to testify and two reports from a psychiatrist and psychologist. The state trial court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Washington then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. After an evidentiary hearing at which trial counsel testified, the District Court denied relief, concluding that although counsel made errors in judgment by failing to investigate mitigating evidence further, no prejudice resulted. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for application of a new framework it developed for analyzing ineffectiveness claims. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the proper standards for judging claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a capital sentencing proceeding.

During 1999 and 2000, Vernon Williams sexually abused H.T., the daughter of his girlfriend, who was three and four years old at the time of the offenses. H.T., her mother, and Williams lived together in two different apartments during the time in question, moving into the second, larger apartment in March of 1999. Williams is the father of three other children with H.T.’s mother, all of whom are younger than H.T. H.T. referred to Williams as “Daddy” and he played an active role in her life. In February 2000, H.T. revealed what she called her “secret” to her grandmother, informing her that Williams had been “bad” and had touched her in a sexual manner. H.T.’s mother and grandmother took her to Children’s National Medical Center, where H.T. explained to a physician in greater detail what Williams had done. At the time of revealing these events, H.T. exhibited a stutter and other nervous behavior. The examination did not reveal any trauma. At trial, which began a few months after H.T. turned five, the court agreed to allow the prosecutor to conduct a competency hearing as the initial part of the direct examination. After voir dire by the prosecutor and defense counsel before the jury, the court determined that H.T. was competent to testify. H.T. then testified that something “yucky” happened to her in her apartment, and she was able to identify male and female genitalia on an illustrative diagram, but as the prosecutor turned to questioning her about what Williams had done to her, H.T. consistently testified that she did not know. The trial judge granted a brief recess and when court reconvened the prosecutor revealed that H.T. was crying and that the prosecutor had called for a Child Advocacy Center counselor to come and help calm H.T. down. Upon taking the stand again, H.T. continued to be unable to testify about the events but did say that Williams had told her not to reveal what had happened to her mother. After the trial court excused H.T. for the day, the prosecutor proposed to continue H.T.’s testimony by way of closed circuit television in the jury room. The prosecutor asked that if isolating H.T. from Williams did not facilitate her ability to testify, then the prosecutor be allowed to impeach her with videotaped statements H.T. had made to a child advocacy counselor. After hearing arguments on this issue, the following day the trial court agreed to take expert testimony from Ashlea Staunch, a clinical social worker at the Children’s Advocacy Center. Based on Ms. Staunch’s testimony, the court agreed to proceed with additional voir dire of the child in the jury room, outside the presence of Williams. On Tuesday, August 1, the trial resumed. The session in the jury room proved unproductive, however, with H.T. continuing to respond that she forgot or did not know the answer to pertinent questions. The prosecutor then began to impeach H.T. by playing portions of the CAC videotape statement and then asking H.T. questions about what they had just viewed. As a result of the impeachment, H.T. testified that Williams had licked her “butt,” that he had touched her “coochie” and that he had licked her “coochie.” Finally, after being shown a portion of the videotape when she had described Williams “pee”ing in her mouth, H.T. then testified that she had been “laying down,” that the “pee” tasted “bad,” and that she had spat it out. The jury later viewed the videotape of H.T.’s testimony taken on both Friday, July 28, and Tuesday, August 1. The court admitted the portions of the CAC videotape used to impeach H.T. After the completion of H.T.’s testimony, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence establishing that Williams had sexually assaulted An.J., a two-year-old girl, in 1991. The child’s mother testified about what the child had told her as an excited utterance exception to the prohibition against hearsay. After presentation of the remainder of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict finding Williams guilty of two counts of first degree child sexual abuse and two counts of second degree child sexual abuse.

Early in 1975, officials of Bessemer City, North Carolina, formed a five-member committee consisting of four men and one woman, Mrs. Auddie Boone, to hire a Recreation Director responsible for managing all city recreational facilities and developing athletic and other programs for residents. Eight persons applied for the position. Petitioner, a 39-year-old schoolteacher holding college degrees in social studies and education, was the only woman among them. After reviewing resumés and conducting brief interviews, the committee offered the job to Mr. Donald Kincaid, a 24-year-old recent college graduate with a degree in physical education; all four male members voted for Kincaid while Mrs. Boone voted for petitioner. Petitioner filed sex-discrimination charges with the Charlotte District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In July 1980 the EEOC District Director found reasonable cause to believe the charges were true, but conciliation efforts failed and petitioner received a right-to-sue letter. Petitioner then filed this Title VII action in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. After a two-day trial at which petitioner, Mr. Kincaid, and the five committee members testified, the district court issued a memorandum decision and, following submission of proposed findings by petitioner’s counsel and detailed objections by respondent, entered formal findings of fact and conclusions of law awarding petitioner $30,397 in backpay and $16,971.59 in attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding clearly erroneous the district court’s findings that petitioner was the better-qualified candidate, that she alone had been asked questions about night work, travel, and spousal approval, and that the male committee members were biased against hiring a woman.

In September 1989 Carol Ankenbrandt, a citizen of Missouri, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on behalf of her daughters L. R. and S. R. against Jon A. Richards and Debra Kesler, both citizens of Louisiana. The complaint alleged that Richards, the divorced father of the children, and Kesler, his female companion, had committed acts of sexual and physical abuse against the daughters and sought monetary damages. Federal jurisdiction rested solely on the diversity-of-citizenship provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. One month earlier, on August 9, 1989, a juvenile court in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, had entered a judgment under state child-protection statutes that permanently terminated Richards' parental rights on account of the alleged abuse and permanently enjoined him from any contact with the children. On December 10, 1990, the District Court granted the respondents' motion to dismiss. The court cited In re Burrus for the proposition that the whole subject of domestic relations belongs to the laws of the States and invoked the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction. It also relied on the abstention principles of Younger v. Harris to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to three questions concerning the existence and scope of any domestic relations exception and the propriety of Younger abstention in the case.