Also known as: coconspirators · co-conspirator · co-conspirators
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A person who participates with one or more others in forming and advancing a criminal conspiracy. The label applies once the agreement and shared criminal purpose are shown by a preponderance of the evidence.
Cynthia Cortez and Charlotte Chung agreed to misrepresent pesticide use on their farms. While disposing of banned barrels, Chung texted a coworker about the plan to avoid detection. The court admitted the text against Cortez because it was made by her coconspirator during and in furtherance of the ongoing concealment.
Cameron Cruz and Cecilia Cabrera discussed falsifying billing records on recorded calls. The prosecution introduced the tapes after showing independent evidence of their agreement. The court treated the statements as admissible against both because each was a coconspirator whose declarations advanced the scheme.
On March 1, 1974, a grand jury returned an indictment charging seven named individuals with offenses including conspiracy to defraud the United States and to obstruct justice. Although not designated in the indictment, the grand jury named President Richard M. Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator. On April 18, 1974, upon motion of the Special Prosecutor, a subpoena duces tecum was issued to the President requiring production of tapes, memoranda, papers, transcripts, or other writings relating to precisely identified meetings between the President and others. The President publicly released edited transcripts of 43 conversations on April 30, 1974, including 20 subject to the subpoena. On May 1, 1974, the President's counsel filed a motion to quash the subpoena under Rule 17(c) along with a claim of privilege. At a subsequent hearing, further motions to expunge the grand jury's action naming the President as an unindicted co-conspirator and for protective orders were filed by counsel for the President. On May 20, 1974, the District Court denied the motion to quash and ordered production of the materials by May 31, 1974. The court rejected claims that the dispute was a nonjusticiable intra-executive conflict and that the Judiciary lacked authority to review executive privilege. On May 24, 1974, the President appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the Special Prosecutor petitioned for certiorari before judgment, which was granted. The case was set for argument on July 8, 1974. The proceeding is a pending federal criminal prosecution in United States v. Mitchell et al. set for trial on September 9, 1974.
View caseChristine Castro and Carmen Choi were indicted after agents intercepted calls between them and a third participant. Castro moved to suppress the recordings. The court held that only those whose own conversations were intercepted could object, limiting standing even though all three were coconspirators.
Petitioners Alderman and Alderisio, along with Ruby Kolod (now deceased), were convicted in federal court of conspiring to transmit murderous threats in interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 875(c). Their convictions were affirmed by the Tenth Circuit in 1967, and the Supreme Court initially denied certiorari. After denial, the petitioners alleged in a rehearing petition that Alderisio's Chicago business premises had been subjected to government electronic surveillance. The government responded by acknowledging that Alderisio's conversations had been overheard through unlawful eavesdropping. Petitioners Ivanov and Butenko were convicted in separate proceedings of conspiring to transmit national defense information to the Soviet Union under 18 U.S.C. §§ 794(a) and (c) and related charges under 18 U.S.C. § 951. The Third Circuit affirmed most convictions. Following the Alderman rehearing developments, certiorari was granted in Ivanov and Butenko on parallel questions concerning surveillance. After the convictions were affirmed and while the cases were pending, it was revealed that the United States had engaged in electronic surveillance that might have violated Fourth Amendment rights and tainted the convictions. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments and remanded each case to the District Court for adjudication of whether any government evidence supporting the convictions was the product of illegal surveillance. The government moved for modification of the remand order, proposing that surveillance records first undergo in camera inspection by the trial judge, who would disclose to petitioners and counsel only those materials found arguably relevant to the prosecution. Petitioners opposed the in camera procedure and sought full disclosure of all surveillance records to which they claimed standing. The government maintained that none of the overheard conversations were arguably relevant to the prosecutions and that disclosure of irrelevant conversations would endanger third parties or national security. The Supreme Court restored the cases for reargument specifically on the disclosure issue and the question of standing to object to the fruits of illegal surveillance.
View caseCameron Cruz and Cecilia Cabrera completed their scheme to divert funds. Weeks later Cruz told a friend about the plan in casual conversation. The court excluded the later statement because it was not made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy even though both remained coconspirators.
A federal district court indictment charged that petitioner and a woman defendant had induced and persuaded another woman to go on October 20, 1941, from New York City to Miami, Florida, for the purpose of prostitution, transported or caused her to be transported for that purpose, and conspired to commit those offenses. Tried alone, the petitioner was convicted on all three counts of the indictment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The challenged testimony was elicited by the Government from its complaining witness and narrated a purported conversation between the complaining witness and the woman defendant more than a month and a half after October 20, 1941. The woman defendant asked the complaining witness if she had talked yet, advised her not to until they got a lawyer, to be very careful what she said, and stated that it would be better for the two girls to take the blame than the petitioner because he could not stand it. At the time the conversation took place in December 1941, the trip to Florida had been made, the complaining witness had left Florida, returned to New York, and resumed her residence there. The petitioner, the woman defendant, and the complaining witness had been arrested. The Florida grand jury failed to indict and the cases there were closed without prosecution in February 1942. The New York indictments were not returned until January 1943. Petitioner was tried four times with the following results: mistrial; conviction; mistrial; conviction with recommendation for leniency. The record of the trial covers more than 800 pages.
View caseCarmen Choi agreed with Christine Castro to submit false insurance claims. Castro filed the first inflated bill. Choi later reported the scheme to regulators. The court held that her withdrawal did not erase her status as a coconspirator for purposes of the completed offense.
Petitioner Calvin Smith was indicted for crimes connected to his role in an organization that distributed cocaine, crack cocaine, heroin, and marijuana in Washington, D.C., for about a decade. The 158-count indictment charged Smith and 16 alleged co-conspirators with conspiring to run, and actually running, an illegal drug business, as well as with committing acts of violence, including 31 murders, to further their goals. Smith was tried alongside five codefendants in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. A jury convicted him of conspiracy to distribute narcotics and to possess narcotics with the intent to distribute them, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), murder in connection with a continuing criminal enterprise, and four counts of murder while armed. Before trial, Smith moved to dismiss the conspiracy counts as barred by the 5-year statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3282. He had spent the last six years of the charged conspiracies in prison for a felony conviction. The court denied his motion and Smith renewed his statute-of-limitations defense at trial. In the final jury charge, the court instructed the jury to convict Smith of each conspiracy count if the Government had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracies existed, that Smith was a member of those conspiracies, and that the conspiracies continued in existence within five years before the indictment. After it began deliberations, the jury asked the court what to do in the event that a defendant withdrew from the conspiracies outside the five-year limitations period. Over the defense's objection, the court instructed the jury that once the government has proven that a defendant was a member of a conspiracy, the burden is on the defendant to prove withdrawal from a conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury then convicted Smith of the conspiracy crimes. As relevant here, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed Smith's conspiracy convictions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the question of which party bears the burden of proving or disproving a defense of withdrawal prior to the limitations period.
View caseCynthia Cortez and Charlotte Chung coordinated false Medicare submissions. The government offered Chung's email describing the plan. The court first found by a preponderance that a conspiracy existed and both participated, then admitted the email against Cortez as a coconspirator statement.
In May 1984, Clarence Greathouse, working as an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, arranged to sell a kilogram of cocaine to Angelo Lonardo. Lonardo agreed that he would find individuals to distribute the drug. When the sale became imminent, Lonardo stated in a tape-recorded telephone conversation that he had a "gentleman friend" who had some questions to ask about the cocaine. In a subsequent telephone call, Greathouse spoke to the "friend" about the quality of the drug and the price. Greathouse then spoke again with Lonardo, and the two arranged the details of the purchase. They agreed that the sale would take place in a designated hotel parking lot, and Lonardo would transfer the drug from Greathouse's car to the "friend," who would be waiting in the parking lot in his own car. Greathouse proceeded with the transaction as planned. FBI agents arrested Lonardo and petitioner immediately after Lonardo placed a kilogram of cocaine into petitioner's car in the hotel parking lot. In petitioner's car, the agents found over $20,000 in cash. Petitioner was charged with conspiring to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Petitioner was also charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The Government introduced, over petitioner's objection, Angelo Lonardo's telephone statements regarding the participation of the "friend" in the transaction. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found that, considering the events in the parking lot and Lonardo's statements over the telephone, the Government had established by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy involving Lonardo and petitioner existed. The court also found that Lonardo's statements over the telephone had been made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Accordingly, the trial court held that Lonardo's out-of-court statements satisfied Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and were not hearsay. Petitioner was convicted on both counts and sentenced to 15 years. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the admission of the recorded statements and related evidentiary and constitutional questions.
View caseThe court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy existed and that the declarant and the party against whom the statement is offered both participated in it. The coconspirator's own statement may be considered along with other evidence in making that preliminary determination.
No. The prosecution need not show that the nontestifying coconspirator is unavailable as a prerequisite to admitting the statement.
Under traditional common law principles, withdrawal after the agreement and any required overt act does not undo the completed conspiracy offense, although it may limit liability for later substantive crimes committed by others.
No. Common law conspiracy requires a genuine meeting of the minds in which both participants share the criminal purpose. Feigned agreement by one party defeats the bilateral requirement.