568 U.S. 106 (2013)
Petitioner Calvin Smith was indicted for crimes connected to his role in an organization that distributed cocaine, crack cocaine, heroin, and marijuana in Washington, D.C., for about a decade.1 The 158-count indictment charged Smith and 16 alleged co-conspirators with conspiring to run, and actually running, an illegal drug business, as well as with committing acts of violence, including 31 murders, to further their goals.2 Smith was tried alongside five codefendants in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.3
A jury convicted him of conspiracy to distribute narcotics and to possess narcotics with the intent to distribute them, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), murder in connection with a continuing criminal enterprise, and four counts of murder while armed.4 Before trial, Smith moved to dismiss the conspiracy counts as barred by the 5-year statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3282. He had spent the last six years of the charged conspiracies in prison for a felony conviction.5 The court denied his motion and Smith renewed his statute-of-limitations defense at trial.6
In the final jury charge, the court instructed the jury to convict Smith of each conspiracy count if the Government had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracies existed, that Smith was a member of those conspiracies, and that the conspiracies continued in existence within five years before the indictment.7 After it began deliberations, the jury asked the court what to do in the event that a defendant withdrew from the conspiracies outside the five-year limitations period.8 Over the defense's objection, the court instructed the jury that once the government has proven that a defendant was a member of a conspiracy, the burden is on the defendant to prove withdrawal from a conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence.9
The jury then convicted Smith of the conspiracy crimes.10 As relevant here, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed Smith's conspiracy convictions.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the question of which party bears the burden of proving or disproving a defense of withdrawal prior to the limitations period.12
Whether the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant did not withdraw from a conspiracy outside the statute-of-limitations period?13
The Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged.14 Proof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has never been constitutionally required.15 Withdrawal does not negate an element of the conspiracy crimes charged here.16
No. The District Court instructed the jury that once the Government proved Smith was a member of the conspiracy, the burden shifted to Smith to prove withdrawal by a preponderance of the evidence.17 Smith had moved before trial to dismiss the conspiracy counts on statute-of-limitations grounds because he spent the last six years of the charged conspiracies in prison.18 He renewed that defense at trial.19 The jury convicted Smith of the narcotics conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 and the RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) after receiving the instruction.20
Withdrawal presupposes commission of the offense and terminates only post-withdrawal liability for co-conspirators' acts rather than negating the elements of agreement and knowing participation.21
The Government need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not withdraw outside the statute-of-limitations period.22
Whether allocating to the defendant the burden of proving withdrawal violates the Due Process Clause?23
Allocating the burden of proving an affirmative defense to the defendant does not violate due process unless the defense negates an element of the crime.24 Proof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has never been constitutionally required.
No. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed Smith's conspiracy convictions after concluding that placing the burden on the defendant does not violate the Due Process Clause.25 Withdrawal excuses conduct that would otherwise remain punishable but does not controvert the elements of conspiracy existence or membership that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.26 The District Court's instruction therefore complied with constitutional requirements by requiring Smith to establish withdrawal by a preponderance after the Government proved the essential elements.27
Allocating the burden of proving withdrawal to the defendant does not violate the Due Process Clause.28
Whether Congress assigned the Government the burden of proving the nonexistence of withdrawal under 21 U.S.C. § 846 or 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)?29
When Congress does not address the burden of proof for an affirmative defense in a statute, courts presume Congress intended to preserve the common-law rule that affirmative defenses are for the defendant to prove.30
No. Congress did not address the burden of proof for withdrawal in either 21 U.S.C. § 846 or 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), so the common-law rule applies.31 The District Court therefore correctly instructed the jury that Smith bore the burden to prove withdrawal by a preponderance of the evidence once the Government established his membership in the conspiracies.32 The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions under that allocation.33 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the resulting circuit split on the issue.34
Congress did not assign the Government the burden of proving the nonexistence of withdrawal under 21 U.S.C. § 846 or 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).35