claim-preclusive effect

Petitioner Teague, a black man, was convicted in an Illinois state court of three counts of attempted murder, two counts of armed robbery, and one count of aggravated battery by an all-white jury. During jury selection for petitioner's trial, the prosecutor used all 10 of his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks. Petitioner's counsel used one of his 10 peremptory challenges to exclude a black woman who was married to a police officer. After the prosecutor had struck six blacks, petitioner's counsel moved for a mistrial. When the prosecutor struck four more blacks, petitioner's counsel again moved for a mistrial, arguing that petitioner was entitled to a jury of his peers. The prosecutor defended the challenges by stating that he was trying to achieve a balance of men and women on the jury. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the jury appeared to be a fair one. On appeal, petitioner argued that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges denied him the right to be tried by a jury that was representative of the community. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected petitioner's fair cross section claim. The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1983. Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Petitioner repeated his fair cross section claim, and argued that the opinions of several Justices concurring in, or dissenting from, the denial of certiorari in McCray v. New York had invited a reexamination of Swain v. Alabama. The District Court, though sympathetic to petitioner's arguments, held that it was bound by Swain and Circuit precedent. On appeal, petitioner repeated his fair cross section claim and his McCray argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner that the Sixth Amendment's fair cross section requirement applied to the petit jury and held that petitioner had made out a prima facie case of discrimination. A majority of the judges on the Court of Appeals voted to rehear the case en banc, and the panel opinion was vacated. Rehearing was postponed until after Batson v. Kentucky was decided. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner could not benefit from the rule in that case because Allen v. Hardy had held that Batson would not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Court of Appeals also held that petitioner's Swain claim was procedurally barred and in any event meritless. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's fair cross section claim, holding that the fair cross section requirement was limited to the jury venire. Petitioner's conviction became final two and a half years prior to Batson.

In 1976 the United States brought an antitrust action against petitioners, owners of various department stores, alleging that they had violated § 1 of the Sherman Act by agreeing to fix the retail price of women's clothing sold in northern California. Seven parallel civil actions were subsequently filed by private plaintiffs seeking treble damages on behalf of proposed classes of retail purchasers. These included the action of respondent Moitie in state court (Moitie I) and respondent Brown (Brown I) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Each of these complaints tracked almost verbatim the allegations of the Government's complaint, though the Moitie I complaint referred solely to state law. The District Court dismissed all of the actions in their entirety on the ground that plaintiffs had not alleged an injury to their business or property within the meaning of § 4 of the Clayton Act. Plaintiffs in five of the suits appealed that judgment to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The single counsel representing Moitie and Brown chose not to appeal and instead refiled the two actions in state court. Although the complaints purported to raise only state-law claims, they made allegations similar to those made in the prior complaints, including that of the Government. Petitioners removed these new actions to the District Court for the Northern District of California and moved to have them dismissed on the ground of res judicata. The District Court denied respondents' motion to remand, holding that the complaints were properly removed because they raised essentially federal law claims. The court then concluded that because Moitie II and Brown II involved the same parties, the same alleged offenses, and the same time periods as Moitie I and Brown I, the doctrine of res judicata required that they be dismissed. Pending the appeal of the dismissals of the refiled actions, the Supreme Court decided Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., holding that retail purchasers can suffer an injury to their business or property as those terms are used in § 4 of the Clayton Act. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the five cases which had been appealed for further proceedings in light of Reiter. When the refiled actions came before the Court of Appeals, the court reversed the District Court's dismissals on res judicata grounds. It asserted that non-appealing parties may benefit from a reversal when their position is closely interwoven with that of appealing parties. The court concluded that the doctrine must give way to public policy and simple justice. Moitie II was voluntarily dismissed, leaving Brown II as the subject of the petition. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the validity of the Court of Appeals' novel exception to the doctrine of res judicata.

Ronald Elwell worked as an engineering analyst for General Motors Corporation from 1959 until 1989. For fifteen years he was assigned to the Engineering Analysis Group studying the performance of GM vehicles in product liability litigation, particularly those involving fires. He assisted GM lawyers in defending such suits. Beginning in 1987 the Elwell-GM employment relationship soured. GM and Elwell first negotiated an agreement under which Elwell would retire after serving as a GM consultant for two years. When the time came for Elwell to retire, however, disagreement again surfaced and continued into 1991. A month later Elwell sued GM in a Michigan County Court alleging wrongful discharge and related tort and contract claims. GM counterclaimed that Elwell had breached fiduciary duties by disclosing privileged and confidential information and misappropriating documents. Following a hearing, the Michigan trial court on November 22, 1991, enjoined Elwell from consulting or discussing with or disclosing to any person any of General Motors Corporation's trade secrets, confidential information or matters of attorney-client work product relating in any manner to the subject matter of any products liability litigation whether already filed or to be filed in the future which Ronald Elwell received, had knowledge of, or was entrusted with during his employments with General Motors Corporation. In August 1992 the parties settled for an undisclosed sum. They jointly submitted a stipulated permanent injunction that the Michigan court entered without further hearing. The injunction comprehensively enjoined Elwell from testifying, without the prior written consent of General Motors Corporation, either upon deposition or at trial, as an expert witness, or as a witness of any kind, and from consulting with attorneys or their agents in any litigation already filed, or to be filed in the future, involving General Motors Corporation as an owner, seller, manufacturer and/or designer of the product(s) in issue. The separate settlement agreement stated that court-ordered testimony would in no way form a basis for an action in violation of the Permanent Injunction or this Agreement. In February 1990 Beverly Garner died when the engine of her 1985 Chevrolet S-10 Blazer caught fire after a Missouri highway collision. Her sons Kenneth and Steven Baker filed a wrongful-death product liability suit against GM in Missouri state court in September 1991. They alleged a defective fuel pump caused the post-collision fire. GM removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds. GM defended on the merits that the fuel pump was not faulty and that impact injuries alone caused the death. The Bakers sought to depose Elwell and call him at trial. GM objected on the basis of the Michigan injunction. After in camera review of the injunction and settlement agreement the Missouri federal district court permitted Elwell's deposition and trial testimony. The court relied on alternative grounds that Missouri public policy favored disclosure of relevant nonprivileged information and that the injunction was modifiable. At trial Elwell testified in support of the Bakers' fuel-pump defect claim. He identified a 1973 internal GM memorandum concerning fuel-fed engine fire risks. The jury returned an $11.3 million verdict for the Bakers. The district court entered judgment on the verdict. The Eighth Circuit reversed. It held that Elwell's testimony should not have been admitted because the Michigan injunction controlled. Missouri's public policy favoring full faith and credit outweighed any disclosure policy. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the full faith and credit requirement stops the Bakers from obtaining Elwell's testimony in their Missouri action.

Phillips Petroleum Company, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Oklahoma, produced or purchased natural gas from leased land in 11 states during the 1970s. It sold most of the gas in interstate commerce at prices regulated by the Federal Power Commission, later the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Beginning in the mid-1970s Phillips proposed price increases. It collected higher amounts subject to refund with interest if disapproved. Phillips suspended royalty payments to lessors until final Commission approval. It paid the suspended royalties of $3.7 million in 1976, $4.7 million in 1977, and $2.9 million in 1978 without interest after the increases were approved. In 1979 the Commission began investigating overcharges. In 1983 it issued an opinion ordering refunds. Royalty owners Irl Shutts, a Kansas resident, and Robert and Betty Anderson, Oklahoma residents owning leases in Oklahoma and Texas, filed suit in Kansas state court seeking interest on the suspended royalties. They sought to represent a class of 33,000 royalty owners later reduced to 28,100 members after 3,400 opted out and 1,500 could not be notified. Fewer than 1,000 class members resided in Kansas and only about one-quarter of one percent of the leases were located there. The Kansas trial court certified the class under a state statute modeled on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on an opt-out basis. It sent first-class mail notice describing the action and the right to opt out. The court applied Kansas law to award interest at Commission rates followed by the Kansas post-judgment rate of 15 percent. After the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1984.