522 U.S. 222, 246 (1998)
Ronald Elwell worked as an engineering analyst for General Motors Corporation from 1959 until 1989.1 For fifteen years he was assigned to the Engineering Analysis Group studying the performance of GM vehicles in product liability litigation, particularly those involving fires.2 He assisted GM lawyers in defending such suits.3
Beginning in 1987 the Elwell-GM employment relationship soured.4 GM and Elwell first negotiated an agreement under which Elwell would retire after serving as a GM consultant for two years.5 When the time came for Elwell to retire, however, disagreement again surfaced and continued into 1991.6 A month later Elwell sued GM in a Michigan County Court alleging wrongful discharge and related tort and contract claims.7 GM counterclaimed that Elwell had breached fiduciary duties by disclosing privileged and confidential information and misappropriating documents.8
Following a hearing, the Michigan trial court on November 22, 1991, enjoined Elwell from consulting or discussing with or disclosing to any person any of General Motors Corporation's trade secrets, confidential information or matters of attorney-client work product relating in any manner to the subject matter of any products liability litigation whether already filed or to be filed in the future which Ronald Elwell received, had knowledge of, or was entrusted with during his employments with General Motors Corporation.9 In August 1992 the parties settled for an undisclosed sum.10 They jointly submitted a stipulated permanent injunction that the Michigan court entered without further hearing.11 The injunction comprehensively enjoined Elwell from testifying, without the prior written consent of General Motors Corporation, either upon deposition or at trial, as an expert witness, or as a witness of any kind, and from consulting with attorneys or their agents in any litigation already filed, or to be filed in the future, involving General Motors Corporation as an owner, seller, manufacturer and/or designer of the product(s) in issue.12 The separate settlement agreement stated that court-ordered testimony would in no way form a basis for an action in violation of the Permanent Injunction or this Agreement.13
In February 1990 Beverly Garner died when the engine of her 1985 Chevrolet S-10 Blazer caught fire after a Missouri highway collision.14 Her sons Kenneth and Steven Baker filed a wrongful-death product liability suit against GM in Missouri state court in September 1991.15 They alleged a defective fuel pump caused the post-collision fire.16 GM removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds.17 GM defended on the merits that the fuel pump was not faulty and that impact injuries alone caused the death.18 The Bakers sought to depose Elwell and call him at trial.19 GM objected on the basis of the Michigan injunction.20 After in camera review of the injunction and settlement agreement the Missouri federal district court permitted Elwell's deposition and trial testimony.21 The court relied on alternative grounds that Missouri public policy favored disclosure of relevant nonprivileged information and that the injunction was modifiable.22
At trial Elwell testified in support of the Bakers' fuel-pump defect claim.23 He identified a 1973 internal GM memorandum concerning fuel-fed engine fire risks.24 The jury returned an $11.3 million verdict for the Bakers.25 The district court entered judgment on the verdict.26 The Eighth Circuit reversed.27 It held that Elwell's testimony should not have been admitted because the Michigan injunction controlled.28 Missouri's public policy favoring full faith and credit outweighed any disclosure policy.29 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the full faith and credit requirement stops the Bakers from obtaining Elwell's testimony in their Missouri action.30
Whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires a Missouri federal court to enforce a Michigan injunction that bars a witness from testifying in a product liability action brought by parties who were not involved in the Michigan proceeding?31
The Full Faith and Credit Clause and its implementing statute require that a final judgment rendered by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties receives the same preclusive effect nationwide as it has in the rendering state.32 Enforcement mechanisms do not travel with the judgment and remain subject to the forum's control.33 A judgment cannot bind nonparties or dictate evidentiary rulings such as witness competence in litigation involving strangers to the original proceeding.34
No. The Michigan injunction arose from a consent decree between Elwell and GM that resolved their employment dispute.35 It received claim-preclusive effect between those parties alone.36 The Bakers were not parties to the Michigan proceeding.37 They never appeared there and held no opportunity to litigate the admissibility of Elwell's testimony.38
Michigan therefore lacked authority to control the Missouri court's determination of witness competence or evidence relevance in the Bakers' wrongful-death action.39 The district court properly allowed Elwell's subpoenaed testimony after reviewing the injunction and settlement agreement.40 The Eighth Circuit erred by treating the Michigan decree as controlling evidentiary issues in a foreign forum.41
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require the Missouri federal court to enforce the Michigan injunction against Elwell's testimony in the Bakers' action.42
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment on the ground that enforcement measures do not travel with sister-state judgments as preclusive effects do.43 He emphasized that the Full Faith and Credit Clause establishes a rule of evidence rather than of jurisdiction.44 Missouri was no more obliged to enforce the Michigan injunction by preventing Elwell from presenting his testimony than it was obliged to enforce it by holding Elwell in contempt.45
The Clause gives judgments only general validity as evidence and requires a new suit for enforcement in the tribunals of other states.46 A judgment or decree of one State may be grounds for an action or a defense to one in another but the Clause and its implementing statute do not affect the jurisdiction of the court in which the judgment is offered in evidence.47
Joined by O'connor And Thomas, Jj.
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment but faulted the majority for announcing broad exceptions to full faith and credit that are neither consistent with rejection of a public policy exception nor in accord with established rules.48 He stressed that the threshold inquiry is the preclusive effect the judgment receives under the law of the rendering state.49 Determining the force and effect of a judgment should be the first step in the analysis.50
Under Michigan law the Bakers as nonparties without mutuality or opportunity to litigate would not be bound by the injunction.51 Michigan law does not appear to support the assumption that Michigan would apply the full force of its judgment to the Bakers.52 Full faith and credit therefore imposes no obligation on Missouri to give the decree any greater effect and the case is resolved without extending or creating exceptions to the doctrine.53
Whether a consent decree and permanent injunction entered in one state can dictate the admissibility of evidence or witness competence in litigation pending in another state?54
No. The Michigan consent decree and injunction resolved only the Elwell-GM employment claims and counterclaims.57 It bound Elwell not to volunteer testimony without GM consent but left court-ordered testimony outside its enforcement reach under the settlement agreement.58
Because the Bakers were not parties and Michigan lacked jurisdiction over them or their Missouri cause of action, the decree could not dictate what evidence the Missouri court would admit or whether Elwell was competent to testify there.59 The district court's decision to permit the testimony after in camera review respected both the limits of Michigan's authority and Missouri's control over its own proceedings.60
A consent decree and permanent injunction entered in one state cannot dictate the admissibility of evidence or witness competence in litigation pending in another state.61
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment on the ground that enforcement measures do not travel with sister-state judgments as preclusive effects do. He emphasized that the Full Faith and Credit Clause establishes a rule of evidence rather than of jurisdiction. Missouri was no more obliged to enforce the Michigan injunction by preventing Elwell from presenting his testimony than it was obliged to enforce it by holding Elwell in contempt.
The Clause gives judgments only general validity as evidence and requires a new suit for enforcement in the tribunals of other states. A judgment or decree of one State may be grounds for an action or a defense to one in another but the Clause and its implementing statute do not affect the jurisdiction of the court in which the judgment is offered in evidence.
Joined by O'connor And Thomas, Jj.
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment but faulted the majority for announcing broad exceptions to full faith and credit that are neither consistent with rejection of a public policy exception nor in accord with established rules. He stressed that the threshold inquiry is the preclusive effect the judgment receives under the law of the rendering state. Determining the force and effect of a judgment should be the first step in the analysis.
Under Michigan law the Bakers as nonparties without mutuality or opportunity to litigate would not be bound by the injunction. Michigan law does not appear to support the assumption that Michigan would apply the full force of its judgment to the Bakers. Full faith and credit therefore imposes no obligation on Missouri to give the decree any greater effect and the case is resolved without extending or creating exceptions to the doctrine.