Also known as: Chimel searches · Chimel doctrine · search incident to arrest
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A limited search of the area within an arrestee's immediate control conducted incident to a lawful arrest. The search protects officer safety and prevents destruction of evidence.
Cameron Cruz was arrested in a clinic parking lot. Officers seized his sedan on the spot and towed it several miles to a government garage. Hours later they opened the locked trunk cases without a warrant. The search fell outside the incident-to-arrest exception because the delay and relocation severed any contemporaneous connection to the arrest.
Connor Clark was stopped for a traffic violation and ordered out of his vehicle. Officers saw a knife on the floorboard and conducted a limited pat-down of the passenger compartment. The search remained within the bounds permitted when an officer reasonably believes the suspect may access a weapon.
In a rural area of Michigan one evening shortly after midnight, Deputies Howell and Lewis observed a car traveling erratically and at excessive speed. The officers observed the car turning down a side road, where it swerved off into a shallow ditch. The officers stopped to investigate. Long, the only occupant of the automobile, met the deputies at the rear of the car, which was protruding from the ditch onto the road. The door on the driver's side of the vehicle was left open. Deputy Howell requested Long to produce his operator's license, but he did not respond. After the request was repeated, Long produced his license. Long again failed to respond when Howell requested him to produce the vehicle registration. After another repeated request, Long, who Howell thought appeared to be under the influence of something, turned from the officers and began walking toward the open door of the vehicle. The officers followed Long and both observed a large hunting knife on the floorboard of the driver's side of the car. The officers then stopped Long's progress and subjected him to a Terry protective patdown, which revealed no weapons. Long and Deputy Lewis then stood by the rear of the vehicle while Deputy Howell shined his flashlight into the interior of the vehicle, but did not actually enter it. The purpose of Howell's action was to search for other weapons. The officer noticed that something was protruding from under the armrest on the front seat. He knelt in the vehicle and lifted the armrest. He saw an open pouch on the front seat, and upon flashing his light on the pouch, determined that it contained what appeared to be marihuana. After Deputy Howell showed the pouch and its contents to Deputy Lewis, Long was arrested for possession of marihuana. A further search of the interior of the vehicle, including the glovebox, revealed neither more contraband nor the vehicle registration. The officers decided to impound the vehicle. Deputy Howell opened the trunk, which did not have a lock, and discovered inside it approximately 75 pounds of marihuana. The Barry County Circuit Court denied Long's motion to suppress the marihuana taken from both the interior of the car and its trunk. He was subsequently convicted of possession of marihuana. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Long's conviction, holding that the search of the passenger compartment was valid as a protective search under Terry. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. The court held that the sole justification of the Terry search, protection of the police officers and others nearby, cannot justify the search in this case. The marihuana found in Long's trunk was considered by the court below to be the fruit of the illegal search of the interior, and was also suppressed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the authority of a police officer to protect himself by conducting a Terry-type search of the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle during the lawful investigatory stop of the occupant of the vehicle.
View caseCynthia Cortez was arrested inside her home after officers entered without knocking. Evidence found in plain view during the subsequent search incident to arrest was offered at trial. The court addressed whether the entry violation required suppression of the items seized from the area within her immediate control.
Police officers obtained a search warrant authorizing a search for drugs and firearms at the home of petitioner Booker T. Hudson in Michigan. Upon arriving to execute the warrant, the officers knocked on the door and announced their presence. They waited only three to five seconds before turning the knob of the unlocked front door and entering Hudson's home. Inside the residence, officers discovered large quantities of drugs, including cocaine rocks in Hudson's pocket, and a loaded gun lodged between the cushion and armrest of the chair in which he was sitting. Hudson was charged under Michigan law with unlawful drug and firearm possession. He moved to suppress all the inculpatory evidence, arguing that the officers' premature entry violated his rights. The Michigan trial court granted the motion to suppress. On interlocutory review, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed that ruling, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Hudson was subsequently convicted of the possession charges. He renewed his suppression claim on appeal, but the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected it and affirmed the conviction. The Michigan Supreme Court again declined review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the case.
View caseCody Callahan was handcuffed at his desk during an office arrest. Officers immediately opened the desk drawers inches from his chair and found incriminating documents. The search stayed inside the area from which Callahan could have reached a weapon or evidence.
On the afternoon of September 13, 1965, three police officers arrived at the Santa Ana, California home of Ted Steven Chimel with a warrant authorizing his arrest for the burglary of a coin shop. The officers knocked on the door, identified themselves to Chimel's wife, and asked if they might come inside. She admitted the officers, who waited ten to fifteen minutes until Chimel returned from work. When Chimel entered, an officer handed him the arrest warrant and asked if he had any coins or medals. Chimel replied that he did not. The officers then asked if he minded if they looked around. Chimel objected, but the officers advised him that on the basis of the lawful arrest they would conduct a search anyway. No search warrant had been issued. The officers looked through the entire three-bedroom house, including the attic, the garage, and a small workshop. In the master bedroom and sewing room the officers directed Chimel's wife to open drawers and move their contents so the officers could view any items. The search lasted between forty-five minutes and one hour and yielded numerous coins, medals, tokens, and other objects. At Chimel's subsequent state trial on two charges of burglary, the seized items were admitted into evidence over his objection that they had been unconstitutionally seized. He was convicted. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of conviction, and the California Supreme Court denied review. Both lower courts held that the arrest was lawful and that the search was justified as incident to that arrest. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the petitioner's constitutional claims regarding the scope of the search.
View caseCharles Cunningham was arrested at a rural site and his truck was towed thirty miles away. Four hours later officers searched the glove compartment at the impound yard. The passage of time and change in location removed the search from the incident-to-arrest category.
In January 1964, fourteen-year-old Pamela Mason disappeared from her home in Manchester, New Hampshire, during a heavy snowstorm after receiving a telephone call about a babysitting job. Her body was discovered eight days later beside a major highway, prompting a massive police investigation. On January 28, officers visited Edward Coolidge at his home after learning he had been absent on the night of the disappearance. Coolidge produced three guns for inspection and agreed to take a lie-detector test. On February 2, while Coolidge was at the police station undergoing the test, two plainclothes officers arrived at his house and spoke with his wife. Mrs. Coolidge provided four guns belonging to her husband and some clothing she believed he might have worn on the night in question. Coolidge was held overnight on an unrelated charge but released the next day. Over the following two and a half weeks, the State accumulated evidence implicating Coolidge. On February 19, the results of the investigation were presented at a meeting between the police officers working on the case and the State Attorney General, who had personally taken charge of all police activities relating to the murder, and was later to serve as chief prosecutor at the trial. Coolidge was arrested at his home that day. His 1951 Pontiac automobile parked in the driveway was seized and towed to the police station two and a half hours later. The Pontiac was searched and vacuumed on February 21, again in January 1965, and a third time in April 1965. At Coolidge's subsequent jury trial for murder, vacuum sweepings from the car were introduced into evidence. One of the guns taken from the home was also introduced. Vacuum sweepings from the clothing were introduced into evidence. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the conviction after upholding the admissibility of the evidence, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseChristine Castro was detained on the street and asked to produce identification. She refused and was arrested. Officers then searched the area within her immediate control incident to the arrest. The validity of the underlying stop and arrest determined whether the search was lawful.
Edward Lawson was detained or arrested on approximately fifteen occasions by San Diego police officers between March 1975 and January 1977 while walking on the streets of the city. On each occasion, officers stopped Lawson and requested that he produce a driver's license or other identification. When he was unable to comply, the officers arrested him under California Penal Code section 647(e). Lawson was prosecuted twice under the statute and convicted once. The second charge was dismissed. Lawson filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California against various officers and officials, including Deputy Chief Commander H. A. Porazzo of the California Highway Patrol. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that section 647(e) was unconstitutional, a mandatory injunction restraining its enforcement, and compensatory and punitive damages. The District Court held the statute overbroad, enjoined its enforcement, and denied damages on the ground that the officers had acted in good faith. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's determination that the statute was unconstitutional. It concluded that the statute violated the Fourth Amendment, contained a vague enforcement standard susceptible to arbitrary enforcement, and failed to give fair notice of the conduct prohibited. The Ninth Circuit also reversed the denial of a jury trial on the damages issue and remanded the case for trial. The officers appealed to the Supreme Court from the portion of the judgment declaring the statute unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. California Penal Code section 647(e) (West 1970) provides that every person who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place without apparent reason or business is guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor. The statute further requires that such a person refuse to identify himself and to account for his presence when requested by any peace officer if the surrounding circumstances indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such identification. California courts have construed the statute to require that a detained person provide credible and reliable identification. This identification must carry reasonable assurance that it is authentic and provide means for later contact with the person who has identified himself. The District Court made no specific findings concerning the circumstances of each stop, but the trial transcript contains descriptions given by both Lawson and the officers. One officer testified that he stopped Lawson on an otherwise vacant street late at night because the area was isolated and near a high-crime zone. Another testified that he detained Lawson while walking at a late hour in a business area where burglaries had occurred. Lawson stated that he had never been stopped by police for any reason apart from these detentions under the statute.
View caseOfficers may search the arrestee's person and the area within the arrestee's immediate control from which the arrestee might gain access to a weapon or destructible evidence. The search does not extend to the entire premises once the arrestee is secured.
The search must be substantially contemporaneous in time and place with the arrest. Delayed searches conducted after the vehicle or item has been towed to a remote location fall outside the exception and require an independent justification such as a warrant or inventory policy.
Handcuffing limits the search to the area the arrestee can still physically reach. Locations beyond that wingspan, such as a file cabinet twelve feet away or a separate room, exceed the permissible scope even in a compact workspace.
No. Issuance of a traffic citation without an actual arrest does not justify a search incident to arrest. Officers must effect a custodial arrest supported by probable cause before the exception applies.