Also known as: changes in circumstances · changed circumstances · changing circumstances · material change in circumstances
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A material alteration in the facts or conditions existing after formation of an agreement or entry of a decree. The alteration may justify a court in refusing enforcement of a contractual term or modifying a support or maintenance order when the change produces substantial hardship or renders original terms unconscionable.
After signing a premarital agreement that waived spousal support, Christine Castro lost her long-term job due to industry collapse and could no longer meet basic living expenses. She petitioned the court to decline enforcement of the waiver. The court examined whether the post-agreement job loss created substantial hardship under the agreement taken as a whole.
Carmen Choi obtained a divorce decree requiring her former spouse to pay monthly maintenance. Two years later her former spouse suffered a permanent disability that eliminated his income. He moved to reduce the obligation. The court required proof that the disability constituted changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to render the original terms unconscionable.
Cody Callahan challenged a state abortion restriction under the undue burden standard. He argued that medical advances and new data on clinic capacity since the original ruling constituted a change in circumstances. The court assessed whether those developments required reexamination of the constitutional framework.
The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989, established several requirements governing the performance of abortions within the Commonwealth. The Act required a woman seeking an abortion to provide informed consent after receiving specific information from a physician or counselor at least twenty-four hours before the procedure. It mandated that a minor obtain the informed consent of one parent, subject to a judicial bypass option. It further required a married woman to sign a statement confirming that she had notified her husband of her planned abortion, unless certain exceptions applied. The Act also imposed reporting obligations on facilities providing abortion services and defined a medical emergency exception to the various requirements. Before any of these provisions took effect, the petitioners brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The petitioners were five abortion clinics and one physician representing himself as well as a class of physicians who provide abortion services. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and challenged each provision as unconstitutional on its face. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction. After conducting a three-day bench trial, the District Court held all the provisions unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against their enforcement by Pennsylvania. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It adopted the District Court's factual findings and legal analysis except with respect to the spousal notification requirement. The Court of Appeals upheld the spousal notification requirement as constitutional and applied the undue burden standard in evaluating the provisions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.
View caseClifford Cox sued to invalidate removal protections for members of an accounting oversight board. He contended that intervening judicial decisions and congressional enactments had altered the separation-of-powers landscape. The court evaluated whether those developments justified revisiting the constitutionality of the dual-layer protection.
In 2002 Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board as a five-member entity appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Board oversees audits of public companies and possesses authority to inspect registered accounting firms, initiate investigations, and issue sanctions. Beckstead and Watts, LLP, a Nevada accounting firm, registered with the Board. The Board inspected the firm, released a report critical of its auditing procedures, and began a formal investigation. Free Enterprise Fund, a nonprofit organization of which the firm is a member, and Beckstead and Watts sued the Board and its members, the Commission, and the United States in federal district court. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that the Board's structure violated the Constitution. The district court determined it had jurisdiction and granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in full. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseCameron Cruz, a grandparent, petitioned for visitation rights after the parents restricted contact. He asserted that the child's increased behavioral issues and the parents' relocation constituted a change in circumstances. The court weighed whether those facts altered the constitutional balance between parental rights and third-party visitation.
Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel never married but had two daughters, Isabelle and Natalie. Jenifer and Gary Troxel are Brad's parents and the paternal grandparents of the children. After Granville and Brad separated in 1991, Brad lived with his parents and regularly brought Isabelle and Natalie to their home for weekend visitation. Brad Troxel committed suicide in May 1993. The Troxels continued to see the children on a regular basis after his death. In October 1993 Granville informed the Troxels that she wished to limit their visitation to one short visit per month. In December 1993 the Troxels filed a petition in Washington Superior Court for Skagit County under Rev. Code Wash. § 26.10.160(3) seeking visitation rights. The statute provides that any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time. The court may order visitation when it may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances. The Troxels requested two weekends of overnight visitation per month and two weeks each summer. Granville proposed one day of visitation per month with no overnight stay. In 1995 the Superior Court ordered visitation one weekend per month, one week during the summer, and four hours on both grandparents' birthdays. Granville appealed. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that nonparents lack standing to seek visitation under the statute unless a custody action is pending. The Washington Supreme Court granted review, held that the Troxels had standing, but affirmed on the ground that the statute unconstitutionally infringes on the fundamental right of parents to rear their children. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment.
View caseCharlotte Chung, a clinic operator, sought to enjoin new state restrictions on abortion facilities. She presented evidence that clinic closures and increased travel distances since prior litigation amounted to a change in circumstances. The court considered whether those developments rendered the restrictions unconstitutional under the applicable standard.
In July 2013 the Texas Legislature enacted House Bill 2. The bill contained an admitting-privileges requirement for physicians performing abortions and a surgical-center requirement for abortion facilities. Before the law took effect a group of Texas abortion providers filed the Abbott case seeking facial invalidation of the admitting-privileges provision. The district court initially enjoined the provision but the Fifth Circuit vacated the injunction and later upheld the requirement on the basis of evidence presented before enforcement. On April 6 2014 petitioners a group of abortion providers that included some Abbott plaintiffs filed this suit in federal district court. They sought as-applied relief against the admitting-privileges requirement for facilities in McAllen and El Paso and a statewide injunction against the surgical-center requirement claiming violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held a four-day bench trial and received stipulations expert depositions and testimony. It found that the number of facilities providing abortions dropped in half from about 40 to about 20 after the admitting-privileges requirement began to be enforced. It found that the number of women of reproductive age living more than 50 miles from a clinic doubled. The number living more than 100 miles away increased by 150 percent. The number living more than 150 miles away increased by more than 350 percent. The number living more than 200 miles away increased by about 2,800 percent. It found that the number of facilities would drop to seven or eight if the surgical-center provision took effect. It found that before H. B. 2's passage abortion was an extremely safe procedure with very low rates of complications and virtually no deaths. It found that abortion was safer than many more common procedures not subject to the same level of regulation. It found that the cost of compliance with the surgical-center requirement would most likely exceed 1.5 million dollars to 3 million dollars per clinic. On the basis of these findings the district court enjoined enforcement of both provisions. The Fifth Circuit reversed in significant part holding that res judicata barred the challenges and that both requirements were constitutional. The case reached the Supreme Court.
View caseThe party must demonstrate that the change is substantial and continuing and that enforcement of the original terms has become unconscionable. Courts confine review to events arising after the decree and do not revisit the original fairness of the award.
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A court may refuse enforcement if the term produces substantial hardship because of a material change arising after signing, when the agreement is viewed as a whole. The court decides the issue as a matter of law.
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Modern doctrine permits enforcement of a modification when it responds fairly to genuinely unforeseen circumstances that make performance substantially more burdensome. Routine market fluctuations do not qualify.
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Property divisions are generally not modifiable absent conditions that justify reopening a judgment under state law. Changed circumstances alone do not suffice.
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Courts require proof of a material change occurring since the prior order. The inquiry focuses on whether the new facts affect the child's best interests or render the existing arrangement unworkable.
…principle to facts as they had not been seen by the Court before. In constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed circumstances may impose new obligations, and the thoughtful part of the Nation could accept each decision to overrule a prior case as a response to the Court's constitutional duty. Because the cases…