484 U.S. 174 (1988)
In July 1978 respondent Susan Clay, then known as Susan Thompson, filed a petition in Los Angeles Superior Court seeking dissolution of her marriage to petitioner David Thompson and custody of their infant son Matthew.1 The court initially awarded the parents joint custody of Matthew.2
After respondent decided to move from California to Louisiana, the California court entered an order granting her sole custody of Matthew upon her departure. This order was to remain in effect until a court investigator submitted a custody report.3 Respondent and Matthew moved to Louisiana in December 1980.4
Three months later respondent filed a petition in Louisiana state court for enforcement of the California custody decree and for sole custody, which the Louisiana court granted on April 7, 1981.5 Two months after that the California court awarded sole custody to petitioner.6
In August 1983 petitioner brought this action in the District Court for the Central District of California.7 He requested a declaration that the Louisiana decree was invalid and the California decree valid, and sought an injunction against enforcement of the Louisiana decree.8 The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction.9 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed on the ground that petitioner had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.10 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.11
Whether the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980 furnishes an implied cause of action in federal court to determine which of two conflicting state custody decisions is valid?12
In determining whether to infer a private cause of action from a federal statute, the focal point is Congress' intent in enacting the statute, as guides to discerning that intent the four factors set out in Cort v. Ash along with other tools of statutory construction are used, and unless this congressional intent can be inferred from the language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some other source, the essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply does not exist.13
No. The context of the PKPA shows that Congress sought to remedy the inapplicability of full faith and credit requirements to custody determinations.14 Congress imposed a federal duty on states to give full faith and credit to custody decrees consistent with the Act.15 The language of 28 U.S.C. § 1738A is addressed entirely to states and state courts as a mandate to respect sister-state decrees.16
It does not confer a right on a specified class of persons.17 The legislative history reveals Congress considered and rejected proposals for federal court enforcement of custody decrees.18 Examples include the exchange between Congressmen Conyers and Fish and the Justice Department letter opposing a federal forum.19 In sum, the context, language, and history of the PKPA together make out a conclusive case against inferring a cause of action in federal court to determine which of two conflicting state custody decrees is valid.20
The Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980 does not furnish an implied cause of action in federal court to determine which of two conflicting state custody decisions is valid.21
Related opinions on this issue
Justice O’Connor concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. For the reasons expressed by Justice Scalia in Part I of his opinion in this case, she joined all but the first full paragraph of Part II of the Court’s opinion and judgment.22
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment that the PKPA does not create a private right of action in federal court.23 He wrote separately to disagree with the Court’s dicta denying the necessity of an actual congressional intent to create a private right of action.24 He also disagreed with referring to Cort v. Ash as though its analysis had not been effectively overruled by later opinions.25
Scalia argued that the congressional intent test should be abandoned in favor of a categorical rule against implying private rights of action.26 He emphasized that Congress alone bears responsibility for determining when private parties receive causes of action under legislation it adopts.27 Scalia viewed the risk of judges distorting the constitutional process through implications as too great to justify the current approach.28