carrying for hire

In 1932, prices received by New York dairy farmers for milk fell substantially below the cost of production amid overproduction and destructive competition. A joint legislative committee investigated the industry through public hearings and expert studies, producing a detailed report that recommended price regulation to stabilize the market and ensure an adequate supply of wholesome milk. The Legislature responded by enacting Chapter 158 of the Laws of 1933, which established a Milk Control Board empowered to fix minimum and maximum wholesale and retail prices for milk. The Board issued an order setting a minimum price of nine cents per quart for milk sold by stores to consumers in cities and villages over one thousand population. Leo Nebbia, the proprietor of a grocery store in Rochester, sold two quarts of milk and a five-cent loaf of bread for eighteen cents on April 19, 1933, thereby charging less than the prescribed minimum. He was prosecuted for violating the order, convicted in the County Court of Monroe County, and sentenced to pay a fine. The conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court and by the Court of Appeals of New York. Nebbia maintained throughout that the statute and the order contravened the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In 1963, the Mulkeys filed an action in California superior court against Reitman and other property owners under sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code. They alleged that the owners had refused to rent them an apartment solely because of their race and sought an injunction and damages. After the filing of the complaint, California voters approved Proposition 14 in the November 1964 statewide election, which added section 26 to Article I of the California Constitution. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the new provision had rendered the statutory claims invalid. The trial court granted the motion, and the Mulkeys appealed to the California Supreme Court. In December 1964, the Prendergasts filed a separate suit in superior court against Snyder to enjoin their eviction from an apartment. They alleged that the eviction was motivated by racial prejudice and would violate sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code. Snyder filed a cross-complaint seeking a judicial declaration that he was entitled to terminate the month-to-month tenancy even if his action was based on racial considerations. The trial court dismissed the cross-complaint with prejudice after concluding that judicial enforcement of a racially motivated eviction would violate the Equal Protection Clause, without addressing the validity of Proposition 14. Snyder appealed to the California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court heard the two cases together. In the Mulkey appeal it reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. In the Prendergast appeal it affirmed the dismissal of the cross-complaint. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgments because the cases presented an important issue under the Fourteenth Amendment. Prior to the adoption of Proposition 14, the California Legislature had enacted several statutes addressing racial discrimination in housing. The Unruh Act of 1959 prohibited certain discriminations in business establishments. The Rumford Fair Housing Act of 1963 prohibited racial discriminations in the sale or rental of private dwellings containing more than four units and was enforceable by the State Fair Employment Practice Commission. Proposition 14 provided that neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge the right of any person to decline to sell, lease or rent residential real property to such person or persons as he in his absolute discretion chooses. The two cases arose after the passage of Proposition 14 and presented challenges to its effect on prior antidiscrimination legislation and on claims of racial discrimination in housing.

The United States brought an action in a Tennessee federal court against T. I. M. E.-D. C., Inc., a common carrier of motor freight with nationwide operations. The complaint charged discriminatory hiring, assignment, and promotion policies against Negroes at its Nashville terminal. Almost three years later, the Government filed a second action in a Texas federal court against the company. It alleged a pattern and practice of employment discrimination against Negroes and Spanish-surnamed persons throughout the company's transportation system. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters was joined as a defendant. The two actions were consolidated for trial in the Northern District of Texas. The central claim in both lawsuits was that the company had engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminating against minorities in hiring so-called line drivers. Those Negroes and Spanish-surnamed persons who had been hired were given lower paying, less desirable jobs as servicemen or local city drivers. They were thereafter discriminated against with respect to promotions and transfers. The complaint also challenged the seniority system established by the collective-bargaining agreements between the employer and the union. The Government sought a general injunctive remedy and specific make-whole relief for all individual discriminatees. The cases went to trial. The District Court found that the Government had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that T. I. M. E.-D. C. and its predecessor companies were engaged in a plan and practice of discrimination in violation of Title VII. The court further found that the seniority system contained in the collective-bargaining contracts between the company and the union violated Title VII because it operated to impede the free transfer of minority groups into and within the company. With respect to individual relief the court accepted the Government's basic contention that the affected class of discriminatees included all Negro and Spanish-surnamed incumbent employees who had been hired to fill city operations or serviceman jobs at every terminal that had a line-driver operation. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the basic conclusions of the District Court. It held, however, that the relief ordered by the District Court was inadequate. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court to hold the evidentiary hearings necessary to apply its remedial principles. The Supreme Court granted both the company's and the union's petitions for certiorari.

The plaintiffs, administrators of the estate of Everett A. Loucks, brought suit in New York courts seeking damages for his death. Loucks was traveling on a highway in Massachusetts when he was run down and killed by the negligence of servants of the defendant Standard Oil Co. of New York who were then engaged in the defendant's business. Loucks left a wife and two children, all residents of New York. A Massachusetts statute, Public Laws chapter 171 section 2 as amended by Laws of 1907 chapter 375, states that if a person or corporation by negligence causes the death of a person who is in the exercise of due care and not in the defendant's employment or service, the defendant shall be liable in damages in a sum of not less than five hundred dollars nor more than ten thousand dollars, to be assessed with reference to the degree of culpability, to be recovered in an action of tort commenced within two years after the injury by the executor or administrator of the deceased, one-half to the use of the widow and one-half to the use of the children. The action was brought under that Massachusetts statute. The case reached the Court of Appeals of New York after proceedings in the lower courts, including an order by the Special Term and a judgment by the Appellate Division. All parties to the action are residents of New York. The death occurred on a Massachusetts highway during the course of the defendant's business operations there.