551 U.S. 249 (2007)
Early in the morning of November 27, 2001, Deputy Sheriff Robert Brokenbrough and his partner saw a parked Buick with expired registration tags.1 In his ensuing conversation with the police dispatcher, Brokenbrough learned that an application for renewal of registration was being processed.2 The officers saw the car again on the road, and this time Brokenbrough noticed its display of a temporary operating permit with the number eleven, indicating it was legal to drive the car through November.3
The officers decided to pull the Buick over to verify that the permit matched the vehicle, even though there was nothing unusual about the permit or the way it was affixed.4 Brokenbrough asked the driver, Karen Simeroth, for her license and saw a passenger in the front seat, petitioner Bruce Brendlin, whom he recognized as one of the Brendlin brothers.5 He recalled that either Scott or Bruce Brendlin had dropped out of parole supervision and asked Brendlin to identify himself.6 Brokenbrough returned to his cruiser, called for backup, and verified that Brendlin was a parole violator with an outstanding no-bail warrant for his arrest.7
While he was in the patrol car, Brokenbrough saw Brendlin briefly open and then close the passenger door of the Buick.8 Once reinforcements arrived, Brokenbrough went to the passenger side of the Buick, ordered him out of the car at gunpoint, and declared him under arrest.9 When the police searched Brendlin incident to arrest, they found an orange syringe cap on his person.10 A patdown search of Simeroth revealed syringes and a plastic bag of a green leafy substance, and she was also formally arrested.11 Officers then searched the car and found tubing, a scale, and other things used to produce methamphetamine.12
Brendlin was charged with possession and manufacture of methamphetamine, and he moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the searches of his person and the car as fruits of an unconstitutional seizure, arguing that the officers lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop.13 The trial court denied the suppression motion after finding that the stop was lawful and Brendlin was not seized until Brokenbrough ordered him out of the car and formally arrested him.14 Brendlin pleaded guilty, subject to appeal on the suppression issue, and was sentenced to four years in prison.15
The California Court of Appeal reversed the denial of the suppression motion, holding that Brendlin was seized by the traffic stop, which they held unlawful.16 By a narrow majority, the Supreme Court of California reversed.17
Whether a traffic stop subjects a passenger, as well as the driver, to Fourth Amendment seizure?18
A person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the government's action under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, terminates or restrains his freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.19 When the actions of the police do not show an unambiguous intent to restrain, there needs to be some test for telling when a seizure occurs in response to authority.20 The same holds when an individual's submission to a show of governmental authority takes the form of passive acquiescence. A seizure occurs if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.21 When a person has no desire to leave for reasons unrelated to the police presence, the coercive effect of the encounter can be measured better by asking whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.22
Yes. The traffic stop of the Buick in which Brendlin rode as a passenger constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure of Brendlin.23 Brendlin submitted by remaining inside once the car halted.24
A reasonable passenger in Brendlin's position would have understood that the police were exercising control over the car and all its occupants.25 They diverted them from the roadway and subjected them to police authority with no practical ability to depart without permission. The objective circumstances of the stop confirm that no one in the vehicle was free to terminate the encounter until the officers completed their investigation.26