224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198 (1918)
The plaintiffs, administrators of the estate of Everett A. Loucks, brought suit in New York courts seeking damages for his death.1 Loucks was traveling on a highway in Massachusetts when he was run down and killed by the negligence of servants of the defendant Standard Oil Co. of New York who were then engaged in the defendant's business.2 Loucks left a wife and two children, all residents of New York.3
A Massachusetts statute, Public Laws chapter 171 section 2 as amended by Laws of 1907 chapter 375, states that if a person or corporation by negligence causes the death of a person who is in the exercise of due care and not in the defendant's employment or service, the defendant shall be liable in damages in a sum of not less than five hundred dollars nor more than ten thousand dollars, to be assessed with reference to the degree of culpability, to be recovered in an action of tort commenced within two years after the injury by the executor or administrator of the deceased, one-half to the use of the widow and one-half to the use of the children.4
The action was brought under that Massachusetts statute.5 The case reached the Court of Appeals of New York after proceedings in the lower courts, including an order by the Special Term and a judgment by the Appellate Division.6
All parties to the action are residents of New York.7 The death occurred on a Massachusetts highway during the course of the defendant's business operations there.8
Whether the Massachusetts wrongful death statute is penal within the rules of private international law?9
The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another. A statute is penal within the rules of private international law when it awards a penalty to the state, or to a public officer in its behalf, or to a member of the public suing in the interest of the whole community to redress a public wrong. The purpose must be vindication of public justice rather than reparation to one aggrieved.10
No. The Massachusetts statute provides that if negligence causes death the defendant shall be liable in damages between five hundred and ten thousand dollars assessed with reference to the degree of culpability.11 Recovery is by the executor or administrator for the widow and children.12 The plaintiffs are the administrators of Everett A. Loucks.13 Loucks left a wife and two children who are New York residents.14
The statute's dominant purpose is reparation to the family.15 This is shown by the requirement of survivors and the evolution from indictment and fine payable to next of kin to a civil action of tort.16
The Massachusetts wrongful death statute is not penal within the rules of private international law.17
Whether differences between the Massachusetts statute and New York law provide a sufficient reason for New York courts to decline jurisdiction over an action to enforce the foreign right?18
A tort committed in one state creates a right of action that may be sued upon in another unless public policy forbids. Courts refuse to enforce a foreign right only when doing so would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, or some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.19
No. The Massachusetts statute differs from New York law by allowing damages assessed with reference to culpability up to ten thousand dollars.20 Yet all parties including the defendant Standard Oil Co. of New York are New York residents.21 The death occurred during the defendant's business operations on a Massachusetts highway.22 New York has a statute giving a civil remedy for death caused in the state.23
New York has embedded that policy in its Constitution.24 Enforcement of the foreign right therefore does not offend public policy.25
Differences between the Massachusetts statute and New York law do not provide a sufficient reason for New York courts to decline jurisdiction over an action to enforce the foreign right.26
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Collin dissents from the decision of the second question addressed in the opinion of Cardozo, J.27 The second question concerns whether differences between the Massachusetts wrongful death statute and New York law provide a sufficient reason for declining jurisdiction.28 By dissenting on this point while otherwise concurring, Justice Collin expresses disagreement with the majority's holding that public policy does not prohibit New York courts from enforcing the foreign right created by the Massachusetts statute.29
Nonetheless, he concurs with the majority's determination that the Massachusetts statute is not penal in the international sense.30