387 U.S. 369 (1967)
In 1963, the Mulkeys filed an action in California superior court against Reitman and other property owners under sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code.1 They alleged that the owners had refused to rent them an apartment solely because of their race and sought an injunction and damages.2 After the filing of the complaint, California voters approved Proposition 14 in the November 1964 statewide election, which added section 26 to Article I of the California Constitution.3 The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the new provision had rendered the statutory claims invalid.4 The trial court granted the motion, and the Mulkeys appealed to the California Supreme Court.5
In December 1964, the Prendergasts filed a separate suit in superior court against Snyder to enjoin their eviction from an apartment.6 They alleged that the eviction was motivated by racial prejudice and would violate sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code.7 Snyder filed a cross-complaint seeking a judicial declaration that he was entitled to terminate the month-to-month tenancy even if his action was based on racial considerations.8 The trial court dismissed the cross-complaint with prejudice after concluding that judicial enforcement of a racially motivated eviction would violate the Equal Protection Clause, without addressing the validity of Proposition 14.9 Snyder appealed to the California Supreme Court.10
The California Supreme Court heard the two cases together.11 In the Mulkey appeal it reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment.12 In the Prendergast appeal it affirmed the dismissal of the cross-complaint.13 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgments because the cases presented an important issue under the Fourteenth Amendment.14
Prior to the adoption of Proposition 14, the California Legislature had enacted several statutes addressing racial discrimination in housing.15 The Unruh Act of 1959 prohibited certain discriminations in business establishments.16 The Rumford Fair Housing Act of 1963 prohibited racial discriminations in the sale or rental of private dwellings containing more than four units and was enforceable by the State Fair Employment Practice Commission.17 Proposition 14 provided that neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge the right of any person to decline to sell, lease or rent residential real property to such person or persons as he in his absolute discretion chooses.18
The two cases arose after the passage of Proposition 14 and presented challenges to its effect on prior antidiscrimination legislation and on claims of racial discrimination in housing.19
Whether Article I, section 26 of the California Constitution denies to any person the equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment?20
A provision of state law that authorizes and encourages private racial discrimination in the housing market involves the state in racial discriminations to an unconstitutional degree under the Fourteenth Amendment.21
Yes. The Mulkeys filed their action in 1963 in California superior court against Reitman under sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code.22 They alleged refusal to rent an apartment solely on account of their race.23 They sought an injunction and damages.24 After Proposition 14 was approved by voters in November 1964, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the new constitutional provision had rendered the statutory claims invalid.25 The trial court granted the motion.26
In a separate action, the Prendergasts filed suit in December 1964 against Snyder to enjoin eviction from their apartment.27 They alleged the eviction was motivated by racial prejudice in violation of the Civil Code.28 Snyder cross-complained for a declaration that he could terminate the tenancy on racial grounds.29 The trial court dismissed the cross-complaint with prejudice.30 It concluded that judicial enforcement of a racially motivated eviction would violate the Equal Protection Clause.31
The California Supreme Court consolidated the appeals.32 It reversed the summary judgment in the Mulkey case.33 It affirmed the dismissal in the Prendergast case on the ground that section 26 violated the Fourteenth Amendment.34 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the important Fourteenth Amendment issue presented by the cases.35
Before Proposition 14, the California Legislature had enacted the Unruh Act in 1959.36 It had enacted the Rumford Fair Housing Act in 1963 to prohibit racial discrimination in housing.37 Proposition 14 added section 26 to the California Constitution.38 The provision provides that the State shall not deny the right of any person to decline to sell, lease or rent residential real property to any person in his absolute discretion.39 The provision was intended to authorize private racial discriminations in the housing market.40 It would significantly involve the State in private racial discrimination contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment by embedding the right to discriminate in the state's basic charter.41
Article I, section 26 of the California Constitution denies to any person the equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.42
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas joined the opinion of the Court.43 He added that Proposition 14 is a form of sophisticated discrimination whereby the people of California harness the energies of private groups to do indirectly what they cannot under our decisions allow their government to do.44 Real estate brokers and mortgage lenders are largely dedicated to the maintenance of segregated communities.45
Zoning is a state and municipal function.46 When the State leaves that function to private agencies or institutions which are licensees and which practice racial discrimination, it suffers a governmental function to be performed under private auspices in a way the State itself may not act.47
Joined by Justices Black, Clark, And Stewart
Justice Harlan dissented and would have reversed the judgments of the California Supreme Court.48 He argued that section 26 merely effects a pro tanto repeal of prior antidiscrimination statutes and places the state in a position of neutrality with respect to private discrimination in residential property transactions.49 The provision is neutral on its face.50
The record contains no findings of fact showing that the state through section 26 is actively promoting racial discrimination rather than simply removing prior statutory impediments to private choice.51 This decision may inhibit legislative flexibility in dealing with race relations.52