Also known as: articulable fact · articulable facts and circumstances · specific and articulable facts
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Specific concrete observations that together with rational inferences supply an objective basis for reasonable suspicion or other Fourth Amendment standards justifying limited police intrusions such as investigative stops protective sweeps or frisks.
Officers arrested Albert Allen inside his apartment for assault. While securing the scene they heard movement in a closed bedroom closet and observed an open window suggesting a possible escape route. These observations supplied the specific facts needed to justify a limited sweep of areas where a person could hide.
Anika Anand lingered outside a closed bank for twenty minutes repeatedly stepping toward customers and patting her waistband. Officer Lane observed the pattern at a high-risk location just after closing. The concrete conduct justified a brief detention and outer-clothing patdown for weapons.
Alexandra Armstrong walked repeatedly along the same block at night without apparent purpose. Officers asked her to identify herself after noting the unusual pattern. The request rested on the observed conduct rather than a general demand for papers.
Edward Lawson was detained or arrested on approximately fifteen occasions by San Diego police officers between March 1975 and January 1977 while walking on the streets of the city. On each occasion, officers stopped Lawson and requested that he produce a driver's license or other identification. When he was unable to comply, the officers arrested him under California Penal Code section 647(e). Lawson was prosecuted twice under the statute and convicted once. The second charge was dismissed. Lawson filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California against various officers and officials, including Deputy Chief Commander H. A. Porazzo of the California Highway Patrol. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that section 647(e) was unconstitutional, a mandatory injunction restraining its enforcement, and compensatory and punitive damages. The District Court held the statute overbroad, enjoined its enforcement, and denied damages on the ground that the officers had acted in good faith. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's determination that the statute was unconstitutional. It concluded that the statute violated the Fourth Amendment, contained a vague enforcement standard susceptible to arbitrary enforcement, and failed to give fair notice of the conduct prohibited. The Ninth Circuit also reversed the denial of a jury trial on the damages issue and remanded the case for trial. The officers appealed to the Supreme Court from the portion of the judgment declaring the statute unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. California Penal Code section 647(e) (West 1970) provides that every person who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place without apparent reason or business is guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor. The statute further requires that such a person refuse to identify himself and to account for his presence when requested by any peace officer if the surrounding circumstances indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such identification. California courts have construed the statute to require that a detained person provide credible and reliable identification. This identification must carry reasonable assurance that it is authentic and provide means for later contact with the person who has identified himself. The District Court made no specific findings concerning the circumstances of each stop, but the trial transcript contains descriptions given by both Lawson and the officers. One officer testified that he stopped Lawson on an otherwise vacant street late at night because the area was isolated and near a high-crime zone. Another testified that he detained Lawson while walking at a late hour in a business area where burglaries had occurred. Lawson stated that he had never been stopped by police for any reason apart from these detentions under the statute.
View caseAndre Antoine was pulled over for speeding and appeared nervous while repeatedly glancing toward the passenger compartment. The officer saw a partially concealed object under the seat. These facts permitted a limited search of areas within the driver's immediate reach.
In a rural area of Michigan one evening shortly after midnight, Deputies Howell and Lewis observed a car traveling erratically and at excessive speed. The officers observed the car turning down a side road, where it swerved off into a shallow ditch. The officers stopped to investigate. Long, the only occupant of the automobile, met the deputies at the rear of the car, which was protruding from the ditch onto the road. The door on the driver's side of the vehicle was left open. Deputy Howell requested Long to produce his operator's license, but he did not respond. After the request was repeated, Long produced his license. Long again failed to respond when Howell requested him to produce the vehicle registration. After another repeated request, Long, who Howell thought appeared to be under the influence of something, turned from the officers and began walking toward the open door of the vehicle. The officers followed Long and both observed a large hunting knife on the floorboard of the driver's side of the car. The officers then stopped Long's progress and subjected him to a Terry protective patdown, which revealed no weapons. Long and Deputy Lewis then stood by the rear of the vehicle while Deputy Howell shined his flashlight into the interior of the vehicle, but did not actually enter it. The purpose of Howell's action was to search for other weapons. The officer noticed that something was protruding from under the armrest on the front seat. He knelt in the vehicle and lifted the armrest. He saw an open pouch on the front seat, and upon flashing his light on the pouch, determined that it contained what appeared to be marihuana. After Deputy Howell showed the pouch and its contents to Deputy Lewis, Long was arrested for possession of marihuana. A further search of the interior of the vehicle, including the glovebox, revealed neither more contraband nor the vehicle registration. The officers decided to impound the vehicle. Deputy Howell opened the trunk, which did not have a lock, and discovered inside it approximately 75 pounds of marihuana. The Barry County Circuit Court denied Long's motion to suppress the marihuana taken from both the interior of the car and its trunk. He was subsequently convicted of possession of marihuana. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Long's conviction, holding that the search of the passenger compartment was valid as a protective search under Terry. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. The court held that the sole justification of the Terry search, protection of the police officers and others nearby, cannot justify the search in this case. The marihuana found in Long's trunk was considered by the court below to be the fruit of the illegal search of the interior, and was also suppressed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the authority of a police officer to protect himself by conducting a Terry-type search of the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle during the lawful investigatory stop of the occupant of the vehicle.
View caseAriana Azizi's suitcase emitted a strong chemical odor and she appeared agitated when questioned about her itinerary. Officers briefly detained the bag to arrange a dog sniff. The observed behavior and smell provided the basis for the limited seizure.
Respondent Raymond J. Place arrived at Miami International Airport on August 8, 1980, aboard a nonstop flight from New York City. Two DEA agents, alerted to his arrival, approached him in the baggage claim area after observing his behavior while purchasing a ticket. The agents requested his airline ticket and identification, which Place provided, and he consented to a search of his two checked suitcases. Because his flight was about to depart, the agents decided not to search the luggage at that time. Prompted by Place's remark that he recognized them as police, the agents examined the address tags on his luggage and discovered discrepancies. Further investigation showed that the addresses did not exist and that the telephone number belonged to a different address. The Miami agents relayed this information to DEA authorities in New York. At La Guardia Airport, two DEA agents approached Place after he claimed his bags. Place refused consent to a search of his luggage. The agents informed him they would take the luggage to obtain a search warrant, and Place declined to accompany them. The agents transported the bags to Kennedy Airport for a sniff test by a trained narcotics detection dog. Approximately 90 minutes after the seizure, the dog alerted positively to one bag. Due to the late Friday afternoon timing, the agents held the luggage until Monday, when they obtained a warrant and discovered 1,125 grams of cocaine inside. Place was indicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The District Court denied his motion to suppress, he pleaded guilty reserving the right to appeal, and the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction.
View caseAlan Ackerman matched a description of a recent theft suspect and stood near the crime scene. Officers detained him briefly and asked his name to confirm identity. The request was a routine part of the investigation supported by the matching description.
The sheriff's department in Humboldt County, Nevada, received an afternoon telephone call reporting an assault. The caller reported seeing a man assault a woman in a red and silver GMC truck on Grass Valley Road. Deputy Sheriff Lee Dove was dispatched to investigate. When the officer arrived at the scene, he found the truck parked on the side of the road. A man was standing by the truck, and a young woman was sitting inside it. The officer observed skid marks in the gravel behind the vehicle, leading him to believe it had come to a sudden stop. The officer approached the man and explained that he was investigating a report of a fight. The man appeared to be intoxicated. The officer asked him if he had any identification on him, which the officer understood as a request to produce a driver's license or some other form of written identification. The man refused and asked why the officer wanted to see identification. The officer responded that he was conducting an investigation and needed to see some identification. The man refused the officer's requests for identification eleven times. He began to taunt the officer by placing his hands behind his back and telling the officer to arrest him and take him to jail. After warning the man that he would be arrested if he continued to refuse, the officer placed him under arrest. The man arrested on Grass Valley Road is Larry Dudley Hiibel. Hiibel was charged with willfully resisting, delaying or obstructing a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge any legal duty of his office in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. § 199.280. Hiibel was tried in the Justice Court of Union Township. The court convicted Hiibel and fined him $250. The Sixth Judicial District Court affirmed the conviction. On review the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the conviction in a divided opinion. Hiibel petitioned for rehearing, seeking explicit resolution of his Fifth Amendment challenge. The petition was denied without opinion. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseArticulable facts are specific concrete observations that an officer can point to and that together with rational inferences support reasonable suspicion. A hunch is an unparticularized suspicion lacking any objective basis in observed conduct or circumstances.
Yes. Courts assess the totality of the circumstances and permit officers to aggregate several individually lawful factors when the combination gives rise to an objective basis to suspect criminal activity.
No. The standard requires only that the facts support a reasonable inference of criminal activity. Officers need not eliminate every possible lawful explanation before acting.
The same facts that support reasonable suspicion of criminal activity can also justify a limited frisk if they additionally indicate the person may be armed and dangerous.