462 U.S. 696 (1983)
Respondent Raymond J. Place arrived at Miami International Airport on August 8, 1980, aboard a nonstop flight from New York City.1 Two DEA agents, alerted to his arrival, approached him in the baggage claim area after observing his behavior while purchasing a ticket.2 The agents requested his airline ticket and identification, which Place provided, and he consented to a search of his two checked suitcases.3 Because his flight was about to depart, the agents decided not to search the luggage at that time.4
Prompted by Place's remark that he recognized them as police, the agents examined the address tags on his luggage and discovered discrepancies.5 Further investigation showed that the addresses did not exist and that the telephone number belonged to a different address.6 The Miami agents relayed this information to DEA authorities in New York.7
At La Guardia Airport, two DEA agents approached Place after he claimed his bags.8 Place refused consent to a search of his luggage.9 The agents informed him they would take the luggage to obtain a search warrant, and Place declined to accompany them.10 The agents transported the bags to Kennedy Airport for a sniff test by a trained narcotics detection dog.11
Approximately 90 minutes after the seizure, the dog alerted positively to one bag.12 Due to the late Friday afternoon timing, the agents held the luggage until Monday, when they obtained a warrant and discovered 1,125 grams of cocaine inside.13 Place was indicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).14 The District Court denied his motion to suppress, he pleaded guilty reserving the right to appeal, and the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction.15
Whether the Fourth Amendment permits law enforcement authorities to temporarily detain personal luggage for the purpose of subjecting it to a sniff test by a trained narcotics detection dog on the basis of reasonable suspicion?16
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures of effects, but under the principles established in Terry v. Ohio and extended to personal property, a brief detention of luggage is permissible when supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion that it contains contraband, provided the scope and duration remain narrowly tailored to the investigation.17
Yes. The agents observed Place's suspicious behavior at Miami International Airport, including discrepancies in address tags and a false telephone number, which provided specific and articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion that he was transporting narcotics.18 They relayed this information to New York agents who approached Place at La Guardia Airport after he claimed his bags.19 The agents then seized the luggage only after Place refused consent to search.20
They transported it a short distance for the dog sniff.21 The Court has determined that a canine sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics without exposing other contents.22 The Fourth Amendment therefore permits such a limited detention of luggage when reasonable suspicion exists and the procedure is conducted promptly without exceeding the bounds of an investigative stop.23
The Fourth Amendment therefore permits such a limited detention of luggage when reasonable suspicion exists and the procedure is conducted promptly without exceeding the bounds of an investigative stop.
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan concurred only in the judgment because the prolonged detention already violated the Fourth Amendment.24 He maintained that seizures of property must be based on probable cause under established precedent rather than reasonable suspicion.25 Brennan emphasized that the Court should not have reached the constitutionality of the dog sniff or expanded Terry to independent property seizures.26
In his view, as soon as the officers seized respondent's luggage independent of the person, they exceeded the scope of a permissible Terry stop.27 Such seizures require probable cause and cannot be justified by the Terry balancing test.28 Brennan would have affirmed the Court of Appeals on the narrow ground that the prolonged seizure violated the Fourth Amendment without addressing broader questions.29
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment but expressed concern that the opinion risked converting Terry into a general reasonableness standard for all seizures.30 He noted that the 90-minute detention exceeded any permissible Terry scope and went well beyond a minimal intrusion.31 Blackmun stated that the Court should not have addressed the dog-sniff question because it was neither presented below nor necessary to the disposition.32
He cautioned against deciding the issue without the benefit of party briefing or consideration of alternative analyses.33 One alternative would treat a minimally intrusive sniff as permissible under Terry upon mere reasonable suspicion.34 Blackmun agreed that the seizure was too intrusive regardless of the validity of the dog sniff.35
Whether the approximately 90-minute detention of respondent's luggage before the dog sniff was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment?36
Even when reasonable suspicion justifies an initial seizure of luggage, the detention must be brief; its reasonableness depends on the length of the intrusion, whether officers diligently pursued the investigation, and the extent to which the seizure disrupts the traveler's possessory and liberty interests.37
No. Although the agents possessed reasonable suspicion when they seized Place's luggage at La Guardia Airport, they transported the bags to Kennedy Airport and waited approximately 90 minutes before conducting the dog sniff.38 The New York agents had advance notice of Place's arrival and ample opportunity to arrange for a dog at La Guardia.39 Yet the delay extended well beyond the momentary stops approved in Terry and its progeny.40 This prolonged dispossession, combined with the failure to inform Place of the exact location or duration of the detention, rendered the seizure unreasonable in the absence of probable cause.41
The 90-minute detention therefore exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry-type investigative stop and violated the Fourth Amendment.42
The 90-minute detention therefore exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry-type investigative stop and violated the Fourth Amendment.
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan agreed that the prolonged seizure of the luggage went far beyond any permissible investigative stop and amounted to a Fourth Amendment violation.43 He emphasized that the Court of Appeals had correctly resolved the case on this narrow ground without needing to decide broader questions about Terry's application to property.44 Brennan would have affirmed the Court of Appeals judgment on this ground alone.45
He declined to join the broader discussion of whether Terry principles authorize seizures of luggage on reasonable suspicion.46 In his view, the Court should not have reached the constitutionality of the dog sniff or expanded Terry to independent property seizures.47 Such seizures require probable cause under established precedent.48
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun stressed that the detention of Place's luggage was functionally identical to a seizure of his person and far exceeded the minimal intrusion contemplated by Terry.49 He viewed the length and circumstances of the seizure as independently sufficient to invalidate the government conduct.50 Blackmun agreed that the seizure went well beyond a minimal intrusion and therefore cannot fall within the Terry exception.51
He noted that the 90-minute detention exceeded any permissible Terry scope.52 Blackmun concurred only in the judgment because the prolonged detention already violated the Fourth Amendment on duration grounds.53
Whether exposure of luggage to a trained narcotics detection dog constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment?54
A Fourth Amendment search occurs only when government action infringes a legitimate expectation of privacy; a canine sniff that reveals solely the presence or absence of contraband, without opening the luggage or exposing noncontraband items, does not constitute a search.55
No. The agents exposed Place's luggage, already in a public place, to a trained narcotics detection dog that alerted only to the presence of narcotics.56 The procedure required no opening of the bags and disclosed no information about noncontraband contents, distinguishing it from a typical rummaging search.57 Because the sniff was limited both in the manner of obtaining information and in the content revealed, it did not intrude upon any legitimate privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment.58 Exposure of luggage to a trained narcotics detection dog therefore does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.59
Exposure of luggage to a trained narcotics detection dog therefore does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan declined to join the discussion of the dog-sniff issue.60 He noted that it had not been contested in the District Court.61 The Court of Appeals did not reach or discuss the issue.62
It was not briefed or argued in this Court.63 Brennan observed that the question is more complex than the majority suggested.64 He would have left it for a future case with fuller briefing.65
Brennan agreed with Justice Blackmun that the issue is more complex than the Court's discussion would lead one to believe.66 He expressed the view that dog sniffs of people constitute searches and suggested that sniffs of inanimate objects might present a different case.67
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun likewise viewed the dog-sniff discussion as unnecessary because the seizure was already unreasonable on duration grounds.68 He cautioned against deciding the issue without the benefit of party briefing or consideration of alternative analyses. One alternative would treat a minimally intrusive sniff as permissible under Terry upon mere reasonable suspicion.
Blackmun noted that neither party had an opportunity to brief the issue.69 He agreed that the Court should not address the issue because it was not presented to or decided by the Court of Appeals.70 Blackmun stated that the Court is in no position to consider all the ramifications of this important issue without full airing in a proper case.71