Also known as: Article III courts · Art. III court · Article 3 court
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A federal court vested with the judicial power of the United States under Article III of the Constitution. Its judges hold office during good behavior and receive compensation that may not be diminished while in office. Such courts exercise jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties, as well as cases in which the United States is a party and certain disputes between states or citizens of different states.
Aurora Biotech filed for Chapter 11 and sued Aether Technologies in bankruptcy court for breach of a prepetition supply contract governed by state law. The bankruptcy judge attempted to enter final judgment on the claim. Aether Technologies objected that the dispute was a traditional state-law contract action between private parties that could not be assigned wholesale to a non-Article III tribunal.
The Special Division of the D.C. Circuit, composed of Article III judges, appointed an independent counsel to investigate executive branch officials. The appointee challenged the appointment as invalid because the Division was acting under a special statute. The court upheld the appointment because the Division remained an Article III court exercising authority permitted by the Appointments Clause.
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View caseAtlas Ventures objected to personal jurisdiction over nonresident class members in a Kansas state court proceeding that would bind them to a judgment. The objector argued that only an Article III court could properly assess standing for absent parties. The Supreme Court confirmed that federal standing rules apply when the judgment is later invoked in federal court.
Phillips Petroleum Company, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Oklahoma, produced or purchased natural gas from leased land in 11 states during the 1970s. It sold most of the gas in interstate commerce at prices regulated by the Federal Power Commission, later the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Beginning in the mid-1970s Phillips proposed price increases. It collected higher amounts subject to refund with interest if disapproved. Phillips suspended royalty payments to lessors until final Commission approval. It paid the suspended royalties of $3.7 million in 1976, $4.7 million in 1977, and $2.9 million in 1978 without interest after the increases were approved. In 1979 the Commission began investigating overcharges. In 1983 it issued an opinion ordering refunds. Royalty owners Irl Shutts, a Kansas resident, and Robert and Betty Anderson, Oklahoma residents owning leases in Oklahoma and Texas, filed suit in Kansas state court seeking interest on the suspended royalties. They sought to represent a class of 33,000 royalty owners later reduced to 28,100 members after 3,400 opted out and 1,500 could not be notified. Fewer than 1,000 class members resided in Kansas and only about one-quarter of one percent of the leases were located there. The Kansas trial court certified the class under a state statute modeled on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on an opt-out basis. It sent first-class mail notice describing the action and the right to opt out. The court applied Kansas law to award interest at Commission rates followed by the Kansas post-judgment rate of 15 percent. After the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1984.
View caseAdam Anderson obtained a jury verdict in federal district court on a state-law claim. The court of appeals applied a state standard to reduce the award. Anderson argued that the reduction violated the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial in an Article III court. The Supreme Court held that the federal court must apply federal standards consistent with Article III constraints.
William Gasperini, a journalist and photographer who had taken over 5,000 slide transparencies while reporting in Central America, agreed in 1990 to supply 300 of his original color transparencies to The Center for Humanities, Inc., for use in an educational videotape titled Conflict in Central America. After the project concluded, the Center could not locate or return the transparencies, prompting Gasperini to pursue legal remedies for their loss. Gasperini, a California citizen, sued the Center, a New York corporation with its principal place of business in New York, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. He invoked diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and alleged state-law claims for breach of contract, conversion, and negligence. The Center conceded liability, so the case proceeded to trial solely on damages. At the three-day jury trial, Gasperini's expert testified that the industry standard valued each lost transparency at $1,500 as the average license fee over the photographer's copyright term. Gasperini testified that his photography earnings from 1984 through 1993 totaled just over $10,000 and that he planned to publish a book of his best Central American photographs. The jury returned a verdict of $450,000, or $1,500 for each of the 300 slides. The Center moved for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, invoking both the federal standard and New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5501(c). The District Court denied the motion without comment. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the judgment after applying the New York deviates-materially standard itself. The Second Circuit surveyed Appellate Division decisions on similar awards and concluded that the verdict materially deviated from reasonable compensation because many slides were generic and Gasperini had limited earnings. It ordered a new trial unless Gasperini accepted a reduction to $100,000. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict over the proper standard.
View caseAngela Acosta and other taxpayers sued in federal district court to enjoin a transfer of federal property to a religious college. The government moved to dismiss for lack of standing. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked the injury required for standing in an Article III court.
In 1942 the Department of the Army acquired approximately 181 acres northwest of Philadelphia and constructed the Valley Forge General Hospital on the site. The hospital provided medical care to members of the Armed Forces for the next thirty years. In April 1973 the Secretary of Defense proposed closing the installation as part of a plan to reduce the number of military facilities in the United States, after which the General Services Administration declared the property surplus. In August 1976 the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare conveyed a 77-acre tract of the former hospital grounds to petitioner Valley Forge Christian College. The appraised value of the tract at the time of transfer was $577,500, but the Secretary applied a 100 percent public benefit allowance that allowed the college to take title without any cash payment. The deed conveyed the land in fee simple subject to conditions subsequent that required the college to use the property for thirty years solely for the educational purposes described in its application. Valley Forge Christian College is a nonprofit educational institution operating under the supervision of the Assemblies of God. Its stated purpose is to offer systematic collegiate training to men and women for Christian service as ministers or laymen, and its degree programs are designed to train leaders for church-related ministries. Faculty members must have been baptized in the Holy Spirit and be living consistent Christian lives, and all members of the college administration must be affiliated with the Assemblies of God. In September 1976 respondents Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., a nonprofit organization with approximately 90,000 taxpayer members, and four of its employees learned of the conveyance through a news release. Two months later they filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, later transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking a declaration that the conveyance was null and void and an order requiring the college to return the property to the United States. The District Court granted summary judgment and dismissed the complaint, finding that respondents lacked standing as taxpayers and had failed to allege any actual or concrete injury beyond a generalized grievance common to all taxpayers. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed by a divided vote. It held that respondents possessed standing as citizens claiming injury in fact to their shared individuated right to a government that shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1981.
View caseAstra Aerospace asserted a state-law counterclaim in bankruptcy court against a creditor. The bankruptcy judge entered final judgment on the counterclaim. The creditor objected that the claim was a private right that required adjudication by an Article III court. The Supreme Court agreed that the bankruptcy court lacked constitutional authority to enter final judgment.
Vickie Lynn Marshall married J. Howard Marshall II, Pierce Marshall’s father, approximately one year before J. Howard’s death. Shortly before J. Howard died, Vickie filed suit against Pierce in Texas state probate court asserting that Pierce had tortiously interfered with a gift J. Howard intended to provide her through a trust. After J. Howard’s death, Vickie filed a petition for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California. Pierce filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding asserting a defamation claim against Vickie’s estate arising from statements made to the press by Vickie’s lawyers accusing him of fraud in controlling his father’s assets. Vickie responded by filing a counterclaim for tortious interference with the expected gift from J. Howard. On November 5, 1999, the Bankruptcy Court granted Vickie summary judgment on Pierce’s defamation claim. After a bench trial, on September 27, 2000, the Bankruptcy Court entered judgment for Vickie on her counterclaim and later awarded her over $400 million in compensatory damages and $25 million in punitive damages. The District Court concluded that Vickie’s counterclaim was not a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §157(b)(2)(C) and therefore treated the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment as proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The District Court conducted an independent review of the record. It declined to give preclusive effect to a Texas state court judgment that had been entered in Pierce’s favor. The District Court awarded Vickie compensatory and punitive damages, each in the amount of $44,292,767.33. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that the Bankruptcy Court lacked authority to enter final judgment on Vickie’s counterclaim because the counterclaim was not so closely related to Pierce’s proof of claim that its resolution was necessary to resolve the allowance or disallowance of that claim. This holding made the Texas probate court judgment the earliest final judgment, which the Court of Appeals held the District Court should have afforded preclusive effect. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseJudges of an Article III court must hold office during good behavior and receive compensation that may not be diminished while they remain in office. These protections ensure judicial independence from the political branches. Bodies whose members serve fixed terms without salary protection cannot exercise the judicial power of the United States.
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Congress may not assign such claims wholesale to Article I courts. A prepetition state-law contract dispute remains a traditional Article III case even when it affects a bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court may submit proposed findings subject to de novo review by an Article III district judge but cannot enter final judgment.
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Congress may create Article I tribunals to administer federal regulatory schemes and adjudicate public rights arising within those schemes. Such tribunals may combine rulemaking and adjudication when their work is tied to implementation of congressionally created rights. They may not, however, resolve traditional private-rights disputes historically decided by Article III courts.
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