577 U.S. 190 (2016)
In 1963, Henry Montgomery, who was then seventeen years old, killed Charles Hurt, a deputy sheriff in East Baton Rouge, Louisiana.1 He was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, but the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground that public prejudice had prevented a fair trial.2
Upon retrial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty without capital punishment.3 Under Louisiana law, this verdict required the trial court to impose a sentence of life without parole automatically.4 Montgomery had no opportunity to present mitigation evidence concerning his youth or prospects for rehabilitation.5 Montgomery has now spent nearly fifty years in prison since his initial custody.6
In 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, which held that mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders violates the Eighth Amendment.7 Thereafter, Montgomery filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence in the East Baton Rouge Parish District Court, arguing that Miller rendered his sentence invalid.8 The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Miller does not apply retroactively on collateral review.9
Montgomery sought review by filing an application for a supervisory writ.10 The Louisiana Supreme Court denied the application, relying on its earlier decision in State v. Tate that Miller does not have retroactive effect in cases on state collateral review.11
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Montgomery's case.12 The petition presented the question whether Miller adopts a new substantive rule that applies retroactively on collateral review to people condemned as juveniles to die in prison.13 The Court also directed the parties to address whether it has jurisdiction to decide whether the Supreme Court of Louisiana correctly refused to give retroactive effect in this case to the decision in Miller.14
Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the Louisiana Supreme Court correctly refused to give retroactive effect to Miller v. Alabama?15
When a new substantive rule of constitutional law controls the outcome of a case, the Constitution requires state collateral review courts to give retroactive effect to that rule under the Supremacy Clause.16 A state court's refusal to apply the rule is therefore reviewable by the Supreme Court as a federal question.
Yes. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction because Montgomery's motion to correct an illegal sentence in the East Baton Rouge Parish District Court and the Louisiana Supreme Court's denial based on State v. Tate directly implicate whether the Constitution mandates retroactive application of Miller's substantive rule to final convictions.17 The established facts show that Montgomery, convicted in 1963 at age seventeen and sentenced to mandatory life without parole, sought relief after Miller.18 The state court's refusal to recognize retroactivity presents a federal constitutional claim that the Supremacy Clause requires federal review to resolve.19
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the retroactivity question.20
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Thomas And Alito, Jj.
Justice Scalia dissented on jurisdiction. He argued that Teague's retroactivity framework was an interpretation of the federal habeas statute rather than a constitutional command.21 Louisiana's adoption of that framework as state law meant the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision involved only state-law grounds beyond the Court's power to review under 28 U.S.C. §1257.22
He contended that the Supremacy Clause does not compel state postconviction courts to apply new substantive rules retroactively because no constitutional provision imposes such an obligation.23
Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's dissent and wrote separately to emphasize that the Court's jurisdictional holding lacks foundation in the Constitution's text or historical traditions.24 He argued that Article III, the Due Process Clauses, and the Equal Protection Clause do not establish a right to retroactive application of new substantive rules on collateral review.25 Postconviction remedies have historically been matters of legislative grace rather than constitutional command.
The Suspension Clause provides the only textual reference to habeas without mandating the scope claimed by the majority. State courts therefore have no constitutional duty to supply remedies for sentences that were lawful when imposed.
Whether Miller v. Alabama announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law that must be given retroactive effect in cases on state collateral review?26
A new rule is substantive if it forbids criminal punishment of specific primary conduct or prohibits a specific category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.27 Such substantive rules must be given retroactive effect because they place certain punishments beyond the state's power to impose, rendering affected sentences void.28
Yes. Miller announced a substantive rule because it held that mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders violates the Eighth Amendment by rendering the sentence disproportionate for all but the rare juvenile whose crime reflects irreparable corruption. This thereby prohibits that punishment for the class of juveniles whose crimes reflect transient immaturity. Applying the rule to the established facts, Montgomery was seventeen at the time of the 1963 offense.29
He received an automatic life-without-parole sentence after a verdict of guilty without capital punishment that afforded no opportunity to present mitigation evidence of his youth or rehabilitation prospects.30 Montgomery has served nearly fifty years in prison.31 Miller's substantive holding therefore controls the outcome and requires retroactive application on state collateral review to avoid leaving in place a punishment the Constitution now forbids.32
Miller announced a new substantive rule that must be given retroactive effect in cases on state collateral review.33
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Thomas And Alito, Jj.
Justice Scalia dissented on the merits. He argued that Miller explicitly stated it did not categorically bar life without parole for a class of offenders but instead mandated only a certain sentencing process. The majority improperly rewrote Miller to create a substantive rule about incorrigibility that Miller itself disclaimed.
Miller's language about disproportionate punishment for most juveniles expressed a preference for procedure rather than a categorical prohibition.34 Extending parole eligibility as a remedy would effectively eliminate life without parole for juveniles in a manner Miller refused to endorse.35
Justice Thomas joined the dissent and added that the majority's treatment of Miller as substantive compounds the jurisdictional error by imposing a constitutional remedy obligation unsupported by history or text.36 Even if Miller created new rights, the Constitution does not require state collateral courts to supply remedies for sentences lawful when imposed.37 The majority's approach transforms an equitable habeas rule into an immutable constitutional command with no logical stopping point.38