454 U.S. 464 (1982)
In 1942 the Department of the Army acquired approximately 181 acres northwest of Philadelphia and constructed the Valley Forge General Hospital on the site.1
The hospital provided medical care to members of the Armed Forces for the next thirty years.2 In April 1973 the Secretary of Defense proposed closing the installation as part of a plan to reduce the number of military facilities in the United States, after which the General Services Administration declared the property surplus.3
In August 1976 the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare conveyed a 77-acre tract of the former hospital grounds to petitioner Valley Forge Christian College.4 The appraised value of the tract at the time of transfer was $577,500, but the Secretary applied a 100 percent public benefit allowance that allowed the college to take title without any cash payment.5 The deed conveyed the land in fee simple subject to conditions subsequent that required the college to use the property for thirty years solely for the educational purposes described in its application.6
Valley Forge Christian College is a nonprofit educational institution operating under the supervision of the Assemblies of God.7 Its stated purpose is to offer systematic collegiate training to men and women for Christian service as ministers or laymen, and its degree programs are designed to train leaders for church-related ministries.8 Faculty members must have been baptized in the Holy Spirit and be living consistent Christian lives, and all members of the college administration must be affiliated with the Assemblies of God.9
In September 1976 respondents Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., a nonprofit organization with approximately 90,000 taxpayer members, and four of its employees learned of the conveyance through a news release.10 Two months later they filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, later transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking a declaration that the conveyance was null and void and an order requiring the college to return the property to the United States.11
The District Court granted summary judgment and dismissed the complaint, finding that respondents lacked standing as taxpayers and had failed to allege any actual or concrete injury beyond a generalized grievance common to all taxpayers.12 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed by a divided vote.13 It held that respondents possessed standing as citizens claiming injury in fact to their shared individuated right to a government that shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion.14 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1981.15
Whether respondents have standing as federal taxpayers to challenge a conveyance of surplus federal property authorized under the Property Clause as violating the Establishment Clause?16
To establish standing as a federal taxpayer under the exception recognized in Flast v. Cohen, a plaintiff must satisfy a two-part nexus test. The test requires first that the challenge be directed to an exercise of congressional power under the Taxing and Spending Clause of Article I Section 8. Second, the enactment must exceed specific constitutional limitations on that power such as the Establishment Clause.17
No. The conveyance at issue was authorized by the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949.1819
That statute was enacted pursuant to Congress's power under the Property Clause of Article IV Section 3 Clause 2 rather than the Taxing and Spending Clause.20 Respondents challenge the executive decision by the Department of Health Education and Welfare to transfer the 77-acre tract to Valley Forge Christian College without payment. They do not challenge a congressional appropriation under Article I Section 8.21
Because the source of the complaint is not congressional action under the taxing and spending power, respondents fail the first prong of the Flast test and therefore lack standing as taxpayers.22
Respondents lack standing as federal taxpayers.23
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Marshall And Blackmun
Justice Brennan dissented arguing that the distinction between the Property Clause and the Spending Clause is meaningless in the context of an Establishment Clause claim.24 He explained that the breach of the Establishment Clause and the relationship of the taxpayer to that breach is precisely the same whether the government donates funds or property.25 Both involve the use of taxpayer resources to support religion.26
Brennan emphasized that the Framers intended the Establishment Clause to prevent the use of tax moneys for religious purposes. The taxpayer is the direct and intended beneficiary of that prohibition.27 He concluded that the Court had disregarded its constitutional responsibility by using standing doctrine to bar review of a meritorious Establishment Clause claim.28
Justice Stevens dissented arguing that Flast attaches special importance to the Establishment Clause and does not permit drawing a tenuous distinction between the Spending Clause and the Property Clause.29 He explained that the essential holding of Flast recognizes the decisive importance of an Establishment Clause claim in resolving standing. The Judiciary therefore has a greater role in enforcing that clause than in enforcing other constitutional norms such as the Accounts Clause or the Incompatibility Clause.30
Stevens concluded that the majority trivialized the standing doctrine by resting its decision on a formalistic distinction between spending power and property power.31
Whether respondents have standing as citizens asserting injury to a shared individuated right to governmental observance of the Establishment Clause?32
Article III standing requires that a litigant allege a distinct and palpable injury in fact that is personal to the plaintiff and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Generalized grievances shared by all citizens about the conduct of government are insufficient to confer standing even when framed in constitutional terms.33
No. Respondents allege only that they have been deprived of the fair and constitutional use of their tax dollars.34
They assert injury to their shared right to a government that does not establish religion.35 This claim amounts to nothing more than a generalized grievance common to all taxpayers and citizens. There is no personal or concrete injury beyond the psychological consequence of disagreeing with government conduct.36
The Court of Appeals recognition of citizen standing based on an individuated right under the Establishment Clause is inconsistent with precedents rejecting such abstract claims of injury.37
Respondents lack standing as citizens.38
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Marshall And Blackmun
Justice Brennan dissented arguing that the Court disregards its constitutional responsibility when it uses standing to slam the courthouse door against plaintiffs entitled to full consideration of their Establishment Clause claims on the merits.39 He explained that the case and controversy limitation of Article III overrides no other provision of the Constitution. The Framers intended the particular beneficiaries of constitutional protections to enjoy rights legally enforceable in courts of law.40
Brennan concluded that the majority opinion obfuscated the nature of the underlying rights at stake and improperly resolved a substantive Establishment Clause question under the guise of a standing determination.41
Justice Stevens dissented. He argued that the Court's decision trivializes the standing doctrine by holding that plaintiffs' standing depends on whether the transfer was an exercise of the power to spend money or the power to dispose of tangible property.42 He explained that one cannot read Flast without forming the firm conclusion that the plaintiffs' invocation of the Establishment Clause was of decisive importance in resolving the standing issue.43
Stevens concluded that the essential holding of Flast attaches special importance to the Establishment Clause and does not permit the drawing of a tenuous distinction between the Spending Clause and the Property Clause.44