Also known as: arsons · arsonable · arsonous
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
A criminal offense consisting of the malicious burning of the dwelling of another. The required burning occurs when fire damages the fibers of combustible material in a structure regularly used for sleeping by someone other than the defendant. Malice exists when the defendant intends the structure to burn, knows it will burn, or consciously disregards an obvious and substantial risk that it will burn.
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Alexis Archer piled newspapers against the shared wall of her neighbor's apartment and lit them at night. The resulting fire charred the fibers of the wooden door to the neighbor's unit. The damage met the burning requirement even though the frame showed only minimal blackening.
Andre Antoine set fire to a rival's warehouse during a robbery attempt. A security guard died from smoke inhalation. The recklessness and extreme indifference required for murder are presumed because the homicide occurred during the arson.
Alan Ackerman doubled the insurance on his own vacant commercial building and then started a fire inside it. He acted with the purpose of collecting the proceeds after the structure sustained damage. The affirmative defense failed because the blaze recklessly endangered an adjacent occupied apartment.
Amber Alonzo set fire to her own single-family home that she occupied full time. Federal prosecutors charged her under the interstate commerce arson statute. The charge failed because an owner-occupied private residence not used for commercial purposes lies outside the statute's reach.
Anika Anand faced an enhanced sentence after a jury convicted her of arson. The judge found at sentencing that the fire had been set at night while occupants were present. The enhancement violated the requirement that any fact increasing the maximum penalty must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Aisha Ahmed received a life sentence without parole for a first-offense arson that caused extensive property damage but no deaths. The sentence was compared to penalties for other serious crimes in the jurisdiction and to sentences imposed on other defendants. The court found the punishment grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.
The prosecution must establish malice, a burning, that the structure is a dwelling, and that the dwelling belongs to another. A burning occurs only when fire damages the fibers of combustible material. A dwelling is a structure people regularly use for sleeping. Ownership is irrelevant so long as someone other than the defendant uses the structure as a home.
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…comparable in terms of the possible sentence imposed to serious felonies such as aggravated battery, § 16-5-24, first-degree arson, § 16-7-60, and robbery, § 16-8-40.[^maj-1] In this case, however, respondent has not been tried, much less convicted and sentenced.[^maj-2] Moreover, respondent has not raised the Eighth…
…See, e. g. , Minn. Stat. § 609.713(1) (1987) (providing for up to five years in prison for terroristic threats); § 609.563 (arson) (providing for up to five years and a $10,000 fine, depending on the value of the property intended to be damaged); § 609.595 (Supp. 1992) (criminal damage to property) (providing for up…
…a statute that was also similar to the statutes at issue in Jones and Castillo . The statute, in a single paragraph, outlawed arson of a dwelling house at night. Arson
…1980), and was authorized to impose a life sentence for treason, § 22-8-1, first-degree manslaughter, § 22-16-15, first-degree arson, § 22-33-1, and kidnaping, S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-19-1 (1967 ed., Supp. 1978) (amended 1979). No other crime was punishable so severely on the first offense. Attempted murder, S. D.…
…or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce." This case presents the question whether arson of an owner-occupied private residence falls within § 844(i)'s compass. Construing the statute's text, we hold that an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not…
No. Mere blackening by smoke or superficial discoloration from heat does not constitute a burning. The fire must actually damage the fibers of the wood or other combustible material. Charring of a door satisfies the element even if the overall damage remains limited.
Supporting sources
Model Penal Code arson requires that the defendant start a fire or cause an explosion with the purpose of destroying a building or occupied structure of another or damaging property to collect insurance. The common-law offense focuses on malice and the burning of another's dwelling rather than a specific purpose to destroy or defraud.
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Yes. Legal title does not control. The offense protects habitation interests. A defendant commits arson by burning a structure that another person occupies or uses as a home even if the defendant holds title to the property.
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Malice exists if the defendant intends the structure to burn, knows that it will burn, or consciously disregards an obvious and substantial risk that it will burn. Hatred, ill will, or a specific intent to burn the dwelling is not required. Negligence alone does not suffice.
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