after-discovered evidence

Petitioner John Giglio was convicted of passing forged money orders and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. While his appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, defense counsel discovered new evidence. This evidence indicated that the Government had failed to disclose an alleged promise made to its key witness that he would not be prosecuted if he testified for the Government. In June 1966, officials at the Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. discovered that Robert Taliento, a teller at the bank, had cashed several forged money orders. Upon questioning by FBI agents, Taliento confessed to supplying Giglio with one of the bank’s customer signature cards used to forge $2,300 in money orders, which Taliento then processed through the regular channels of the bank. Taliento related this story to the grand jury, resulting in Giglio's indictment, after which Taliento was named as a coconspirator but not indicted. At trial, which commenced two years after indictment, Taliento testified identifying Giglio as the instigator of the scheme. Defense counsel cross-examined Taliento about possible agreements for prosecutorial leniency, and Taliento stated that nobody told him he would not be prosecuted and that he believed he still could be prosecuted. In summation, the Government attorney stated that Taliento received no promises that he would not be indicted. The issue arose on Giglio's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. An affidavit from Assistant United States Attorney DiPaola confirmed that he had promised Taliento that if he testified before the grand jury and at trial he would not be prosecuted. Assistant Golden, who handled the trial, filed an affidavit stating that DiPaola had assured him before trial that no promises of immunity had been made to Taliento. The United States Attorney Hoey filed an affidavit stating that he had personally consulted with Taliento and his attorney shortly before trial. He emphasized that Taliento would definitely be prosecuted if he did not testify. If he did testify he would be obliged to rely on the good judgment and conscience of the Government as to whether he would be prosecuted. The District Court did not resolve the apparent conflict between the two assistants. It proceeded on the theory that even if a promise had been made, it was not authorized and its disclosure would not have affected the verdict.

Brady and his companion Boblit were found guilty of murder in the first degree and were sentenced to death following separate trials in Maryland, with Brady tried first. At his trial Brady took the stand and admitted his participation in the crime but claimed that Boblit did the actual killing. Prior to the trial Brady's counsel requested the prosecution to allow him to examine Boblit's extrajudicial statements. Several of those statements were shown to him. One statement dated July 9, 1958, in which Boblit admitted the actual homicide, was withheld by the prosecution and did not come to Brady's notice until after he had been tried, convicted, and sentenced and after his conviction had been affirmed. Brady moved the trial court for a new trial based on the newly discovered evidence that had been suppressed by the prosecution. His appeal from a denial of that motion was dismissed by the Court of Appeals without prejudice to relief under the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act. The petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed by the trial court. On appeal the Court of Appeals held that suppression of the evidence by the prosecution denied petitioner due process of law and remanded the case for a retrial of the question of punishment, not the question of guilt. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case. The crime was murder committed in the perpetration of a robbery. In Maryland punishment for that crime is life imprisonment or death, the jury being empowered to restrict the punishment to life by addition of the words "without capital punishment." By reason of the state constitution the jury in a criminal case are the judges of law as well as of fact.

In October 1977 respondent Hughes Anderson Bagley was indicted in the Western District of Washington on fifteen counts of violating federal narcotics and firearms statutes. On November 18, 1977, twenty-four days before trial, Bagley filed a discovery motion requesting the names and addresses of government witnesses, their prior criminal records, and any deals, promises or inducements made to witnesses in exchange for their testimony. The government's response identified James F. O'Connor and Donald E. Mitchell as its two principal witnesses and stated that each had been paid $250 for information and expenses. It produced forms signed by both men entitled "Contract for Purchase of Information and Payment of Cash Reward" showing the $250 payments. O'Connor and Mitchell were state law-enforcement officers employed by the Milwaukee Railroad as private security guards. Between April and June 1977 they assisted the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in an undercover investigation of Bagley. At the December 1977 bench trial O'Connor and Mitchell testified that they had observed Bagley selling a handgun to a third person and test-firing several weapons. The district court found Bagley guilty on the narcotics charges, acquitted him on the firearms charges, and sentenced him to a total of twenty years' imprisonment, all but two years of which were suspended. In mid-1980 Bagley filed requests under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act and received copies of additional ATF contracts that O'Connor and Mitchell had signed on May 3, 1977. Each contract was entitled "Contract for Purchase of Information and Payment of Lump Sum Therefor." The printed portion stated that the vendor would provide information to ATF and that upon accomplishment of the objective the United States would pay a sum commensurate with services and information rendered. The typewritten description stated that each man would provide information regarding violations committed by Bagley, purchase evidence for ATF, work undercover, assist in gathering evidence, and testify against the violator in federal court. The contracts also provided for monthly payments of $300 up to a maximum of $3,000 and a $2,500 reward for information leading to arrest and conviction. On the basis of the newly obtained contracts Bagley moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence, alleging that the government's failure to disclose the contracts violated his right to due process. After an evidentiary hearing before a magistrate, the district court denied the motion, finding beyond a reasonable doubt that disclosure of the agreements would have had no effect on its finding of guilt. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.